Aumann, R. J., & Kurz, M. (1977). Power and Taxes. Econometrica, 45, 1137-1161. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914063
has been cited by the following article:
TITLE: Shapley Value and Income Taxation
AUTHORS: Robert A. Agnew
KEYWORDS: Income Taxation, Cooperative Game Theory, Shapley Value
JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.12 No.4, August 16, 2022
ABSTRACT: Income taxation is modeled as a spatial voting game where Shapley value leads to a simple linear tax function on gross income with a single marginal tax rate and a universal basic income subsidy. Shapley net income is not generally in the game core; therefore, it is inherently unstable and subject to relentless pressure from higher gross income individuals to reduce their taxes and increase their net incomes.