TITLE:
Wage Bargaining and Welfare Benefits in the Time of Covid-19. Bipartite Sectoral Funds and Labor Market Equilibrium
AUTHORS:
Giuseppe Croce, Riccardo Tilli
KEYWORDS:
Bipartite Sectoral Funds, Tax-Benefit Policy, Labor Taxation, Social Contributions
JOURNAL NAME:
Modern Economy,
Vol.13 No.6,
June
9,
2022
ABSTRACT: We provide a theoretical model of the employment effects of
a tax-benefit policy implemented by Bipartite Sectoral Funds (BSFs), ruled by
workers’ unions and employers’ organizations, based on a wage bargaining that includes the basic
elements of a tax-benefit policy and allows for the equivalence of
contributions and benefits. We show that employers and workers share the provision costs of the benefits and the institutional profile
of the BSFs affects the degree of the equivalence of contributions and
benefits. This may actually occur if 1) the exchange between wage and benefits is feasible in the context of
current industrial relations; 2) the workers attach a sufficiently high value to the benefits; 3) BSFs are autonomous from
Government interference.