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Franke, J., Kanzow, C., Leininger, W., & Schwartz, A. (2013). Effort Maximization in Asymmetric Contest Games with Heterogeneous Contestants. Economic Theory, 52, 589-630.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0657-z

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: On Optimal Favoritism in Asymmetric Competitions

  AUTHORS: David Lu

  KEYWORDS: Affirmative Action, All-Pay Auction, Asymmetric Contest, Favoritism

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.11 No.1, February 10, 2021

  ABSTRACT: Favoritism towards a relatively weaker competitor is widely adopted as an effective instrument to enhance productive effort provision in asymmetric competitions. In this paper, we investigate the effort-maximizing favoritism rule in asymmetric two-player contests with all-pay auction technology, while accommodating fully flexible (nonlinear) favoritism rules. We assume that the players’ competencies (measured by their values of winning the competition, or marginal effort costs) are public information. We find that at the optimum, the weaker player is extremely favored; however his/her winning chance converges to zero. This finding illustrates that the effort-maximizing extreme favoritism rule perversely decreases winner diversity.