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Varian, H. R. (1994). Sequential Contributions to Public Goods. Journal of Public Economics, 53, 165-186.
https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(94)90019-1

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Contribution Mechanisms and Types of Cost Threshold in the Subscription Game with Private Information on Valuation: Public Good Experiments

  AUTHORS: Hui-Chun Peng

  KEYWORDS: Simultaneous Contribution Mechanism, Sequential Contribution Mechanism, Cost Threshold, Laboratory Experiment

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.10 No.6, December 11, 2020

  ABSTRACT: This paper conducts a lab experiment to analyze individual voluntary contribution behaviors in the simultaneous and sequential contribution mechanisms with different types of the cost threshold. The experimental results show that individual contribution behaviors are different when individuals face different types of cost threshold and participate in situations with different contribution mechanisms. When the cost threshold is certain, the contribution in the simultaneous contribution mechanism is significantly higher than the contribution in the sequential contribution mechanism. Furthermore, the contribution with cost certainty is significantly higher than the contribution with cost uncertainty, whether the contribution mechanism is a simultaneous or sequential institution. As for individual characteristic variables, the study finds that the “cooperative” individual contributes more to the public goods than the “individualistic” individual does.