TITLE:
Research on “Subsidy Defraud” of New Energy Vehicles Enterprises Based on Signal Game
AUTHORS:
Xi Tang, Junmin Wu, Bo Feng, Xiaozhuo Wei, Xiangyu Mao, Weiyi Shao
KEYWORDS:
Signal Game, New Energy Vehicles, Enterprise Sales, Government Subsidy
JOURNAL NAME:
Open Journal of Business and Management,
Vol.7 No.4,
September
27,
2019
ABSTRACT: New energy vehicle subsidy is an important way for our government to support
new energy vehicle industry. In recent years, our government has formulated a policy of vigorously
supporting the new energy automobile industry. With the increase of support,
the number of new energy vehicles in China has increased year by year. In view
of the information asymmetry between the government and the enterprise in the
implementation of the new energy vehicle subsidies
policy, this paper studies the problem of the reverse selection of the
enterprise and the government in the subsidy process by using the signal game
model, and analyzes the related influencing factors and the game equilibrium.
The results show that the probability of “subsidy defraud” is greatly improved
due to the asymmetry of information between enterprises and governments. Realize
the optimal separation and equilibrium solution of high sales enterprises
applying for high subsidies and the government giving high subsidies; low sales enterprises apply for low subsidies, and the
government gives the optimal separation equilibrium solution of low subsidies.
It is necessary to increase the camouflage cost of the enterprise’s “subsidy
defraud” and to increase the punishment of the “subsidy defraud”. At the same
time, according to the results of the study, the relevant suggestions and
countermeasures of the government’s preventive “subsidy defraud” behavior are
put forward. The above research is of great theoretical
significance and practical value in promoting the development of new energy
vehicles in the post-subsidy era.