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Von Neumann, J. (1953) A Certain Zero-Sum Two-Person Game Equivalent to the Optimal Assignment Problem. In: Kuhn, H.W. and Tucker, A.W., Eds., Contributions to the Theory of Games, Vol. 2, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 5-12.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400881970-002

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: An Axiomatic Characterization of the Leximin Choice Rule

  AUTHORS: Osamu Mori

  KEYWORDS: The Leximin Choice Rule, The Lorenz Criterion, Suppes-Sen Optimality, The Common Ordinal Invariance Axiom

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.9 No.6, August 30, 2019

  ABSTRACT: This study discusses the characterization of the lexicographic maximin (leximin) choice rule using an axiom related to the Lorenz criterion, which states that a utility vector that Lorentz dominates a solution vector should not be Pareto dominated by any feasible vector, named Pareto Undominatedness of Lorenz-superior Distribution (PULSD). PULSD in itself does not imply that a solution vector of the choice rule is Lorenz undominated by any utility vectors in the feasible set. Therefore, we may say that the PULSD’s requirement for inequality aversion is weak. Indeed, PULSD is consistent with the utilitarian choice rule, which is viewed as indifferent to equity. We show that the leximin choice rule is characterized by PULSD, combined with the Suppes-Sen optimality and the common ordinal invariance axiom.