TITLE:
Analysis of Enterprise’s XBRL Technology Adoption Based on Evolutionary Game Theory
AUTHORS:
Yong Xue, Ding Pan
KEYWORDS:
XBRL Technology, Evolutionary Game, Government Policy, Information
JOURNAL NAME:
Modern Economy,
Vol.9 No.12,
December
4,
2018
ABSTRACT: Starting from the assumption of bounded rationality
in game, this article explores the evolution of XBRL adoption by enterprise to
enterprise, and enterprises to Government from the perspective of evolutionary game. Research
shows that without government guidance, enterprise adopting XBRL technology is
affected by the adoption probability of relevant enterprises or industries. In
the case of government guidance, the initial state of adoption of XBRL
technology by the government and enterprises affects the evolution direction
and speed of the system. System evolution has obvious “path dependence”. After
a long period of repeated game XBRL technology adoption may be “unhealthy cycle”
trend development. The results of the game have been found that influencing
factors which are the probability of government mandatory adoption and the deep-seated
factors that affect the adoption of XBRL technology in enterprises, for the government and
business decision-making provide a reference from evolutionary direction and evolutionary
stabilization strategy.