TITLE:
Different Rationales of Coalition Formation and Incentives for Strategic Voting
AUTHORS:
Eric Linhart, Johannes Raabe
KEYWORDS:
Strategic Voting, Coalitions, Decision Theory, Simulation
JOURNAL NAME:
Applied Mathematics,
Vol.9 No.7,
July
30,
2018
ABSTRACT: Research on strategic voting has mainly focused on electoral system effects but
largely neglected the impact of different rationales of coalition formation. Based
on a formal model of rational party choice and a simulation study, we systematically
investigate this impact and explore the implications. We show that the
logic of the underlying coalition formation procedure clearly affects the degree
to which the electorate is exposed to strategic incentives regarding the vote
choice. The key implications are that sincere voting is more often in the voter’s
best interest if parties are policy-seeking and if there is increased uncertainty
during the stage of coalition formation. Furthermore, we explore how
different types of coalition formation affect strategic incentives across the policy
space.