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Abramson, P.R., Aldrich, J.H., Blais, A., Diamond, M., Diskin, A., Indrieason, I.H., Lee, D.J. and Levine, R. (2009) Comparing Strategic Voting under FPTP and PR. Comparative Political Studies, 43, 61-90.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009341717

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Different Rationales of Coalition Formation and Incentives for Strategic Voting

  AUTHORS: Eric Linhart, Johannes Raabe

  KEYWORDS: Strategic Voting, Coalitions, Decision Theory, Simulation

  JOURNAL NAME: Applied Mathematics, Vol.9 No.7, July 30, 2018

  ABSTRACT: Research on strategic voting has mainly focused on electoral system effects but largely neglected the impact of different rationales of coalition formation. Based on a formal model of rational party choice and a simulation study, we systematically investigate this impact and explore the implications. We show that the logic of the underlying coalition formation procedure clearly affects the degree to which the electorate is exposed to strategic incentives regarding the vote choice. The key implications are that sincere voting is more often in the voter’s best interest if parties are policy-seeking and if there is increased uncertainty during the stage of coalition formation. Furthermore, we explore how different types of coalition formation affect strategic incentives across the policy space.