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has been cited by the following article:
TITLE: Cooler Heads Prevail: An Experimental Study on the “Cooling” Effect of the Strategy Method on Agent Resentment
AUTHORS: Jing L. Davis
KEYWORDS: Strategy Method, Hidden Cost of Controls, Gift-Exchange Game
JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.8 No.5, April 8, 2018
ABSTRACT: This study investigates whether agents’ resentment of controls in a gift-exchange game can be effectively mitigated using the strategy method where agents’ effort choices are elicited contingent on all possible contract choices by principals. The results suggest that allowing agents to contemplate contract choices prospectively results in less resentment and that agents exert higher effort than without this “cooling” process.