TITLE:
A Signaling Explanation for Political Parties and Advertisements
AUTHORS:
Tamura Masaoki
KEYWORDS:
Signaling, Political Economics, Reelection, Political Party, Political Advertise-ments
JOURNAL NAME:
Theoretical Economics Letters,
Vol.8 No.3,
February
9,
2018
ABSTRACT: This study examines the signaling roles of political
parties and political advertising. Although
politicians’ types are unobservable during an election, their party
affiliations and political advertisements are observable to the voters. Through
these two political behaviors, politicians can reveal their hidden types to the
public. We extend Snyder and Ting to a multi-period model with the possibility of reelection and examine the roles and
relationships of political parties and advertisements. We show that
political parties are not sufficient signals to reveal politicians’ types. Political advertisements work as a
complementary signal to political
parties. With political parties and advertisements, voters can elect
their favored candidates adequately. Even if the advertisements are a waste of
money, they contribute to voting for favored candidates.