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has been cited by the following article:
TITLE: Endogenous Timing in Contests with Group-Specific Public-Goods Prizes
AUTHORS: Jong Hwa Lee
KEYWORDS: Group-Specific Public-Goods Prize, Endogenous Timing, Free-Rider Problem
JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.7 No.6, September 29, 2017
ABSTRACT: I analyze the two-group contest with the group-specific public-goods prize when each player decides on the timing of their moves endogenously and individually. Unlike the previous papers, I show that free riders suffer a damage in the endogenous-timing framework because the decision on the endogenous timing adversely affects the behavior of free riders, by making them more egotistical.