Berg, J., Dickhaut, J. and McCabe, K. (1995) Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History. Games and Economic Behavior, 70, 122-142. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1027
has been cited by the following article:
TITLE: A Reexamination of “The Hidden Return to Incentives”
AUTHORS: Jing Davis, Steven Schwartz, Richard Young
KEYWORDS: Incentives, Trust Game, Gift-Exchange Game
JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.7 No.5, August 18, 2017
ABSTRACT: Prior literature has observed a “hidden return to incentives” where principals receive more cooperation from agents when formal incentives are available but not used than when not available. Previous experiments are replicated using a gift-exchange rather than a trust game. Hidden returns to incentives are not observed, and in fact the results show the opposite. Suggestions for future research are provided.