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has been cited by the following article:
TITLE: Decentralized Policy in Resolving Environmental Disputes with Private Information
AUTHORS: Huei-Chin Lin
KEYWORDS: Conflict Resolution, Extensive-Form Game, Implementation, Strategic Information Transmission, Asymmetric Information
JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.1 No.2, August 16, 2011
ABSTRACT: We have design a private-information game to incorporate independent experts’ assistance. With the better information provided by experts, the mistrust of the uninformed party might be dissolved. And we may get an effective and efficient resolution outcome. We will investigate conditions under which the experts’ information may help the economy to get an efficient outcome or an effective resolution result.