TITLE:
Effort Application in an Arranged Marriage: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
AUTHORS:
Amitrajeet A. Batabyal, Seung Jick Yoo
KEYWORDS:
Arranged Marriage, Effort, Net Utility, Static Game, Strategic Complements
JOURNAL NAME:
Theoretical Economics Letters,
Vol.7 No.1,
December
31,
2016
ABSTRACT: In this note we study a simple game model of effort application by two individuals (1
and 2) who wish to have an arranged marriage. We first specify the net utility function
of individual i as a function of this individual’s own effort and the effort applied
by individual j,i ≠ j , in three distinct cases. Next, we compute the ith individual’s
best response function. Finally, we analyze effort application by two identical
pairs of individuals who are located in two different nations. In the first (second) nation,
arranged marriages are uncommon (common) and hence it is relatively difficult
(straightforward) for the two individuals to apply and coordinate effort. We explain
why the net utility of the pair wishing to have an arranged marriage in the first nation
is likely to be much lower than the corresponding net utility of the pair in the
second nation.