Article citationsMore>>

Samet, D. (2013) Common Belief of Rationality in Games of Perfect Information. Games and Economic Behavior, 79, 192-200.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.01.008

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Rationalizing Irrational Beliefs

  AUTHORS: Geoffrey Dunbar, Ruqu Wang, Xiaoting Wang

  KEYWORDS: Centipede Game, Game Theory, Experimental Economics, Behavioral Economics

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.6 No.6, November 21, 2016

  ABSTRACT: In this paper we propose a “behavioral equilibrium” definition for a class of dynamic games of perfect information. We document various experimental studies of the Centipede Game in the literature that demonstrate that players rarely follow the subgame perfect equilibrium strategies. Although some theoretical modifications have been proposed to explain the outcomes of the experiments, we offer another: players can choose whether or not to believe that their opponents use subgame perfect equilibrium strategies. We define a “behavioral equilibrium” for this game; using this equilibrium concept, we can reproduce the outcomes of those experiments.