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Tang, Y.J. and Xie, R.M. (2006) Share Liquidity, Balance Mechanism of Shareholders and Tunneling of Cash Dividend: Evidences from Chinese Listed Companies from 1999 to 2003. China Industrial Economy, No. 2, 120-128.

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: The Largest Shareholder Holdings, Cash Dividends and Supervision of Board —An Empirical Analysis from Chinese Market

  AUTHORS: Ziyao Yang

  KEYWORDS: The Largest Shareholder Holdings, Cash Dividends, Monitoring Directors, Tunneling Theory

  JOURNAL NAME: Open Journal of Business and Management, Vol.4 No.3, July 22, 2016

  ABSTRACT: Based on tunneling theory and principal-agent theory, setting 2008 to 2014 listed companies in China as samples, this paper explores the relationship between largest shareholders’ shareholdings and cash dividends, and meanwhile, identifies the supervisory directors according to their office and education background to analyze the influence of supervision role of board to the relationship between the largest shareholding and cash dividends. The empirical results show that the higher the shareholdings of the largest shareholder, the more cash dividends per share. In addition, the higher the proportion of supervisory directors, the smaller the influence of the largest shareholding on cash dividends, which means supervisory directors can inhibit the tunneling behavior of the largest shareholders to a certain extent, and the board of directors play a role of supervision.