TITLE:
Making an Arranged Marriage Work: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
AUTHORS:
Amitrajeet A. Batabyal
KEYWORDS:
Arranged Marriage, Effort, Nash Equilibrium, Static Game, Strategic Complements
JOURNAL NAME:
Theoretical Economics Letters,
Vol.6 No.3,
June
3,
2016
ABSTRACT: In this note, we analyze a simple game model of effort and time
investment in an arranged marriage where the goal of the two partners making
this investment is to create a better marital relationship. We first specify
the best response functions of the two married partners. Next, we solve for the
Nash equilibrium and then argue that this equilibrium is unique. Finally, we
delineate an interesting connection between the two best response functions in
our model and the corresponding best response functions in the well known
two-player Cournot game.