TITLE:
Lattice Gas Model for Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games: Emergency of Altruism in a Company
AUTHORS:
Hiroki Yokoi, Ayako Morishita, Yasuo Tateoka, Keiichi Tainaka
KEYWORDS:
Long-Lived Companies, Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, Intra-Cellular Interaction, Error Level, Altruism, Happiness of Employees
JOURNAL NAME:
Theoretical Economics Letters,
Vol.6 No.2,
April
28,
2016
ABSTRACT: In Japan, there exist
many sustainable companies. Their distinctive feature is mutualism; they often
take altruistic behaviors. To explain such behaviors, we carry out iterated
prisoner’s dilemma games by lattice gas model. Each lattice point is regarded
as a company which contains m + 1 players
with an identical strategy. Simulations reveal that All Cooperation wins, when m takes a value larger than a threshold.
We obtain a power law depending on error level. This law implies altruism may
prevail in a company which has many employees or high error level.