TITLE:
An Economic Model of Bystanders’ Behaviour
AUTHORS:
Yuriko Isada, Nobuko Igaki, Aiko Shibata
KEYWORDS:
Bullying, Non-Corporative Game, Small Class, Free Rider
JOURNAL NAME:
Journal of Applied Mathematics and Physics,
Vol.4 No.1,
January
11,
2016
ABSTRACT: In this paper, we deal with a
classroom where bullying is occurring and assume that if a number of bystanders
who tattle bullying exceeds a threshold, then bullying is stopped. Bystanders’
behaviour is formulated as a non-cooperative game, with negative externality,
retaliation cost and reporting cost. Our research shows that to stop bullying,
it is useful to raise the cost of negative externality and to reduce the
retaliation cost and or the reporting cost. Additionally, it is shown that
small class is effective in preventing bullying.