TITLE:
A Critique of Selective Abortion in Lesotho
AUTHORS:
Seeiso J. Koali
KEYWORDS:
Abortion, Moral Status, Offence, Person, Severely Mentally Disabled
JOURNAL NAME:
Open Journal of Philosophy,
Vol.5 No.7,
November
6,
2015
ABSTRACT: Under the Penal Code Act of 2010 in Lesotho, abortion is considered as an offense against a person. This article normatively argues that the two clauses in the Penal Code that allow selective abortion to take place in Lesotho commit the fallacy of inconsistency because it treats the fetus which is regarded as a person differently from a born baby. In that Penal Code, it is allowed to terminate the life of a healthy person (fetus) if it poses harm to the life of the mother or to terminate its life if it is severely mentally disabled or physically deformed. As a matter of fact, this law allows the worse treatment of a disabled unborn person than the already born disabled person for whom when killed is regarded as murder. It is concluded that if the fetus and the born baby are regarded as persons, then they are both the bearers of moral status and they should be treated equally with dignity.