TITLE:
Anti-Money Laundering Game between Banking Institutions and Employees in the Progressing CNY Internationalization
AUTHORS:
Dexiang Mei, Li Zhou
KEYWORDS:
CNY Internationalization, Banking Institutions (BIs), Banking Employees (BEs), Anti-Money Laundering (AML), Dynamic Game
JOURNAL NAME:
Modern Economy,
Vol.6 No.4,
April
30,
2015
ABSTRACT: Based on the establishment
of imperfect dynamic game model of multiple node information sets, the paper analyzes
the three equilibrium strategies of banking institutions (BIs) and employees (BEs)
under Chinese government’s different anti-money laundering (AML) efforts: both free
of AML, BIs involved in AML but BEs away from AML, and both engaged in AML. It finds
that Chinese government’s AML effort will impact BIs’ AML choice, and BIs’ AML choice
will affect BEs’ AML choice. Only with the effective cooperation among the government,
BIs, and BEs can we achieve the AML equilibrium strategy of the two gaming parties.