TITLE:
An Enhanced Dragonfly Key Exchange Protocol against Offline Dictionary Attack
AUTHORS:
Eman Alharbi, Noha Alsulami, Omar Batarfi
KEYWORDS:
Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE), Original Dragonfly, Patched Dragonfly, Enhanced Dragonfly, Two-Pre-Shared Password
JOURNAL NAME:
Journal of Information Security,
Vol.6 No.2,
March
12,
2015
ABSTRACT: Dragonfly is Password Authenticated Key Exchange protocol that uses a shared session key to authenticate parties based on pre-shared secret password. It was claimed that this protocol was secure against off-line dictionary attack, but a new research has proved its vulnerability to off-line dictionary attack and proving step was applied by using “Patched Protocol” which was based on public key validation. Unfortunately, this step caused a raise in the computation cost, which made this protocol less appealing than its competitors. We proposed an alternate enhancement to keep this protocol secure without any extra computation cost that was known as “Enhanced Dragonfly”. This solution based on two-pre-shared secret passwords instead of one and the rounds between parties had compressed into two rounds instead of four. We prove that the enhanced-Dragonfly protocol is secure against off-line dictionary attacks by analyzing its security properties using the Scyther tool. A simulation was developed to measure the execution time of the enhanced protocol, which was found to be much less than the execution time of patched Dragonfly. The off-line dictionary attack time is consumed for few days if the dictionary size is 10,000. According to this, the use of the enhanced Dragonfly is more efficient than the patched Dragonfly.