TITLE:
Choosing Wisely and Sharing Cost: A Multi-Bidding Cost Sharing Mechanism
AUTHORS:
Yoshio Kamijo
KEYWORDS:
Multi-Bidding Mechanism, Cost Sharing, Selection Rules
JOURNAL NAME:
Theoretical Economics Letters,
Vol.4 No.6,
June
18,
2014
ABSTRACT: We consider a
situation where agents have to choose one project among the set of multiple
alternatives and at the same time they have to agree with the way of sharing
the cost of the project that is actually developed. We propose a multi-bidding
cost sharing mechanism where each agent simultaneously announces his voluntary
contribution for each project when the project is actually carried out, in
combination with his vote for the projects. We show that a Nash equilibrium
exists in this mechanism, and in any Nash equilibrium of this mechanism, the
efficient project is always chosen. Moreover, in the Nash equilibrium, the way
of sharing the cost of the project is, in a sense, an equal sharing rule.