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Kreps, D. and Scheinkman, J. (1983) Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes. Bell Journal of Economics, 14, 326-337. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3003636

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Vertical Mergers, Raising Rivals’ Costs and Foreclosure in a Network Industry

  AUTHORS: Adekola Oyenuga

  KEYWORDS: Vertical Structure, Oligopoly, Antitrust Policy, Congestion Externalities, Network Effects

  JOURNAL NAME: Modern Economy, Vol.5 No.4, April 22, 2014

  ABSTRACT: Foreclosure through raising a network rival’s costs may not be detrimental in the short-term, but in the longer-term it may allow a predator to expand its market share. The focus of antitrust opinion in assessing potential vertical mergers should therefore be on the longer-term effects of such mergers.