Riordan, M. (2008) Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration. Forthcoming in: Buccirossi, P., Ed., Handbook of Antitrust Economics, MIT Press, Cambridge, 145-182.
has been cited by the following article:
TITLE: Vertical Mergers, Raising Rivals’ Costs and Foreclosure in a Network Industry
AUTHORS: Adekola Oyenuga
KEYWORDS: Vertical Structure, Oligopoly, Antitrust Policy, Congestion Externalities, Network Effects
JOURNAL NAME: Modern Economy, Vol.5 No.4, April 22, 2014
ABSTRACT: Foreclosure through raising a network rival’s costs may not be detrimental in the short-term, but in the longer-term it may allow a predator to expand its market share. The focus of antitrust opinion in assessing potential vertical mergers should therefore be on the longer-term effects of such mergers.