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has been cited by the following article:
TITLE: Price and Quantity Competition in a Mixed Duopoly with Emission Tax
AUTHORS: Shuichi Ohori
KEYWORDS: Mixed Duopoly; Price Competition; Quantity Competition; Environmental Policy
JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.4 No.2, March 4, 2014
ABSTRACT: This paper compares price and quantity competition in a mixed duopoly with emission tax; in a mixed duopoly, one public firm competes with one private firm in the market. We find that social welfare is the highest when both the firms simultaneously choose price levels. Then, the optimal emission tax is sufficiently lower than the marginal social damage.