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A. Abdulkadiroglu and T. Sönmez, “Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems,” Econometrica, Vol. 66, No. 3, 1998, pp. 689-701. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2998580

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Cycles and Rationalization

  AUTHORS: Patrick de Lamirande

  KEYWORDS: Indivisible Goods; Cycle; Rationalizability; Pareto Allocations

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.3 No.6, December 20, 2013

  ABSTRACT: This paper studies the composition of the Paretian allocation set in the context of a finite number of agents and a finite number of indivisible goods. Each agent receives at most one good and no monetary compensation is possible (typically called the house allocation problem). I introduce the concept of a cycle which is a sequence of allocations where each allocation is linked to the following allocation in the sequence by the same switch of goods between a subset of agents. I characterize the profiles of agent preferences when the Paretian set has cycles.