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J. Ma, “Strategy-Proofness and the Strict Core in a Market with Indivisibilities,” International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 23, 1994, pp. 75-83.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01242849

has been cited by the following article:

• TITLE: Cycles and Rationalization

  AUTHORS: Patrick de Lamirande

  KEYWORDS: Indivisible Goods; Cycle; Rationalizability; Pareto Allocations

  JOURNAL NAME: Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol.3 No.6, December 20, 2013

  ABSTRACT: This paper studies the composition of the Paretian allocation set in the context of a finite number of agents and a finite number of indivisible goods. Each agent receives at most one good and no monetary compensation is possible (typically called the house allocation problem). I introduce the concept of a cycle which is a sequence of allocations where each allocation is linked to the following allocation in the sequence by the same switch of goods between a subset of agents. I characterize the profiles of agent preferences when the Paretian set has cycles.