

The Impact of the War between Ukraine and Russia on Relations between Russia and the West

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Abstract

The Relationship between Russia and western countries is like the Sino American relationship one of the most important bilateral relationship in the world and at the heart of this relation is the Ukraine issue. This research will present the impacts of the war in the relation between Russia and western countries. This perspective aims to provide information for a better understanding of the origin of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. This research will first explore the position of Western countries to Ukraine independence forces, the adjustment of global strategic objective of western countries, the rise of Russia and the adjustment of the strategy between Russia and western countries and the factors of Ukraine issue influencing on pattern of common interests of Russia and western countries. Documentary and qualitative research were used to analyze this topic.

Keywords

Russia, Western, Russo Western Relation, Ukraine

1. Introduction

The issue of cooperation between Russia and the West has always been at the center of the debates. As Joe Biden takes over as president of the United States, the issue of how to deal with the rise of Russia will be one of the most important factors defining its foreign policy and the war in Ukraine is an example.

The war between Russia and Ukraine began in 2014, following the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine, which overthrew pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovich. This political shift, with its significant pro-European movement, deeply displeased

Moscow, which was concerned about Ukraine's move closer to NATO and the European Union. In response, Russia quickly illegally annexed the Crimean Peninsula, a strategic region in the Black Sea, while supporting pro-Russian separatist movements in eastern Ukraine, particularly in the Donbass region, where a protracted armed conflict erupted. This war lasted for many years, marked by a hybrid confrontation between the Ukrainian army and pro-Russian forces supported by Moscow, causing thousands of deaths and a major humanitarian crisis. On February 24, 2022, Russia expanded its offensive with a full-scale invasion, officially justified by the objectives of "demilitarization" and "denazification" of Ukraine, justifications widely contested internationally. This new phase significantly intensified the war, provoking fighting on several fronts and a massive rejection of the invasion worldwide (Amnesty, 2024). The main issue in the conflict lies in Russia's desire to control Ukraine or, at least, to prevent its integration into the Western bloc via NATO, which Moscow sees as a direct threat to its security and regional influence. The war thus illustrates a major geopolitical struggle between the assertion of a sovereign and democratic Ukraine oriented towards the West, and Russia's desire to preserve its zone of influence inherited from the Soviet era (Orcier, 2022). This conflict is the result of a deep political and identity fracture in Ukraine, exacerbated by international influence games, where Russia reacts to the loss of its influence and the geostrategic fear represented by a Ukraine integrated into NATO, which has led to a major war with dramatic consequences for the region.

The West and Russia are both worse off for their efforts to try to weaken each other. This competition will only end when one side feels it is losing the race. As the Biden administration begins to discuss Russia strategy with its European allies, this mutual weakening will probably continue. Neither Russia nor the West seems on the verge of revising their approach. Opportunities to re-engage will arise, but for that to happen one side has to feel that it is losing the race. Alternatively, both sides simultaneously need to decide that the policy is failing and both need to change course. For now, that is unlikely. Russia thinks it has been doing pretty well in foreign policy. And from a Western standpoint, several overtures to Russia in the last decade have not really paid off. Multiple reset offers, the freezing of NATO enlargements to Ukraine and Georgia, the decade-long repudiation of 'humanitarian interventions' as a guide to policy, and the softening of human rights promotion policies under the presidencies of both Obama and Donald Trump have not improved relations with Russia (Nicu, 2021). Nowadays, western have to consider and respect the fact that Russia is becoming a rising power in the international system. The world has repeatedly witnessed situations where the hegemonic powers would try to control the rising powers to protect their own power. The activity of a country in its exchanges with the international community remains guided by its interests, which allows us to understand the analysis of relations between Russia and the West from the perspective of the Russo Ukrainian war.

2. The Position of Western Countries Regarding Ukraine Accessions to NATO

A sovereign, independent and stable Ukraine, firmly committed to democracy and the rule of law, is essential to Euro-Atlantic security. Established in the early 1990s, relations with the country have evolved into one of NATO's most substantially rich partnerships. As a result of the conflict that broke out between Russia and Ukraine, cooperation intensified in several critical areas from 2014 onwards. The dialogue began in 1991 when Ukraine became a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and cooperation was established when the country joined the Partnership for Peace programme in 1994. The ties were strengthened in 1997 with the signing of the Specific Partnership Charter, establishing the NATO-Ukraine Commission, responsible for carrying out cooperation further. Since 2009, the NATO-Ukraine Commission has overseen Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration process, including the reforms carried out under the Annual National Program. Cooperation, which has deepened over time, is beneficial to both sides, with Ukraine actively contributing to NATO-led operations and missions. In June 2017, the Ukrainian Parliament passed a law under which NATO membership once again became a strategic objective of the country's foreign and security policy. The amendment that enshrines this goal in the Ukrainian constitution entered into force in 2019. In September 2020, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky approved Ukraine's new national security strategy, which provides for the development of the NATO-Ukraine Distinctive Partnership with a view to the country's membership in the Organization. In response to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, NATO has increased its support for the development and capacity building of Ukraine. The Allies condemn and will not recognize the illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea by Russia, just as they condemn the destabilizing and aggressive activities carried out by this country in eastern Ukraine and in the region of the black Sea. NATO has strengthened its presence in the Black Sea and intensified its maritime cooperation with Ukraine and Georgia. NATO condemns in the strongest terms the large-scale invasion of Ukraine launched by Russia in February 2022 without any justification and in the complete absence of provocation. This is a serious violation of international law and a serious threat to Euro-Atlantic security (NATO, 2022).

A former US ambassador to NATO makes the case that the alliance should welcome Kyiv. As part of its membership in the bloc, Ukraine will receive a security guarantee from other EU members: The Treaty of the European Union includes a mutual-defense clause of the type that Ukraine has demanded as part of any peace negotiation or cessation of hostilities with Russia (Ivo, 2022). However, Ukraine's NATO membership remains a complex and ongoing issue. Allies reaffirm Ukraine's right to choose its future, and NATO supports Kyiv in its integration and reform efforts, while continuing to provide significant security assistance (Jacque & Ricard, 2024). Moscow remains fiercely opposed to this membership, considering it

an existential threat. Thus, the aforementioned plea reflects the belief that Ukraine's membership would provide the country with legally binding collective protection within the European framework, which it considers key to meeting its security demands vis-à-vis Russia (AFP, 2025).

Although this is important, there are two problems with relying on this alone to ensure Ukraine's long-term security against Russian aggression. First, even if fast-tracked, EU accession will likely take many months, if not a year or two. Second, although the EU's security guarantee is significant, it doesn't bind the U.S., Europe's ultimate protector, to Ukrainian defense. Fortunately, both of these shortcomings can be overcome with NATO membership. Joining the alliance itself is straightforward, requiring the unanimous agreement of NATO's 30 member states and their ratification of NATO's governing treaty, including its Article 5 collective-defense provision. And because the U.S. is a leading member, bringing Ukraine into NATO also extends America's security guarantee to its territory. We have been here before. In 2008, Ukraine sought an invitation to apply for NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP), which prepares aspirant nations for membership in the alliance. Sharp disagreement among allies blocked a decision, leading to the vague commitment that Ukraine (and Georgia) "will become members of NATO." Until now, key allies such as Germany and France have rejected inviting Ukraine to join NATO, for fear of provoking Russia. Now that Moscow has demonstrated that it need not be provoked to commit aggression, NATO must reverse course and bring Ukraine into the alliance as soon as possible (Ivo, 2022).

A new European security order will only be possible when the West finds a way to protect the territorial integrity of all states, including those that are not currently members of NATO or the EU. This will only happen if these states become NATO members, accept the stationing of permanent US or NATO forces on their territory, or—as Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea have done—decide to secure their own territorial integrity by equipping themselves with nuclear weapons. Of all these solutions, NATO membership is the best one for Ukraine. Given the size of the Russian nuclear arsenal, Moscow would be certain that NATO members had no intention of invading its territory (such an attack would warrant its first use of nuclear weapons). At the same time, Moscow would know that any conventional invasion of Ukraine leading to the partition of the country would meet with NATO's use of non-strategic nuclear weapons (as with an invasion of the Baltic States or Poland). Russia has destroyed the existing European security order and replaced it with a de facto disorder in which it uses its conventional and nuclear forces to decide the fate of its neighbors. Europeans can no longer trust Russia's promises to respect the territorial integrity of its neighbors. At the same time, the West should take Putin's nuclear threats seriously. In all, a new European security order worthy of the name seems a long way off. To change this, we need to recognize that Ukraine's and Europe's security can only be guaranteed by NATO and EU membership, and by nuclear deterrence against Moscow's imperial ambitions (Torreblanca, 2022).

3. The Adjustment of Global Strategic Objective of the West

The crisis in Ukraine and the succession of events since the invasion of Crimea impose another attitude on the part of Westerners towards Russian power and its Eurasian project. It is in haste, with a time delay, that the West is redeploying, the geopolitical maneuver first bringing together the member states of NATO and the EU. Efforts aimed at extending the Western diplomatic front to other countries and the examination of the resolution proposed by the United States in the Security Council and then in the General Assembly of the United Nations, highlights the relative strategic solitude of Russia. A resolution voted by the majority of member states. On the military level, the game is played through the Atlantic Alliance. The strengthening of the deterrent posture reaffirms the will to defend the central-eastern European states belonging to NATO, with Ukraine remaining outside this security perimeter. Finally, political and diplomatic sanctions were adopted, not without consequences on the Moscow Stock Exchange and the economic prospects of Russia. With the acceleration of the last few weeks, the flight of capital since the beginning of 2014 is already equivalent to the total of the previous year (Institut Thomas More, 2014). The war in Ukraine and its impact on international relations will be a very important determinant of the shape of the political and economic order around the world in the next decade. The stories, projects and actions of western allies regarding not only Russia but the role southern countries will play in Ukraine's reconstruction project once the war is over will determine or reveal their long-term strategic goals. At the start of the war, the western allies claimed that their primary objective was to defend the United Nations charter and democracy. At the end of the spring, some strategists and representatives did not know if this would be maintained in the event of a change of regime in Moscow (Media 24, 2022). The West, supported by its allies, particularly those in Asia, has implemented a triple response. He has imposed unprecedented sanctions affecting both Russia's ability to access the technologies it needs for its civil and military development and its financial system. Despite several difficulties that this implies and the length of the delay, Europe is taking measures initially to reduce and then eliminate its dependence on Russian hydrocarbon imports. At the same time, it was decided by some countries to provide large-scale military aid to Ukraine and to these countries is added for the first time in its history the European Union. Initially, it was a question of supplying Ukraine with defensive armaments, but gradually heavier equipment was sent. The West's strategy was clearly defined in such a way as to exclude any direct involvement in the conflict and to avoid Russian escalation as much as possible (Ricardo, 2022).

It is however very important to note the absence of a unified strategy, or even of real national strategies on the Western side. But we still notice a collective and progressive increase in support both quantitatively and qualitatively. Two different strategies were adopted in a purely and simply antagonistic context. As for the Ukrainian side in opposition to Russia, it is a direct military confrontation whose final goal is the liberation of the territory, including the Crimea. On the Western

side, it is an indirect strategy whose ultimate goal is to prevent a possible Russian victory. All reflections on the current situation focus mainly on the question related to the nature and performance of the armaments requested by the Ukrainians, as well as on the responses that the European countries and the United States provide to these requests. Westerners do it piecemeal, country by country, considering their own capabilities, and their domestic political sensitivities. Thus, the NATO members closest to Russia, such as the Baltic countries and Poland, provide strong and immediate support accompanied by demands. Germany is slow to decide because of its internal political process and the sensitivity of its public opinion. It ends up acceding to Ukrainian demands when they appear to be supported by the vast majority of the allies, as was the case very recently with the Leopard tanks. France and Italy are now providing very significant means, such as Caesar guns accompanied by a Mamba anti-aircraft defense system. After having chosen a more diplomatic path by wanting to negotiate but by holding a very badly received speech in Eastern Europe, it now shows a clear desire to support Ukraine until its victory. The United States provides the largest share of military aid. They decide unilaterally, however, limiting the means granted. They thus refuse to provide F16 aircraft, while gradually improving those they have already allocated (European Security, 2023). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is once again implementing a policy aimed at making its defense system more effective in order to push Russia to renounce its possible intention to attack the European Alliance by giving priority to conventional capacities. Countries are obviously relying on the course of the war in Ukraine to define their military strategy and establish the planning of the armed forces. Thus, many adjustment projects are underway within national armed forces. Like the other key member countries of NATO, the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany to mention only these three powers are redefining their respective strategies to meet the Russian challenge by focusing in large section on capabilities and processes that Moscow has already used in Ukraine. The United States Army has recently been transformed. A transformation that responds to a very specific challenge. The last transformation, which is considered to be the most important, was the attempt generals like David Petraeus of preparing the army for operations counter-insurgency, stabilization and counter-terrorism, by adapting its structure and its equipment accordingly. In England, the army is still continuing to recover from the major budget cuts made by Cameron's government in 2010, during its austerity policy. Since 2015, the UK strategy papers renew with a more ambitious tone. Some capabilities, such as on-board naval air assets, are being replenished. With a view to predicting a land conflict in Europe, the London army thus wishes to follow in the footsteps of the other NATO countries and counts, from here 2025, be able to rapidly deploy a full division in Europe of ballast. The armed forces will no longer be divided into small corps troops that are light and quick to deploy, but in large units. Like its NATO partners, Germany sees the main mission of his army, in the near future, is to dissuade Russia from attacking Alliance members. To ensure this

commitment, the German Ministry of Defense has announced personnel changes and of equipment. This “reorientation” envisages the resumption of high-intensity military operations, even if stabilization missions are officially considered as “as important” (Masuhr, 2019).

The war in Ukraine is influencing European foreign policy in several major ways:

Strengthening support for Ukraine: The European Union (EU) and its Member States have adopted unprecedented political, financial, humanitarian, and military support for Ukraine, strongly condemning Russian military aggression. This support has resulted in massive and repeated sanctions against Russia, aimed at weakening its military-industrial complex and punishing those responsible for actions undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity (UE, 2024).

Unity and divisions within the EU: While the EU aims to be united in its support for Ukraine, divisions are emerging among member states over how to manage the relationship with Russia and the economic impact of sanctions. This internal tension presents a challenge for developing a common long-term strategy (Vimont, 2025).

Strengthened European Security and Defense Policy: The war accelerated Ukraine’s integration into European security policy, recognizing its common threats and military experience. The Ukrainian defense industry is becoming a strategic player that can contribute to European rearmament with effective and economical solutions (Bulana & Holubytska, 2025).

Pressure on EU enlargement choices: Ukraine’s EU membership is now on the cards, but remains conditional on significant institutional reforms supported by the EU. However, rising Euroscepticism in some member states is creating an uncertain political climate surrounding future enlargement.

Strengthening resilience against Russian hybrid warfare: The EU is facing an increase in hybrid attacks (sabotage, cyberattacks, disinformation) targeting its critical infrastructure, particularly in countries actively supporting Ukraine, such as Poland, the Baltic states, and Germany. Energy, transport, and communications security are therefore becoming a priority (Le Monde, 2023).

Support from European public opinion: The majority of European citizens now support aid to Ukraine, which legitimises government action and the EU’s involvement in this conflict (Verdier, 2025).

The war in Ukraine acts as a catalyst to strengthen European strategic cohesion, intensify its support for a struggling Ukrainian partner, while provoking internal debates and complex security challenges that are permanently transforming European foreign policy. When it started, it first seemed like a thorn in Washington’s side. An unforeseen event that falls badly and diverts priority: the rivalry with China. But, past the first hesitations, the Biden administration has turned a problem into an opportunity. The short-term effects on the American economy created by the invasion of Ukraine, the ongoing war, sanctions and future events remain uncertain. Appropriate decision-making on monetary policy in the context

of war in Ukraine in addition to the draconian economic sanctions imposed by the United States on Russia without forgetting the potentially unpredictable events show that the economy evolves in unexpected ways. The invasion of Ukraine by Russia nevertheless seriously complicates the task of the powerful American financial institution since this offensive took place at a time when prices, in particular of energy, were already very high everywhere in the world, due to the fact insufficient supply and a strong recovery in international demand linked to the lifting of restrictions against the COVID-19 pandemic in many countries (Touitou, 2022).

4. The Rise of Russia and the Adjustment of Its Strategy towards the West

The Russian Federation is the largest state born of the disintegration of the USSR in 1991. The stakes have been many for this country which once represented a pivot of the Soviet space. After the 1990s, marked by the difficult transition to the liberal economy and the instability of the new political and administrative organization, Russia experienced an improvement in its economic system associated with the strengthening of the state in all areas. The country now wants to regain the status of a great power and to reassert its hegemony within the post-Soviet space (Olga, 2020). Today, the relationship between the United States and Russia is worse than it has been since 1985. The launch of the ongoing war in southeastern Ukraine, as well as its support for Syrian Bashar al-Assad in his civil war and many others, has increased tensions between the two countries. For the national security strategy of the United States, Russia and China represent two main threats to the national security of the United States (Angela, 2020). Although Russia's various defense missions seem, at first, less complex than stabilization missions in countries like Afghanistan or Iraq, the Russian army, reorganized by Vladimir Putin, places NATO in the face of very important challenges. Since 2008, the country has implemented several comprehensive reforms within its armed forces and invested in specifically manufactured equipment and skills to neutralize Western military advantage. Russia has acquired long-range weapons, also called state-of-the-art missiles, capable of reaching distant air, land and sea targets, not to mention equipment intended to jam radio and satellite communications. While they were able to rely on secure communications and air superiority in Iraq and Afghanistan, Western armed forces would then meet conditions more difficult in the event of a conflict with Russian troops (Masuhr, 2019).

In order to better understand the Russian frame of mind nowadays, it is very important to consider the dominant vision of Russia, in which their ideas were developed. According to this dominant view, the conflict with the West has always existed since the destruction of the Soviet Union. The geopolitical battle did not end with the Cold War; it simply changed shape while keeping the same main objectives. Two very genuine novelties can be noted in the current Russian strategic approach. The first, and most important, is that this approach relies not on

brute force, but on a strategy of coercion. The Russian strategy puts in place both military and non-military actions in several areas, while minimizing kinetic engagements. It constitutes a break with the paradigm of the Great War which has dominated Russian military thought for several decades. There is now a predisposition to the logic of deterrence and constraint. The second novelty is the unprecedented role assigned to information warfare. Russia's recent conduct in certain theaters of operations allows some general remarks on the Russian strategic style. First, Russia's *modus operandi* in the Syrian theater has demonstrated that the logic behind its strategy and the employment of Russian forces is that of "reasonable sufficiency". An expression already used at the end of the cold war and which means the fact of seeking a maximum political result while keeping the military commitment to a strict minimum. Second, it seems that Moscow assumes that in all theaters of confrontation there is an asymmetry between its core interests and those of its Western adversaries. By considering this principle, Russia thinks it can afford more aggressive behavior and greater risk-taking, because the balance of credibility in terms of deterrence is tilted in its favor. Finally, Russia has shown throughout its last periods of crisis, a certain speed in the decision-execution cycle and efficiency in the use of various forms of power within the framework of its operations. Qualities in its defense system which can be explained by a centralized decision-making system, institutionalized without always being bureaucratic (Dmitry, 2020). In a document of more than forty pages remembering in its content and language the era of confrontation between the Soviet Union and America in the last century, Russia presents itself as a bulwark of the Russian-speaking world against the West accused of wanting to weaken the country by any means. Russia has recently adopted a new foreign policy that designates the West as an "existential threat", which Moscow must fight and eliminate its "dominance". The adoption of this new strategy confirms the deep rift that has existed between Russia and Western countries since the start of the assault on Ukraine, which has led NATO to consolidate and Russia to move towards People's Republic of China. The new foreign policy of Russia is a doctrine that defines the priorities that countries set themselves in the field of international affairs, and analyzes the way in which other states on the international scene perceive their relations with the world. The United States and its allies have implemented heavy economic sanctions against Russia, which in turn accuses them of waging a proxy war by delivering weapons to Kyiv. In this specific context, Russia in a situation of isolation is forced to get closer economically and diplomatically to China, following the complicity of the Russian president with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping during a summit in Moscow few months earlier, where he praised the "special nature" of the relations between their countries, which nevertheless seem increasingly unbalanced in favor of Beijing, because of the growing dependence of Moscow. The new Russian strategy also gives an important place to relations with African countries, while Moscow is strengthening its presence in Africa, in particular through the Wagner Group (Le Monde, 2023).

5. The Factors of Influence of Ukraine in the Common Interest of Russia and the West

The issue concerning Ukraine is a historical issue that dates back to the end of the cold war and the destruction of the USSR. The Russian government thinks that the problem of Ukraine is a problem between former members of the USSR, so that it cannot tolerate any direct or indirect interference of any foreign force especially the West and its alliance NATO. Thus, Ukraine, a former member of the USSR, is considered as an inalienable part of Russia and this has been proven throughout history. However, the political behavior of States is not always dominated by rationality. In many cases, political behavior will be irrational because of national interests. This is one of the important reasons why the question of Ukrainian territory can be used to measure the level of the relationship between Russia and the West.

Ukraine is a country of 44 million inhabitants which extends over 603,000 km², with a natural border, the 2290 km Dnieper River which runs from Russia to the Black Sea via Kiev and which delimits the western and eastern part of the country. Clearly, this country is perceived differently depending on whether one takes the point of view of the West or that of Russia. In 1672, Ukraine was invaded by the Crimean Tatars and the Ottoman Empire who settled in the Odessa region. To ensure its defense, the western coast of Ukraine will be part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire from 1867 to 1918. In 2022, a European vision of a country at the limits of the borders of the European Union and therefore a little far from everything: The European Union accounts for 15% of Ukraine's trade, while Ukraine accounts for only 0.4% of EU trade; Ukraine has real agricultural potential, it is considered "the breadbasket of Europe"; The industry needs to be rebuilt, especially after the Chernobyl nuclear accident; The country serves as a transit for Russian gas. This allows the European Union to help Ukraine become a market economy and less corrupt.

The American president surrounded by all the American diplomacy is very present in the war between Russia and Ukraine. A policy designed to satisfy American opinion as well as European allies. But what makes this country and its allies so invested in a confrontation that takes place far from its borders confrontation? Russia decided to go to war with Ukraine simply to bring the country into its sphere of influence. The United States and its allies talk about protecting Ukraine from Russian invasion. But do not say that Ukraine is a very important country and a centerpiece of their strategy of economic domination. A strategy that is totally at the service of their multinationals where there is a working class that has nothing to gain. For the United States and all its various allies, taking control of Ukraine is very essential because it will make it possible to meet three main objectives: The first is the strengthening of NATO. It is a military alliance created in 1949 to deal with the Soviet threat. The second is to prevent the rise of Russia because just after the fall of the USSR in the 1990s, Russia was largely submissive to the United States and did not worry them much but that has changed since the

arrival of Poutine at the head of Russia in 2000. Finally, the United States and its allies wish to control the gas routes because Nord Stream II, which is a gas pipeline project of more than 1000 kilometers linking Russia to Germany, would make it possible to double the delivery of natural gas from Russia to Europe. The United States, which is fighting with Russia for the place of the world's leading supplier, takes a very dim view of the construction of this gas pipeline (Claire, 2022).

For Russia, from 1922 to 1991, Ukraine is part of the Republics of the USSR and by its historical importance, its geography, its Slavic and Orthodox roots, its Russian-speaking populations; Ukraine has a major importance for Russia. Its independence in 1991, the desire of some of its leaders to join the European Union and NATO has created very strong tensions because the objectives are clearly different between Russia and the West (Mingzi, 2022). For Russia, Ukraine is important for three different reasons. First, Russia operates today these policies simply because it observes that a country with which it shares the same border becomes a platform for a threatening military alliance. This explains the possibility that Ukraine will become a member of NATO and therefore harbor missiles and troops from this alliance. The territory of Ukraine has served as a buffer zone for Moscow since the Napoleonic invasion of 1812. Second, historically, for Russia, Ukraine is by no means a country like any other. The dominant view of Russian nationalism is that Ukraine is a sister Slavic nation, considered to be the heart of the Rus nation. It is a very powerful ideology that makes Russia draw its identity through Ukraine. Third, some analysts also argue that Putin is personally humiliated by what happened in Ukraine during his tenure when he wanted to install pro-Russian leaders in Kiev and that didn't happen. For Putin, this is an unfinished business that is part of his legacy and must be settled once and for all (Bermúdez, 2022).

6. Conclusion

After several years of war in Ukraine, marked by immense human suffering, colossal material losses, and prolonged regional instability, the question of a diplomatic exit from the conflict has become more pressing than ever. While previous attempts have failed in the face of persistent tensions, the wear and tear of the conflict and international pressures are now opening a fragile but real window toward possible de-escalation. Diplomatic solutions, whether they take the form of bilateral negotiations, multilateral initiatives, or neutral mediation, could offer an alternative to the cycle of violence. While they do not guarantee immediate or complete peace, they allow us to imagine a future where dialogue prevails over confrontation and where reconstruction can finally begin. Diplomatic solutions without full Russian troop withdrawal are possible but require intricate compromises, such as recognition of current control lines, armed neutrality for Ukraine, phased conflict settlement, and significant international security guarantees and reconstruction efforts. However, the deep mistrust and conflicting core demands have so far prevented a lasting agreement, making diplomacy a protracted and attempted

process under current conditions (Graham, 2025).

The strategy of the West towards Russia is considered to be one of the most important key factors that can have a considerable influence on the development of relations between Russia and the West and the strategy of the West towards Russia is subordinate to its overall strategy. The fate of Russia today is since the fall of the USSR a long term work. So, in the process of its rise and its return to world power, Russia must maintain good bilateral relations with the other powers present in the international sphere. The governments of the member countries of NATO, with the United States in the lead, would particularly insist on different aspects or areas, and therefore, it could destroy the strategy of these countries towards Russia. Taking into account the current international system situation, the West has an increasing demand for cooperation with Russia, so that the relations between its member countries and Russia can be considered constructive and cooperative as well. On the international scene, there is no doubt that a new dimension of great power relations emerges after this type of confrontation and the main theme of relations is the search for win-win cooperation. The interests and relations of the great powers are not so easy to understand that one cannot say that the relationship between the great powers is completely antagonistic. In fact, they seek cooperation in many aspects and the relationship between Russia and the West also falls within the framework of great power relations. For the foreseeable future, Russia and the West will not have a strong incentive to break the frame relations between the great powers.

The United States and other NATO allies do not intervene in Ukraine because Ukraine simply has to be protected from Russian invasion. It is above all to protect and to defend their own economic and geostrategic interests. By opting for a policy of confrontation, the United States in particular is playing a dangerous game in which the European working class could be the big loser.

The war caused a global surge in oil prices, which in turn drove up gasoline prices in the United States. Even though the country produces its own oil, prices remain pegged to the global market, impacting American households' wallets. Food prices have risen, with Ukraine being a major supplier of grain and fertilizers. Rising energy costs have also increased inflationary pressures on food and other essential goods. US inflation has reached levels not seen in 40 years, harming the purchasing power of families and complicating the management of the national economy (Challenges, 2025). The instability caused by the Russo-Ukrainian conflict has destabilized US financial markets, increasing the volatility of the dollar and stocks. The war has exposed the United States' dependence on certain global supply chains, pushing companies to diversify their sources and strengthen their resilience. Billions of dollars in military and economic aid to Ukraine have partly boosted the US defense industry, creating jobs and industrial activity (Lo, 2023). A new agreement grants the United States access to certain Ukrainian natural resources in exchange for military and financial support. The agreement also aims to promote Ukraine's reconstruction, which could generate future economic op-

opportunities for American companies (Çopur & Gökkoyun, 2025). Support for Ukraine divides public opinion and Congress, with some advocating for a reduction in aid to focus on domestic challenges. Nearly half of Americans consider the financial effort to be excessive. Some parts of society see this support as crucial to defending democracy and preserving global security. Others believe that national priorities must take precedence. Price increases particularly affect the most vulnerable populations, amplifying social inequalities and the debate on economic justice (Lo, 2023).

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this paper.

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