Is Cognition an Attribute of the Self or It Rather Belongs to the Body? Some Dialectical Considerations on Udbhatabhatta’s Position against Nyāya and Vaisesika

doi:10.4236/ojpp.2011.12009

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Open Journal of Philosophy

2011. Vol.1, No.2, 48-56

Is Cognition an Attribute of the Self or It Rather Belongs to the

Body? Some Dialectical Considerations on Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa’s

Position against Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika

Krishna Del Toso

University of Trieste, Trieste, Italy.

Email: [email protected]

Received October 14th, 2011; revised November 15th, 2011; accepted November 20th, 2011.

In this article an attempt is made to detect what could have been the dialectical reasons that impelled the Cār-

vāka thinker Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa to revise and reformulate the classical materialistic concept of cognition. If indeed

according to ancient Cārvākas cognition is an attribute entirely dependent on the physical body, for Udbha-

ṭabhaṭṭa cognition is an independent principle that, of course, needs the presence of a human body to manifest

itself and for this very reason it is said to be a peculiarity of the body. Therefore, Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa seems to de-

scribe the cognizing faculty according to a double ontology: it is both a principle and a characteristic, both inde-

pendent and dependent. Two philosophical contexts—Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya schools—are here taken into account

as possible anti-Cārvāka fault-finding points of view that spured Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa to reconsider the Cārvāka per-

spective. Although we do not have so much textual material on this particular aspect of the ancient and medieval

philosophical debate in India, it nonetheless can be supposed that Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa’s reformulation of the concept

of cognition was a tentative response to the Vaiśeṣika idea that cognition is not an attribute of the body, rather of

the mind (which is here supposed to be eternal), and to the Naiyāyika perspective according to which cognition

would be an attribute of an everlasting self. In the case of the Nyāya school, fortunately we have at our disposal

the criticism put forward by Vātsyāyana against the materialistic conception of cognition during this time. By

examining some Vātsyāyana’s objections, it will emerge that Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa’s idea of cognition really seems to

have the aspect of a consistent answer to them, from a renewed materialistic point of view.

Keywords: Cognition, Cārvāka Materialism, Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Vātsyāyana

Introduction

This paper is to be considered as a philosophic exercise ba-

sed on what can be called a case study because here I will take

into consideration a particular aspect of the discussion con-

cerning the nature of cognition (caitanya, buddhi, jñāna etc.)1

according to three different philosophical perspectives, which

are on the one hand, the “reformed” Cārvāka materialism of

Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa (or Bhaṭṭodbhaṭa, 8th - 9th century CE?) and, on

the other hand, both the classical Vaiśeṣika and Vātsyāyana’s

Naiyāyika points of view. It is a philosophic exercise because,

in spite of the paucity of the sources available at present on

Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa’s thought, an attempt is here proposed to make

two different philosophical contexts—Cārvāka and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣi-

ka—interact critically on the same subject, namely, the idea of

cognition. Furthermore, I will try to give some indication on the

possible reasons for Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa’s reformulation of the clas-

sical Cārvāka concept of cognition, on the basis of Vaiśeṣika

and Nyāya material.

Classical Cārvāka View on Cognition

Even if only very few fragments of the Cārvākas’ aphorisms

have reached us, from the extant excerpts fortunately we can

infer the general position on cognition upheld by the adherents

to this school. The materialistic perspective on cognition pecu-

liar to the classical Cārvāka system is, hence, summarized by

the following aphorisms:2

01. pṛthivyāpastejovāyur iti tattvāni |

“Earth, water, heat and air are the principles”.

02. tatsamudāye śarīrendriyaviṣayasaṃjñāḥ |

“What is called “body”, “sense organs”, “object” [takes

place] in the combination of those [principles]”.

03. tebhyaś caitanyam |

“Out of those [there is] cognition”.

04. kiṇvādibhyo madaśaktivat |

“Like the inhebriating power [that takes place] out of fer-

ments and so on”.

05. caitanyaviśiṣṭaḥ kāyaḥ puruṣaḥ |

“The man is [nothing but] a body characterized by cogni-

tion”.

06. śarīre bhāvāt |

“Because of the existence/appearance [of cognition only]

when there is a body”.

From these aphorisms we deduce that, according to the Cār-

vākas, the material elements are only four, and that these ele-

ments constitute not only the physical body (śarīra, kāya) and

the external objects (viṣaya), but also cognition (caitanya), whi-

ch appears in the body as, for instance, the alcoholic power in a

hotchpotch of juices, ferments, sugar, etc. Consequently, the

1As a preliminary note it has to be underlined that with “cognition” I mean

here both knowledge (cognition of objects) and self-awareness (cognition o

oneself or of one’s self). This is because it seems to me that within the Cār-

vāka philosophy caitanya sometimes can stand for “knowledge” (buddhi,

ñāna), whereas some other times for “consciousness” (caitanya tout court).

2For the full list (with all the references) and translation of the extant San-

skrit fragments of the Cārvākas see Bhattacharya (2009: pp. 78-92), from

which I quote with little adaptation. All the passages from Sanskrit texts

referred to in this paper have been, when necessary, adapted to the quotation

style used here, without of course changing the structure and meaning.

K. DEL TOSO 49

human being is here reduced to a very particular mixture of

physical elements, characterized by the presence of a cognizing

faculty, which is likewise physical. Anantavīrya (10th - 11th cen-

turies CE), in his Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā (Explanation of The as-

certainment of logical demonstrations), informs us that one of

the adherents to the classical Cārvāka philosophy, viz. Puran-

dara, theorized that the arising of cognition from a mass of

elements is possible only when those very elements assume a

certain and well-determined shape. In all the other cases, cogni-

tion would not appear:3

07. mūrtasya pṛthivyādicatuṣṭayasya jñānam anena pauraṃ

mataṃ darśitam |

“[There is appearance of] cognition of the four [elements

such as] earth etc., [only when they are] settled into a fix-

ed shape. By means of this, the opinion of Paura[ndara] is

explained”.

Unfortunately, the exiguity of Purandara’s and other classical

Cārvākas’ fragments at our disposal does not allow us to know

in detail which was his conception of cognition. In any case, on

the basis of our aphorism 05. we can suppose also that the fixed

shape (mūrta), needed for the appearance of cognition, to which

Purandara alludes to, were the human figure.

However, even if we agree to consider cognition as somehow

dependent on the material elements (aphorism 03.) only when

they assume the form of a human body (quotation 07.), we still

have to solve the problem of defining which kind of relation

exists between the body and cognition itself. Indeed, the pas-

sage 07. shows us a Purandara’s reasoning on the cognizing

faculty that, although it is evidently based on the abovemen-

tioned aphorism 05., unfortunately does not provide in itself

any further explanation of that very aphorism. In other words,

we still do not know whether cognition is a product of the ma-

terial body, or if it is rather some material thing, which is added

to the body. Indeed, this one is the crucial philosophical prob-

lem related to the cognizing faculty. More precisely, the ques-

tion is whether the relation between body and cognition is

similar to the one between cause and effect, or to the one be-

tween substance and its attribute(s).

This should have been a fundamental matter of discussion

also within the Cārvāka cyrcles, as it emerges from for instance

the different interpretations assigned by Cārvākas to some of

the abovementioned aphorisms. In particular, it is worth noting

here that aphorism 03. accounts for at least two readings on the

basis of both grammatical and semantic considerations. Gram-

matical considerations, because the term tebhyaḥ can be inten-

ded either as a dative (“to them”) or as an ablative case (“from

them”). Semantic considerations, because the absence of a verb

specifying the nature of the relation between the terms involved

in the sentence is undoubtedly problematic. These ambiguities

led at a certain point to two parallel commentarial positions on

that aphorism, as Kamalaśīla (8th century CE) clearly points out

in his Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā (Running commentary on The

collection of philosophical principles):4

08. tatra kecid vṛttikārā vyācakṣate utpadyate tebhyaś caitan-

yam | anye abhivyajyata ity āhuḥ | ataḥ pakṣadvayam

āha jayate vyajyate’tha ceti |

“There, some commentators explain that “consiousness

originates from those [principles]”; others say “[cognition]

is manifested”. Therefore, they set forth a double position:

“[cognition] is born” and “[cognition] is manifested”.

Hence, according to the first interpretation, cognition origin-

nates (utpadyate), or comes into being (jayate), from the mix-

ture of material elements. The verbs utpadyate and jayate con-

vey the idea of a somehow productive relation between two fa-

ctors, one of which plays the role of cause and the other the role

of effect. In this case, the link between cognition and body cou-

ld be philosophically interpreted according to at least two per-

spectives. On one side, cognition could be considered as an

attribute of the body, which is therefore its substance (this posi-

tion is in accordance with our aphorism 05., where the human

body is defined caitanyaviśiṣta, “characterized by cognition»).

On the other side, cognition could be thought as the effect of the

body, with the specification that the two must be necessarily

involved in a particular kind of causal relation in which, when

the cause ceases, the effect does not survive to it in any way

(this is a possible reading of the abovementioned aphorism

06.).5

The second perspective referred to by Kamalaśīla recalls the

idea that the elements are not the cause stricto sensu, rather the

occasion for the apparition of cognition (note the passive forms

abhivyajyate, vyajyate, “is manifested”): in this case, cognition

would somehow (but unfortunately our sources do not allow us to

understand exactly how) differ from the four elements, although

existing in dependence on them. If the first position (utpadyate,

jayate) seems to represent the classical Cārvāka perspective, the

second one (abhi vyajya te , vyajyate) depicts or, better, anticipates

the so-called “reformed” Cārvāka philosophy of Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa.6

Cakradhara (11th century CE), in his Granthibhaṅga (Break-

ing the knot), a commentary on Jayantabhaṭṭa’s (9th century CE)

Nyāyamañjarī (The flower of Nyāya), appears to be more accu-

rate in explaining which are the fundamental distinctions be-

tween the two perspectives. In doing that, he also informs us

that the first position, besides other ancient Cārvāka thinkers,

was upheld by Bhāvivikta:7

09. cirantanacārvākair hi bhāviviktaprabhṛtibhiḥ bhūtebhyaś

caitanyam iti sūtram bhūtebhya iti pañcamyantapaday-

ojanayā vyākhyātam bhūtebhya utpadyate caitanyam iti ||

udbhaṭena tu bhūtebhyaḥ itipadaṃ caturthyantatayā

vyākhyātam bhūtebhyaś caitanyaṃ bhūtārthaṃ caitan-

yaṃ svatantram eva śarīrārambhakabhūtopakārakam ity

arthaḥ ||

(Indeed, by the ancient Cārvākas, beginning with Bhāvi-

vikta, the aphorism “bhūtebhyaś caitanyam” is explained

with the use of the term bhūtebhya in the fifth [ablative]

5Unfortunately, we do not have any witness of what Cārvākas thought about

causal relations except for a fragment from Vādidevasūri’s Syādvādaratnā-

kara (The jewel mine of the doctrine of “may be”), where Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa’s

conception of effect is referred to (Osval, 1988: p. 764): yatra tu bhaṭṭodb-

haṭaḥ prācīkaṭat | na hy atra kāraṇam eva kāryātmatām upaiti yata ekas-

ākāraṇātmana ekakāryarūpatopagame tadanyarūpābhāvāt tadanyakāry-

ātmanopagatir na syāt | kiṃ tv apūrvam eva kasyacid bhāve prāgavidya-

mānaṃ bhavat tat kāryam |. I propose the following translation: “Whereas

Bhaṭṭodbhaṭa demonstrated that in this case the cause itself does not obtain

the nature of the effect since, when there is assimilation/acquisition of the

essential form of a certain effect by something that is not a cause, then it

[i.e., that non-cause] could not get the nature of the effect [which is] othe

than that [cause], because it has not the essential form of the other [i.e., o

the cause]. Nonetheless, that which is completely new, [and although hav-

ing being] formerly absent, [becomes] existent when something [else] is

present, that is the effect». Quoted—but not translated—also in Bha-

ttacharya (2009: p. 82).

6For a discussion on these two positions see Bhattacharya (2010b: pp. 537-

539).

7Quoted from Bhattacharya (2009: p. 81).

3Quoted from Bhattacharya (2009: p. 83).

4Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā ad Tattvasaṃgraha (The collection of Philoso-

hical Principle) verses 1857-1858 (Śāstrī, 1968: p. 633).

K. DEL TOSO

case: “from the elements, cognition originates”. But by

Udbhaṭa the word bhūtebhya is explained with the fourth

[dative] case: “to the elements, cognition [is added]”; in-

deed, cognition is [for Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa] a material object,

[which is] independent [but] auxiliary to the elements

that constitute the body. This is the meaning).

Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa’s New Approach

The main point that distinguishes Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa’s from Bhā-

vivikta’s perspective, as can be inferred from our quotation 09.,

is the idea that cognition would be a material (bhūtārtha), self-

dependent (svatantra) element, which nonetheless needs the

presence of a likewise material body for manifesting itself (see

the abovementioned aphorism 06.). Hence, Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa see-

ms to describe a cognition that is actually a principle (because

of its being svatantra, “self-dependent”), but a non-primary

principle (because it is bhūtopakāraka, “subsidiary to the ele-

ments”). In this very consideration lies the fundamental differ-

rence between cognition, on the one hand, and earth, water, heat

and air (that could be consequently considered as primary prin-

ciples), on the other hand. Once again, it is Cakradhara who he-

lps us to better understand Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa’s thought:8

10. tatra hi pṛthivyāpastejovāyur iti ya itiśabdaḥ sa evaṃ

prāyaprameyāntaropalakṣaṇatvena tasyābhimataḥ |

“There, indeed, [in the sūtra] “pṛthivyāpastejovāyur iti”

the word iti is thus supposed by him [scil. Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa]

to imply similar objects of knowledge, [but] different [from

earth, water, heat and air]”.

Besides the four material elements—we infer from this pas-

sage—Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa supposes the existence of other elements

that remain unmentioned in the aphorism, but implicitly for-

shadowed by the particle iti (“thus”). Vādidevasūri (12th cen-

tury CE), in his Syādvādaratnākara (The jewel mine of the do-

ctrine of “may be”), confirms to us that this was the original

perspective of Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa:9

11. yadā caṣṭa bhaṭṭodbhaṭaḥ itiśabdaḥ pradarśanaparo na

punaḥ samāptivacanaś caitanyaśabdasukhaduḥkhecchā-

dveṣaprayatnasaṃskārāṇām tattvāntaratvāt |

“Whereas, Bhaṭṭodbhaṭa said [that] the word iti is noth-

ing but illustrative and is not [at all] an indication of con-

clusion, because of the [existence of the] other principles

of cognition, sound, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, ef-

fort and subliminal impressions”.

Moreover, Cakradhara elucidates as follows Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa’s

position on the relation existing between cognition and the phy-

sical body:10

12. yathā udbhaṭenoktam śarīrārambhakakāraṇānām eva

bhūtānāṃ sa kaścit tādṛśo vicitrasukhaduḥkhopabhoga-

do dharmaḥ svabhāvaviśeṣa ity arthaḥ |

“As said by Udbhaṭa, this [cognition] is such a certain

property, [which is capable of] enjoying the various plea-

sures and pains, a particular intrinsic nature of just the e-

lements that are the causes that constitute the body. Thus

is the meaning”.

This excerpt reminds us of the abovementioned aphorism 05.,

where cognition is described as a characteristic of the body.

Also in the present case, indeed, cogniton is defined by Udbha-

ṭabhaṭṭa as a property (dharma) or an intrisic attribute (svab-

hāvaviśeṣa) of the four elements, but only (eva) when they are

mixed up in the shape of a human body (śarīra; see the passage

07., quoted above). This very property is what experiences the

different feelings to which the body is subjected. Furthermore,

the parallel reading of the passages 11. and 12. suggests to us

that also those feelings like pleasure, pain, desire etc., should be

considered as peculiar properties of the physical body, because

they share a similar nature with cognition. All this helps us to

understand the nature of the auxiliary principles: they are prin-

ciples because they are svatantra (“self-dependent”), but they

are in a certain way properties because they are bhūtopakāraka

(“auxiliary to the elements”). Put it in another—somehow con-

tradictory—way, they are self-based properties.

However, why did Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa deviate from the classical

Cārvāka perspective on cognition? Why did he feel the need for

developing a definition of cognition, which is more sophisti-

cated than the one accepted by the ancient Cārvākas? Is this due

to the fact that, like apparently other Cārvākas, Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa

accepted within his philosophical horizon some tenets belong-

ing to other traditions of thought such as the Nyāya and/or the

Vaiśeṣika (as scholars generally believe)?11 Well, I think that,

even if it could be, in this case it is not unlikely to suppose that

Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa reconsidered the materialistic concept of cogni-

tion because at a certain point Cārvākas had to face up to many

opponents who articulated more and more their rebuttals a-

gainst the idea that cognition could be a simple effect or attri-

bute of the material elements.12 Therefore, in order to give more

internal consistence to his theories in the light of the criticism

put forward by the non-materialists, as was the case of the ob-

jections discussed below and raised against Cārvāka philosophy

by Vātsyāyana (5th century CE) in his Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya (Com-

mentary on The Nyāya aphorisms), it is not impossible that

Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa tried to find new interpretations of some pro-

blematic Cārvāka aphorism.

First of all, with the aim of giving more substance to this per-

spective, let us take into consideration the Vaiśeṣika notion of

cognition. If Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa was really influenced by this phi-

losophical school, the outline of his possible dialectical interac-

tions with Vaiśeṣikas will help us to understand in what the two

ideas of cognition differ.

Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa and the Vaiśeṣikasūtras

on Cognition

The abovementioned Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa’s passages give the im-

pression that, in developing his point of view on cognition, he

took care in distinguishing his own understanding of the na-

ture of the cognizing faculty from the Vaiśeṣika understanding

of the same concept. Indeed, if we look at the Vaiśeṣikasūtras

(The Vaiśeṣika aphorisms, compiled around the turn of the

common era and traditionally attributed to the sage Kaṇāda),13

we remark that the substances and the qualities admitted here

are (Vaiśeṣikasūtra 1.1.4-5):

11Consider for instance Bhattacharya (2010a: p. 423): “Aviddhakarṇa and

Udbhaṭa were basically Naiyāyikas. Even if they were converted to the

Cārvāka/Lokāyata, they brought the whole baggage of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

terminology when they composed their commentaries on the Cārvākasūtra”.

A similar opinion on Aviddhakarṇa has been upheld by Solomon (1972); see

also Solomon (1977-1978).

12Consider the following opinion of Halbfass (1991: p. 293): “the old [Cār-

vāka] ideas attributed to Bṛhaspati and Purandara were adjusted, modified,

and refined in response to the arguments presented by the Hindu and Bud-

dhist opponents”.

13For an outlook on the Vaiśeṣikasūtras see, among others, Matilal (1977: pp

53-59). All the quotations from the Vaiśeṣikasūtras, and the relative num-

ers of the aphorisms, when not specified otherwise, are here referred to

from Jambuvijayaji (1961).

8Quoted from Bhattacharya (2009: p. 81).

9Quoted from Bhattacharya (2009: p. 82).

10Quoted from Bhattacharya (2009: p. 81).

K. DEL TOSO 51

13. pṛthivyāpastejovāyurākāśaṃkālodigātmāmaneti dravyā-

ṇi |

“The substances are earth, water, heat, air, ether, time, s-

pace, self and mind”.

14. rūparasagandhasparśāḥ saṃkhyāḥ parimāṇāni pṛthakt-

vaṃ saṃyogavibhāgau paratvāparatve buddhayaḥ suk-

haduḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnaś ca guṇāḥ |

“The qualities are form/colour, taste, odour, touch, num-

ber, weight, distinctiveness, conjunction, separation, other-

ness, non-otherness, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aver-

sion and effort”.

Besides the elements barely material, according to Vaiśeṣi-

kas there are other non strictly material principles, such as time

or space. But what is worth noting here is that some among the

qualities listed in aphorism 14.—cognition, pleasure, pain, desi-

re, aversion and effort—are the same that Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa consi-

dered to be principles (see quotation 11.), which have the nature

of properties (see quotation 12.) of material bodies. Because of

the almost identical order according to which these qualities are

listed in both cases, it can be argued that Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa could

have been actually influenced by the Vaiśeṣikas. For instance,

he could have derived from the Vaiśeṣikas the very idea that

cognition, pleasure etc.—because they need a substratum for

actually taking place—should necessarily have the nature of

quality or property. What makes the fundamental difference

between Vaiśeṣika philosophy and Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa is the follo-

wing point: for Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa, cognition, pleasure etc. are all

independent attributes of the physical body, whereas for Vaiśe-

ṣikas, on the one hand, cognition is thought as a sign of the mi-

nd (manas) and, on the other hand, pleasure, pain, desire, aver-

sion and effort are thought as signs of the self (ātman), the body

being here confined to a secondary level or role. Indeed, as

concerning the mind, we read (Vaiśeṣikasūtra 3.2.1):

15. ātmendriyārthasannikarṣe jñānasyābhāvo bhāvaś ca ma-

naso liṅgam |

“When there is contact between self, senses and object,

the presence or absence of cognition is the mark of the

mind”.

Moreover, concerning the self we have the following apho-

rism (Vaiśeṣikasūtra 3.2.1):

16. prāṇāpānanimeṣonmeṣajīvanamanogatīndriyāntaravikā-

rāḥ sukhaduḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnaś cety ātmaliṅgā-

ni |

“The marks of the self are prāṇa and apāna [breaths],

closing and opening of the eyes, vital and mental mo-

tions, alteration of [some sense with] another sense, plea-

sure, pain, desire, aversion and effort”.

To that, it must be added that both mind and self are by the

Vaiśeṣikas believed to be everlasting substances. The following

aphorism, repeated twice (once referring to the mind and once

to the self) clarifies exactly this point (Vaiśeṣikasūtra 3.2.2, 5):

17. dravyatvanityatve vāyunā vyākhyāte |

“[Its] substance-hood and permanence are explained by

[the reference to] the air [which is unseen but exis-

tent]”.14

It is because the mind and the self are conceived as eternal,

not strictly material elements, that they are denied by the mate-

rialist Cārvākas, who cannot admit that something does actually

survive to the death of the body.15 Even if we do not have any

specific fragment bearing witness on Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa’s position

on this particular issue, it is not difficult to imagine that also

him, like all the other Cārvākas, accepted this perspective. Con-

sequently, in theorizing the attributive nature of cognition,

pleasure, pain etc., Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa assigned to the body the sta-

tus of their substratum. In doing so, he implicitly refuses the

Vaiśeṣika opinion that, on the one side, the mind is the actual

substratum of cognition16 and, on the other side, the self is the

actual substratum of pleasure, pain etc. To say the truth, Udbha-

ṭabhaṭṭa probably had to face himself with a later Vaiśeṣika

theory, according to which cognition was listed among the at-

tributes of the self, rather than among those of the mind. This

suspect acquires more substantiality when we compare the list

of the “other principles” in passage 11., quoted above, with the

following excerpt from Candrānanda’s (around 8th - 9th century

CE) Vaiśeṣikasūtravṛtti (Glosses on The Vaiśeṣika aphorisms)

15As fas as the theory of the existence of a former life is concerned, the

Cārvāka perspective is summarized for instance in the extant Tibetan

translation of Bhāviveka’s (6th century CE) Prajñāpradīpavṛtti (Glosses

called The lamp of wisdom) on Nāgārjuna’s (2nd century CE) Mūlamad-

hyamakakārikā (Root stanzas on the middle) stanza 16.1 (foll. 164a7-

b1): ’di ltar ma śi ba’i bar du gnas pa rnams la blo gcig kho nar zad pa’i

hyir te | de ltar re źig ’jig rten sṅa ma med do | | (“Thus, because, until

the[ir] death, there is nothing but one [faculty of] cognition for [each of]

those who remain [in this world], hence, then, [it is to be concluded that] a

former world does not exist”). Other Cārvāka arguments against the idea

of a stream of consciousness underlying several existences is met with in

the following excerpts. Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā ad Tattvasaṃgraha verses

1871-1876 (Śāstrī, 1968: p. 637): punarukta deśāntaraṃ kalāntaram

avasthāntaraṃ vā paralokaḥ (“It is repeted [by the Cārvākas] that the

world beyond [the present one] is another place, another time or another

condition”) . Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā ad Tattvasaṃgraha verse 1938 (Śās-

trī, 1968: p. 663): ihalokaparalokaśarīrayor bhinnatvāt tadgatayor api

cittayor naikaḥ santānaḥ (“Because of the difference between the body in

this world and [the body] in the world beyond, also the stream of the two

cognitions that adheres [respectively] to those [two bodies] is not the

same”). All these passages are referred to also in Bhattacharya (2009: p.

83), with the exception of the excerpt from Bhāviveka’s Prajñāpradī-

avṛtti that is quoted there from a Sanskrit restoration provided by San-

itkumar Sadhukhan (see Bhattacharya, 2009: p. 91). A text entirely de-

voted to the Buddhist rebuttal of the Cārvāka idea of the inexistence of a

world beyond the present one is Dharmottara’s (8th century CE) Paralo-

kasiddhi (The proof of rebirth), on account of which see Steinkellner

(1986).

16See Candrānanda’s Vaiśeṣikasūtravṛtti (Glosses on The Vaiśeṣika apho-

risms) on Vaiśeṣikasūtra 3.2.1 (Jambuvijayaji, 1961: p. 28): ātmendriyār-

- thānāṃ sannikarṣe yadabhāvāj jñānaṃ na bhavati yadbhāve ca bhavati

tad manaḥ | evaṃ jñānotpattyanutpattī manaso liṅgaṃ | (“When there is

contact of self, senses and objects, mind is that which, because of its

absence, there is no cognition, while in its presence, there is [cognition].

Thus, the occurrence and non occurrence of cognition is the mark of the

mind”). On the absence of cognition among the characteristics of the sel

in our aphorism 16. see Bronkhorst (1994: pp. 675-676). Within the phi-

losophical Vaiśeṣika horizon, cognition can be admitted as an attribute o

the mind because the mind is considered to be a substance and not, as it

happens in other systems of thought, an organ of sense (see below, note

23). In spite of its being a characteristic of the mind, cognition is in any

case accepted among the proofs of the existence of the self, as Vaiśe-

ṣikasūtra 3.1.2 is reputed to demonstrate: indriyārthaprasiddhir indri-

ārthebhyo’rthāntaratve hetuḥ (“The accomplishment of [the contact

between] senses and objects [i.e., cognition,] is the proof of something

different from senses and objects”). It is perhaps for this very reason that

at a certain point in the development of Vaiśeṣika philosophy, and not-

withstanding the clear import of our aphorisms 15. and 16. quoted above,

cognition began to be considered a mark not of the mind, rather of the self,

as we will see in a while.

14The term vāyunā, “by the air” here refers to the arguments in favour of the

permanence of the air contained in Vaiśeṣikasūtra 2.1.11 (adravyavattvā

dravyam; “[The air] is a substance because of [its] non inherence to [other]

substances”) and 2.1.13 (adravyavattvena nityatvam uktam; “The perma-

nence [of the air] is affirmed by means of [its] non inherence to [other] sub-

stances”). The same reasoning, according to our aphorism 17., should be

applied to the self and the mind.

K. DEL TOSO

on Vaiśeṣikasūtra 3.2.17:17

18. tasya guṇāḥ buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnādṛṣṭ-

asaṃskārā vaiśeṣikāḥ ||

“Its [scil. the self’s] peculiar qualities are cognition,

pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, the unseen [me-

rit and demerit] and subliminal impressions”.

The list is almost identical in both cases, except for ādṛṣṭa

(“the unseen”, referring to karman, the moral law of cause and

effect) in Candrānanda’s passage, which is—so to speak—sub-

stituted by Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa with śabda (“sound”). In any case,

the Vaiśeṣika re-elaboration of the concept of “self”, of which

Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa was surely aware, does not invalidate in itself

his dialectical position towards the classical Vaiśeṣika dichoto-

my between the mind and the self. In sum, the point against

which Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa seems to hurl himself is the Vaiśeṣika

idea that cognition, pleasure etc., although they need a body for

actually taking place, depend nonetheless primarily on the mind

and the self (or on the self alone, according to Candrānanda): it

is, indeed, the presence of the mind and the self that for Vai-

śeṣikas would allow the origination or the manifestation of co-

gnition, pleasure etc. Therefore, a body devoid of a mind and a

self could not—we infer from our aphorism 15.—experience

any cognition, pleasure and so on. On the contrary, according to

Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa (and to Cārvākas in general), it is exactly be-

cause the occurrence of those events is observed to take place

only when and where there is a body, that we should consider

the body itself to be the actual basis for the intervention of cog-

nition etc. (this is the primary meaning of our aphorism 06.).

Consequently, the need for a mind and/or a self becomes com-

pletely unnecessary.

However, the materialistic reduction of psychological or psy-

cho-physical events, such as cognition or pleasure, to the sim-

ple aggregation of four material elements, and the total denial

of some non-physical substratum (mind, self or whatever), on

which make those events depend, may have put Udbhaṭab-

haṭṭa (and of course many other Cārvākas) in front of a serious

problem. Indeed, in order to be consistent with the assumption

that cognition, pleasure etc., are qualities or characteristics, the

Vaiśeṣikas admitted the mind and the self as their substantial

substrata. Furthermore, the Vaiśeṣika consideration that the

mind and the self are substances quite different from the mate-

rial elements that constitute the physical body represents a good

position to explain why events like cognition or desire etc.,

notwithstanding their being qualities, do not manifest them-

selves in the same way in which other (physical) qualities, like

form, taste etc., do. Indeed, being cognition, pleasure etc., psy-

chological characteristics, the ancient Vaiśeṣikas should have

remarked that their intervention into or onto the substance (s) to

which they adhere to, had to depend on precise and more ar-

ticulated causes than the causes allowing the manifestation of a

colour, of a form, and so on. To exemplify this point, we can

say that a white stone of 21 pounds remains always a stone that

is white and whose weight is 21 pounds: in this case the sub-

stance “stone” holds—so to speak—permanently the characteri-

stics “white” and “21 pounds”. Pleasure, on the contrary, rises

in or on its very substance only on certain occasions, and when

there is pleasure, generally there is not pain, which in its turn

takes place on other occasions. To justify, on the one hand, the

collection of all the cognitions, all the pleasures etc., experi-

enced in one’s life under a unifying principle that could gua-

rantee the reference of all those psychological events to the one

and the same person or body and, on the other hand, the fact

that a body is not always affected by cognitions, pleasures etc.,

the Vaiśeṣikas admitted the mind and the self as permanent

substances—underlying bodies—of, respectively, cognition and

pleasure, pain etc. Hence, for the ancient Vaiśeṣikas the cog-

nizing faculty can actually take place not merely when and

where there is a body, but primarily where and when there is an

active mind (which of course dwells in the body): in this way

they explain why cognition does not always characterize the

body. The same for the self with pleasure, pain etc.

The Cārvāka denial of any substance different from the body

and able to support the cognizing faculty, the pleasures etc.,

could have represented a serious philosophical problem in the

differentiation of bare characteristics (such as colour, form, and

so on), which are observed to belong always to their characteri-

zed, from psychological events (such as cognition, desire etc.)

that, albeit adhering to the same substratum, are nonetheless

occasional. Hence, facing this consideration, the fundamental

question could have been: how can we save the materialistic

assumption of the inexistence of the self etc., and simultaneou-

sly justify the fact that, because cognition, pleasure etc., mani-

fest themselves in one and the same body, but only on certain

occasions, they—unlike the other characteristics—seem to have

a sort of partial independence from their own substratum? Per-

haps, it is because he was impelled exactly by problems of this

kind that Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa theorized what could be called a new

materialistic ontology of cognition, rethinking it in terms of

svatantra (self-dependent). Of course, being both svatantra

(self-dependent) and bhūtārtha (material), cognition cannot ob-

viously be a mere characteristic: indeed, characteristics are by

definition paratantra, that is, “dependent on something other”.18

Therefore, if a certain thing is not a characteristic tout court, it

must have also some aspect of the nature of the characterized,

that is, of a principle, a tattva. However, cognition as a prince-

ple is observed to take place only in the presence of a body

(constituted in its turn by other principles). This means that,

when a body is absent, also what depends on it does not occur:

it is for this very reason—I suggest—that earth, water etc. are

taken to be bhūtas (elements) while cognition is defined by

Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa as bhūtārtha (litt: “object/thing made by/based

on elements”; see quotation 09. above). To put it in simple wo-

rds, cognition in Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa’s system of thought preserves

its—so to speak—behaviour of property, without being exactly

a property: it can be described as a secondary or auxiliary prin-

ciple (that is, not a principle tout court). Transposed in more

philosophical terms, we could say that Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa’s cogni-

tion seems to lie on a double ontology: it is a characteristic

when compared with its substance (i.e., the body), but it is also

17Jambhuvijayaji (1961: p. 31). Note the presence of “subliminal impres-

sions” (saṃskāra) among the characteristics of the self. Another thinker,

who flourished some century before Candrānanda, namely the Buddhist

Bhāviveka, asserted a similar perspective in his Tarkajvālā. Bhāviveka, in-

deed, upheld that the Vaiśeṣikas admitted the following qualities of the sel

(I quote from He, 2011: p. 25, note 8): blo daṅ | bde ba daṅ | sdug bsṅal ba

daṅ | śes pa daṅ | ’dus byas (“Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion,

effort, merit, demerit, knowledge and subliminal impressions”). He (2011: p

25) translates ’dus byas with “conditioned”, thus interpreting this term as

meaning saṃskṛta. No doubt that here it is to be taken rather as the Tibetan

translation of the Sanskrit saṃskāra. Bhāviveka belongs to the so called

Vaiśeṣika “dark period” (Matilal, 1977: pp. 59-62) and for this very reason

his witness is particularly important for the reconstruction of the history o

Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

18In Vaiśeṣikasūtra 1.1.15, the author describes the nature of a quality (guṇa)

as: dravyāśrayī agunavān (“Resting on a substance and not endowed with

[other] qualities”).

K. DEL TOSO 53

an independent principle when compared with the other char-

acteristics of its very substratum.19 A reasoning of such a kind

could have been what led Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa to reformulate the

Cārvāka idea of cognition.

Of course, all this would remain only a supposition, although

likely, unless we find some further corroboration. I suggest he-

re—also on the basis of the abovementioned familiarity of Ud-

bhaṭabhaṭṭa with the Nyāya philosophy—that a possible argu-

ment in favour of this thesis could be (found) forshadowed in

some passages of Vātsyāyana’s (4th - 5th century CE) Nyāya-

sūtrabhāṣya against materialism, with which Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa cer-

tainly had to face up to.

Vātsyāyana on Cognition and His Criticism

towards Materialism

Before taking into account Vātsyāyana’s reasoning, it will be

helpful here to contextualize in brief the general, classical Nyā-

ya perspective on cognition—as is drawn in the Nyāyasūtras

(The Nyāya aphorisms)—and the subjects related to it. To be-

gin with, we find that the principles admitted by the Naiyāyi-

kas are five (Nyāyasūtra 1.1.13):20

19. pṛthivyāpastejovāyurākāśam iti bhūtāni |

“Earth, water, heat, wind and ether are the elements”.

Moreover, we are also reminded that several words are to be

taken as synonyms referring to cognition (Nyāyasūtra 1.1.15):

20. buddhir upalabdhir jñānam ity anarthāntaram |

“Cognition, conception and knowledge have the same

meaning”.

On the basis of this specification we are allowed to consider

all these three terms as indicating the same faculty. This is an

important assumption for correctly interpreting the excerpts that

follow. Taking these aphorisms as general premises, let us con-

sider now the following one (Nyāyasūtra 1.1.10):

21. icchādveṣaprayatnasukhaduḥkhajñānāni ātmano liṅgam

iti |

“Desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain and cognition are

the mark of the self”.

What is worth noting here, is the fact that according to the

Naiyāyikas, contrarily to what was asserted by the ancient Vai-

śeṣikas (see our aphorisms 15. and 16.), but in at least partial

accordance with the abovementioned position of Candrānanda,

also cognition is a characteristic of the self. However, like in

the case of Vaiśeṣikas, the Naiyāyikas accepted the existence of

a self,21 which is conceived as an entity that, albeit its dwelling

within the body, survives to the physical or biological death

(Nyāyasūtra 1.1.9 mentions pretyabhāva, litt. “the state after

death”, as a peculiarity of the the self). Consequently, the body

is described as nothing but the place or the means that allows

the self’s wordly experiences (Nyāyasūtra 1.1.11):

22. ceṣṭendriyārthāśrayaḥ śarīram |

“The body is the recipient of exertion, senses and [the

feelings derived from] objects”.

It is interesting, in this respect, to notice that Vātsyāyana, in

his Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya, clearly interprets the body as an instru-

ment of the self. Introducing his discussion on the aphorism just

quoted, he indeed writes:22

23. tasya bhogādhiṣṭhānam |

“[The body] is the basis of its [scil. self’s] experiences”.

The reason why the Naiyāyikas conceived the body as the

seat of the sense organs can be, in my opinion, understood quite

intuitively. Not so for exertion and objects, for which we need

to have recourse to Vātsyāyana’s interpretation:23

24. kathaṃ ceṣṭāśrayaḥ | īpsitaṃ jihāsitaṃ vārtham adhikṛt-

yepsājihāsāprayuktasya tadupāyānuṣṭhānalakṣaṇā samī-

hā ceṣṭā sā yatra vartate tac charīram | […] katham ar-

thāśrayaḥ | yasmin āyatane indriyārthasannikarṣād ut-

pannayoḥ sukhaduḥkhayoḥ pratisaṃvedanaṃ pravartate

sa eṣām āśrayaḥ tac charīram iti |

“How [is the body] a recipient for exertion? Concerning a

thing desired or avoided, exertion [consists in] the wish—

which aims at carring out the means for [obtaining or

avoiding] that [thing]—of appropriate desire to obtain or

desire to abandon; the place in which this [exertion] takes

place is the body. […] How [is the body] a recipient for

objects? The enjoyment of pleasure and pain arisen be-

cause of the contact between senses and objects occurs

where there is such a support [viz. the body, consequently]

that which is the recipient of those [objects], is the body”.

We conclude, hence, that the Naiyāyikas considered the self

as the actual experiencer of cognition, desire, aversion, pleasure

and pain, whereas the body would have a mere role of occa-

sioning factor or, better said, of bare place for the occurrence of

these very experiences. Furthermore, by not admitting—as, on

the contrary, the ancient Vaiśeṣikas did—the mind as substra-

tum of cognition,24 the Naiyāyikas had to refer the articulation

22Sastri Tailanga (1984: p. 25).

23Sastri Tailanga (1984: pp. 25 - 26), with the following readings: tadupāyā-

nuṣṭhānalakṣaṇam

→ tadupāyānuṣṭhānalakṣaṇā; varttate → vartate; ya-

sminn → yasmin; utpannayoḥ sukhaduḥkhayoḥ pravartate sa eṣām āśrayaḥ

ratisaṃvedanaṃ → utpannayoḥ sukhaduḥkhayoḥ pratisaṃvedanaṃ pra-

vartate sa eṣām āśrayaḥ.

24The most important distinction between the ancient Vaiśeṣika and the

aiyāyika psychologies lies in their different interpretation of the mind.

According to the Naiyāyikas, indeed, the mind is to be intended as having

the nature of internal sense organ—even if it is not explicitly defined as

such in the Nyāyasūtras. Vātsyāyana is quite clear on this point in his com-

mentary on Nyāyasūtra 1.1.4 (Sastri Tailanga, 1984: p. 13): manas aś cen-

driyabhāvān na vācyaṃ lakṣaṇāntaram iti | tantrāntarasamācārāc caita

atyetavyam iti | paramatam apratiṣiddham anumatam iti hi tantrayuktiḥ|

(“And [mind] is not explicitly mentioned as another attribute [of perception,

different from the five sense organs,] because of the nature of sense organ o

the mind. This [notion] is to be admitted because of the customary [accep-

tance of it] in other systems [of thought]: it is indeed usage with [other]

systems that an opinion different [from ours, when] not denied, is [impli-

citly] approved”). Whereas, the Vaiśeṣikasūtras (Comba, 1987: p. 44):

“never clearly state that the manas is an indriya, on the contrary they de-

scribe it as something very different from the sense organs: the manas is

substance (dravya), while the sense organs are made of substances but do

not constitute separate substances; the manas is eternal, while the sense

organs die with the body, because of their composite and elemental nature;

the functions of the manas are totally different from the functions of sense

organs […]; every time that the sūtras speak of the manas and of the sense

organs, they are listed separately”. For a clear survey on the philosophical

import of Vaiśeṣika into Vātsyāyana’s thought see Thakur (2003: pp.

367-372).

19What has been called here “double ontology”—referring to a dialectical

perspective—is to be considered as a quite different concept from Bhatta-

charya’s (2010a: p. 424) “the dualist position adopted by Udbhaṭa”—refer-

ring rather to a philosophical definition. See also Bhattacharya (2010a: pp.

423, 427-428). According to Bhattacharya (2010b: p. 538): “

y saying that

consciousness is independent of the four elements that constitute the human

body Udbhaṭa leaves the door open to a non-materialist position. The Cār-

vāka position was essentially monistic: no body, no consciousness”. But, as

we have seen, our quotation 12. prevents us to think that for Udbhaṭabhaṭṭ

there could be actually any cognition without a body, a concept that seems to

e somehow forshadowed also in quotation 09., where cognition is said to be

bhūtārtha, “an object/thing made by/based on the elements”. Thus, the in-

dependence of cognition seems to be a concept that is dialectically (it is

svatantra without exactly being svatantra), more than philosophically use-

ful.

20All the quotations from the Nyāyasūtras follow the edition Chandra, Sinha

(1930).

21A discussion on the Naiyāyika proofs of the existence of the self is avail-

able, among others, in Chakravarti (1982).

K. DEL TOSO

of all the psychological events to the self.25 This means that the

self is not only what experiences the various feelings and de-

sires, but it is also the actual knower of them. Hence, if the

ancient Vaiśeṣikas kept separated the feelings (referring to the

self) from cognition (referring to the mind), the Naiyāyikas—as

apparently some later Vaiśeṣikas like Candrānanda—prefer to

unify all these elements under one single factor, namely, the

self. The self is thus capable of both knowing and feeling.

Now, it seems to me that Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa’s idea of cognition

conceptually followed more—so to speak—the “self” unifying

principle of the Naiyāyikas, than the “self-mind” dichotomy

proposed by the ancient Vaiśeṣikas. Indeed, on the basis of the

abovementioned passage 12., and considered the fact that Ud-

bhaṭabhaṭṭa, as specified above, could not admit the existence

of a self without contravening the basic Cārvāka stance, we can

easily understand why for him cognition must represent not

only the knowing faculty (being it, by definition, the knowing

faculty) of the body, but also what experiences pleasures, pains

etc. In other words, Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa seems to confer to cognition

the same role that in the Nyāya system is played by the self.

Now, keeping in mind all what precedes and considering it as

a general premiss, let us turn our attention to a particular pas-

sage of Vātsyāyana’s commentary on the Nyāyasūtras, from

which we can take a sketch of the pre-Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa Cārvāka

argumentation in favour of the physicity of cognition. Accord-

ing to Vātsyāyana’s Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya ad Nyāyasūtra 3.2.35-

36, the first of these two aphorisms would expound a theory,

attributed to a general opponent, a partisan of materialism (call-

ed bhūtacaitanika, a term referring to the upholder of the doc-

trine that cognition is from material elements, and recalling our

aphorism 03.), according to whom activity (ārambha) and inac-

tivity (nivṛtti)—that in Nyāyasūtra 3.2.34 are said to be occa-

sioned by desire and aversion (which are, in their turn, the

marks/properties of the self, as our quotation 20. clearily testi-

fies)—would belong to the physical body. The second aphorism,

on the contrary, represents the Naiyāyikas’ answer:26

25. atra bhūtacaitanika āha | [Nyāyasūtra 3.2.35:] talliṅga-

tvād icchādveṣayoḥ pārthivādyeṣv apratiṣedhaḥ || āra-

mbhanivṛttiliṅgāv icchādveṣāv iti yasyārambhanivṛttī ta-

syecchādveṣau tasya jñānam iti prāptaṃ pārthivāpy ata-

ijasavāyavīyānāṃ śarīrāṇām ārambhanivṛttidarśanād ic-

chādveṣajñānair yoga iti caitanyam |

[Nyāyasūtra 3.2.36:] paraśvādiṣv ārambhanivṛttidarśa-

nāt || śarīre caitanyanivṛttiḥ | ārambhanivṛttidarśanād

icchādveṣajñānair yoga iti prāptaṃ paraśvādeḥ karaṇa-

syārambhanivṛttidarśanāc caitanyam iti | atha śarīra-

syecchādibhir yogaḥ paraśvādes tu karaṇasyārambhani-

vṛttī vyabhicarataḥ na tarhy ayaṃ hetuḥ pārthivāpy

ataijasavāyavīyānāṃ śarīrāṇām ārambhanivṛttidarśanād

icchādveṣajñānair yoga iti |

ayaṃ tarhy anyo’rthaḥ talliṅgatvād icchādveṣayoḥ pār-

thivādyeṣv apratiṣedhaḥ | pṛthivyādīnāṃ bhūtānām āra-

mbhas tāvat trasasthāvaraśarīreṣu tadavayavavyūha-

liṅgaḥ pravṛttiviśeṣaḥ loṣṭādiṣu ca liṅgābhāvāt pravṛtti-

viśeṣābhāvo nivṛttiḥ | ārambhanivṛttiliṅgāv icchādveṣāv

iti pārthivādyeṣv aṇuṣu taddarśanād icchādveṣayogas

tadyogāj jñānayoga iti siddhaṃ bhūtacaitanyam iti |

kumbhādiṣv anupalabdher ahetuḥ | kumbhādimṛdavaya-

vānāṃ vyūhaliṅgaḥ pravṛttiviśeṣa ārambhaḥ sikatādiṣu

pravṛttiviśeṣābhāvo nivṛttiḥ | na ca mṛtsikatānām āram-

bhanivṛttidarśanād icchādveṣaprayatnajñānair yogaḥ |

tasmāt talliṅgatvād icchādveṣayor ity ahetur iti ||

“There, the adherent to the doctrine that cognition is from

material elements says: [Nyāyasūtra 3.2.35] “Because

they are marks of those [activity and inactivity, which

takes place only in presence of a body], there [can] not

[be] negation of desire and aversion in these [bodies]

made by earth etc.” Desire and aversion are the marks of

activity and inactivity; [therefore,] activity and inactivity

[are characteristics] of some thing, of which [also] desire

and aversion [are characteristics, and] it is proper [to

think] that [also] knowledge [must be a characteristic] of

that [very thing]; moreover, the [body] made by earth—

because activity and inactivity are observed [to be the

marks] of bodies not [composed by] igneous and aereal

[elements]—does possess desire, aversion and knowledge,

and hence cognition.

[Nyāyasūtra 3.2.36] “[We Naiyāyikas reject all this,] be-

cause activity and absence of activity are observed in

[inanimated things like] axes etc.” [This functions as a]

rebuttal of [the idea that] cognition is in the body. [If] it

were proper [to admit] that the combination of desire,

aversion and knowledge [belongs to the body] because

activity and inactividy are observed [in it, then] cognition

[should be a property also] of instruments like an axe etc.,

because activity and inactivity are observed [also there].

But, [if only] the body possesses desire etc., then activity

and inactivity of instruments such as an axe etc. deviate

from [your argument], and in that case this [of yours] is

not a [valid] reason [for upholding that]: moreover, the

[body] made by earth—because activity and inactivity

are observed [to be the marks] of bodies not [composed

by] igneous and aereal [elements]—does possess desire,

aversion and knowledge.

25To explain this point in brief, let us follow this reasoning. Nyāyasūtra 1.1.16:

ugapaj jñānānutpatt

ḥ manaso liṅgaṃ | (“The non-arising of simultaneous

cognitions is the mark of the mind”). In this aphorism the function of the mind is

limited to the simple sieving of the several cognitions coming from the senses

and it does not, as in the abovementioned Vaiśeṣikas’ aphorims 15., constitute

the primary element whose presence allows consequently the presence of cogni-

tion. The perspective put forward in Nyāyasūtra 1.1.16 represents the theoretical

basis for Nyāyasūtra 3.2.19: yugapaj jñeyānupalabdheś ca na manasaḥ | (“An

[cognition does] not [belong] to the mind because of the non perception o

simultaneous cognised objects”). Vātsyāyana comments on this last aphorism as

follows (Sastri Tailanga, 1984: p. 168): yugapaj jñeyānupalabdhir antaḥkar-

aṇasya liṅgam tatra yugapaj jñeyānupalabdhyā yad anumīyate antaḥkaraṇam

na tasya guṇo jñānam | kasya tarhi jñasya vaśitvāt | vaśī jñātā vaśyaṃ karaṇam

ñānaguṇatve ca karaṇabhāvanivṛttiḥ | (“The non perception of simultaneous

cognised objects is the mark of the internal instrument [of cognition, scil. the

mind]; therefore, by means of the non perception of simultaneous cognised

objects, the internal instrument is inferred; [hence,] cognition is not a quality o

that [internal instrument]. Of what then [is cognition a quality]? [It is the quality]

of the cognizer [scil. the self], because of [its] being the controller. The control-

ler is the knower and the controlled is the instrument, and if [the mind] had the

quality of cognition, [there would be] cessation of [its] being an instrument”).

Therefore, according to the Naiyāyikas, cognition cannot be the mark of the

mind, rather it is the mark of the self. To the mind seems to belong the capacit

of processing just one cognition at a time.

26Sastri Tailanga (1984: p. 174). The enumeration of the aphorisms in Sastri

Tailanga’s edition differs from ours as follows: Nyāyasūtra 3.2.35 is Sastri

Tailanga’s Nyāyasūtra 3.2.36, and Nyāyasūtra 3.2.36 is Sastri Tailanga’s

yāyasūtra 3.2.37.

[Objection by the materialist:] in that case, this [sūtra],

“Because they are marks of those [activity and inactivity],

there [can] not [be] negation of desire and aversion in

these [bodies] made by earth etc.” has [to be interpreted

according to] another meaning. Activity is [a property] of

elements like earth etc., insofar as there is a particular

spontaneous attitude in moving or immovable [living]

bodies, which is a mark of the component limbs of those

[very bodies], and inactivity is the absence of that par-

ticular spontaneous attitude in [for instance] a lump of

clay etc., because of the absence of that mark. Desire and

K. DEL TOSO 55

aversion are the marks of activity and inactivity; as those

[activity and inactivity] are observed in the atoms27 of

those [elements like] the earthy one etc., there is con-

junction with desire and aversion. Because there is con-

junction with those [two], there is [also] conjunction with

knowledge. Thus it is established that cognition [belongs]

to elements.

[Answer: your argument] is not a [valid] reason because

of the non perception [of activity and inactivity] in [ob-

jects like] a jar etc. [Indeed, if we follow your reasoning,]

activity [should be also] a particular spontaneous attitude

that is the mark of the [whole] structure of the portions of

clay of a jar etc., and inactivity [should be] the absence of

that particular spontaneous attitude in [things such as]

gravel etc. [where there is no structure of parts]; but [in

these inanimate things] there is not conjunction with de-

sire, aversion, effort and knowledge [simply] because ac-

tivity and inactivity of jars and gravel are observed.

Therefore, “of desire and aversion, because they are mar-

ks of those” is not a [valid] reason».

The objection raised here by the hypothetical materialist can

be summarized in the following terms: (a) activity (ārambha) is

a mark of only the living beings (both movable, as animals, and

immovable, as vegetals); (b) activity is due to a particular

spontaneous attitude (pravṛttiviśeṣa) that is peculiar to those

living beings; (c) this particular spontaneous attitude can be

peculiar to living beings because in primis it is a mark of the

material elements that constitute their parts, and manifests itself

only when and where the elements attain the form and nature of

a living being. Moreover, it is worth noting that (d) cognition is

by the materialist proved to belong to the material elements on

the basis of its link with desire and aversion (as the sentence

tadyogāj jñānayoga, “because there is conjunction with them,

there is conjunction with cognition”, reveals), which are seen in

their turn as the marks of activity and inactivity.

All this reminds us of the abovementioned passage 12., in

which Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa speaks of a particular intrinsic nature

(svabhāvaviśeṣa, to compare with pravṛttiviśeṣa, “particular sp-

ontaneous attitude”, of quotation 25.), which is described as a

property (dharma, to compare with tadav ayavavy ūhaliṅga, “ma-

rk of the component limbs of those [bodies]”, of quotation 25.)

peculiar to the body, and which is able to experience pleasures,

pains, desires and aversions.

The argument of the materialist against which Vātsyāyana

directs his criticism seems, in any case, to have some weak as-

pect. Indeed, if the materialist upholds that desire and aversion

exist where activity and inactivity exist, Vātsyāyana argues that

activity and inactivity can be observed also in non living beings,

as for instance in an axe (whose activity depends on someone’s

utilization of it). The fundamental critical point is, therefore, the

following one: Vātsyāyana rejects the idea according to which

activity and inactivity are primarily defined as marks of bodies,

which are in their turn thought to be an assemblage of different

component parts, each of them subjected to activity and inac-

tivity. Indeed, Vātsyāyana points out that also inanimate objects

have parts—like for example a jar, which has a lip, handels

etc.—, but nobody would admit that these parts do actually ex-

perience desire, aversion etc. It follows that (A) cognition (and

desire and aversion as well) cannot be a simple or mere proper-

ty of the elements, otherwise it should be present in each ele-

ment, with the consequence that every single body would have

a number of cognitions according to as many elements concure

to constitute it (Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya ad Nyāyasūtra 3.2.37):28

26. bhūtacaitanikasyaikaśarīre bahūni bhūtāni jñānecchād-

veṣaprayatnaguṇānīti jñātṛbahutvaṃ prāptam |

“[If we accept the idea] of the adherent to the doctrine

that cognition is from material elements, [then] the va-

rious material elements [present] in a single body [would

each one] have the qualities of cognition, desire, aversion

and effort; [thus, we will] come to a multitude of cogni-

zers [in one and the same body]”.

Cognition (B) cannot be either a property of the parts that

constitute a body as such, otherwise it would/should be pre-

sent—according to Vātsyāyana’s reasoning—in almost every

body, because the majority of the existents are formed by dif-

ferent parts linked together (like in the case of a man, a jar etc.).

This is, I think, a good example of the kind of criticism to

which Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa intended to answer to with his reformula-

tion of the Cārvāka idea of cognition: to admit that cognition is

a bhūtārtha svatantra (a self-dependent thing consituted by

material elements), as we have seen, allows Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa to

confer to it a certain degree of autonomy from the body, on

which it depends nonetheless in toto for its manifestation.

Moreover, by virtue of its partial autonomy, cognition does not

depend stricto sensu on bare elements (atoms etc.) or on the

component limbs of a body tout court. Rather, it takes place as

a—so to speak— added principle, but only when and where the

elements are mixed up in a certain, precise manner, to consti-

tute bodies whose parts are organized in a likewise certain and

precise way. The concept of a svatantra (self-dependent) cogni-

tion, which is also a svabhāvaviśeṣa (particular intrinsic nature)

of the body, therefore, can represent a tentative dialectical re-

sponse to both the abovementioned Vātsyāyana’s objections (A)

and (B).

Conclusion

Cognition, pleasure, pain etc., are defined by Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa

both as principles and as properties of the human body, for

distinguishing them from what we have called the bare proper-

ties, like colour, weight etc., which are characteristics not pecu-

liar to human bodies, but belonging to every existing thing.

Indeed, cognition, pleasure etc. are really of a particular nature,

because they do not manifest themselves for all the time their

substantial substratum remains present, as colour or weight ac-

tually do. This aspect—namely, the occasionality of cognition,

pleasure etc.—marks a fundamental difference also with, for

instance, the quality “inhebriating power” belonging to the su-

bstance “liquour” (see our aphorism 04.). When, in fact, the mi-

xture of ferments, juices etc., develops its alcoholic degree, this

alcoholic degree remains permanent in that very substance. In

other terms, a case in which a liquour does not manifest the

27The Sanskrit term aṇu generally refers to “atom”. Atoms, according to

certain philosophers (among which the Vaiśeṣikas) would represent the

basic particles of every material element (earth, water etc.). Although Vāt-

syāyana’s reference to aṇus (atoms) is probably due to the fact that materi-

alists known to him upheld atomism (see Sinha, 1952: p. 242), nonetheless

we do not have any certain data on whether Cārvākas or other schools o

materialism were atomists or not. A

ossible source in favour of Cārvākas’

atomism could be for instance Guṇaratnasūri’s (14th - 15th century CE)

Tarkarahasyadīpikā (The lamp of subtle points on reasoning) on Haribha-

drasūri’s (8th century CE) Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya (Collection of six points o

view) verses 48 - 49, where the materialistic point of view on this subject is

explained as follows (Jain, 1981: p. 218): aṇavo’pi hy apratyakṣāḥ kiṃtu

haṭādikāryatayā pariṇatās te pratyakṣatvam upayānti (“Although the

atoms are imperceptible, nevertheless [when] developed into the condition

of an effect [of their mixture,] like a jar etc., they gain perceptibility”).

28Sastri Tailanga (1984: p. 175). According to Sastri Tailanga’s edition this

is the commentary on Nyāyasūtra 3.2.39.

K. DEL TOSO

inhebriating power as its quality is not given, whereas we con-

tinuously have experience of ourselves enjoying pleasures and

pains only on certain occasions. Also cognition takes place just

when we cognize. Therefore, for instance, during the deep sleep

the cognizing faculty is reputed to be suspended. This means

that the simile of the liquour (the lion’s roar of the materialistic

conception of cognition), although being very attractive, does

not represent with the due accuracy the relation existing be-

tween body and cognition. The learned Vātsyāyana should have

remarked, and consequently criticized, exactly this kind of in-

congruences.

Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa tried, with his reformulation of the nature of

cognition, to find a new definition of the psychological events

that were, at one time, in line with the materialistic assump-

tions—according to which cognition would be nothing but a

factor that is subordinated (note the compounds caitanyaviśiṣṭa,

“characterized by cognition”, in aphorism 05., and svabhāvavi-

śeṣa, “particular intrinsic nature”, in quotation 12.) to the hu-

man body—, but more philosophically and dialectically ar-

ticulated—although it is definded by him as svatantra (self-de-

pendent), Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa’s cognition is not at all an independent

principle in the same way in which the four elements of the

aphorism 01. are independent, and nonetheless it is less de-

pendent on that four elements than a bare quality, such as co-

lour, weight etc., is to conclude, we can suppose that Udbha-

ṭabhaṭṭa did so for better preventing and/or rebutting some pos-

sible spiritualistic or anti-materialistic objections, among which

those pointed out by Vātsyāyana undoubtedly represent a good

example.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank in particular Antonio Rigopoulos for

having read a draft of this paper, for his comments and sug-

gestions, Gianni Pellegrini for having discussed with me some

among the Sanskrit passages quoted here and Chiara Zaccone

for her valuable help in amending and refining the English text.

Moreover, I would have never been able to draw up the present

article without having been acquainted with the work and writ-

ings of Ramkrishna Bhattacharya—and without the intense epi-

stolary relationship occurred between him and me, to whom I

due all my knowledge of Cārvāka philosophy.

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