Justification of public investment initiatives on water transfer systems as an instrument for water balances in Spain: the case of the Júcar–Vinalopó water transfer system

doi:10.4236/as.2011.24067

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Vol.2, No.4, 518-525 (2011)

doi:10.4236/as.2011.24067

Agricultural Scienc es

Justification of public investment initiatives on water

transfer systems as an instrument for water balances

in Spain: the case of the Júcar-Vinalopó water transfer

system

Martin Sevilla*, Teresa Torregrosa*

Applied Economic Depart me n t, Water Institute, University of Alicante, Alicante, Spain;

*Corresponding Aut hor: [email protected], [email protected]

Received 5 September 2011; revised 16 October 2011; accepted 23 October 2011.

ABSTRACT

One of the most controversial issues in recent

years in water management has been finding a

balance between available resources and water

needs related to certain territories. The changes

brought about by a new awareness over the

need to preserve the environment, the social

perception of the ownership of the river chan-

nels, the need for adjust financial costs arising

from the waterworks and the compliance with

European standards urgently require redesign

of water supply policies in force at this time. The

Júcar-Vinalopó water transfer, considered as an

historic aspiration for many years in the region,

has been regarded as a key element for solving

the depletion of groundwater in a large area lo-

cated in the southeast of the Iberian Peninsula,

mainly for irrigation purposes. In this paper we

present an approach to the economic aspects

related to the implementation of the project, its

investment and financing arrangements and the

question of the subsequent management with

the impact of the well-known “recovery cost

principle”, highlighting the current difficulties in

carrying out projects of this size, due to severe

limitations, as social and economic conditions

of the transfer.

Keywords: Water Transfer; Cost Recovery;

Groundwater; Water Cos t

1. INTRODUCTION

Unlike what happens in other neighboring countries

like the United Kingdom [1] or even the OECD’s re-

commendations for additional capital investments on

into the urban infrastructures by institutional investors

[2], in Spain, public investment on water infrastructures

such as water transfers remains essential.

Throughout history there has been a constant desire to

provide the Vinalopó river basin in the south of the prov-

ince of Alicante with external water supplies, matched

by an equal desire to design initiatives to achieve this.

The Júcar-Vinalopó water transfer, considered as an his-

toric aspiration for many years in the region, has been

regarded as a key element for solving the depletion of

groundwater in a large area located in the southeast of

the Iberian Peninsula. From an institutional and territo-

rial point of view, these demands have largely been con-

centrated in the coastal areas, especially in the municipal

area of Elche, although more recently Alicante has also

started to request resources.

The beginning of the 20th century saw firstly the

transfer of sign ifican t vo lu mes o f water to the coast, o rig i-

nating in the aquifers of the Villena area, and secondly,

an increase in water transferred from the mouth of the

River Segura by the irrigation companies of the area; El

Porvenir, El Progreso and Riegos de Levante S.A.

The gradual drying out of the River Segura prompted

the first projects related to the Tajo-Segura Water Trans-

fer System1 at the end of the 1960s. Also at this time the

towns of Alicante and Elche joined the Mancomunidad

de Canales del Taibilla (MCT)2 (District Association of

the Canales del Taibilla) in order to address the drinking

1The Tajo-Segura water transfer system, one of the largest in Spain,

was initially designed to transport up to 600 Hm3 per year from the

centre to the south-east of the country, although only on one occasion,

the water year of 2000/2001, was this maximum volume of water

transferred. The General Preliminary Project of exploiting the Tajo-

Segura contemplated a maximum volume of 600 Hm3 per year “and i

has been commented that in a second phase, a further 400 Hm3may be

added.”

2The Mancomunidad de Canales del Taibilla (hereafter MCT) created

in 1927, is a public body responsible for the high-level network supply

to several towns in South-East Spain [3].

M. Sevilla et al. / Agricultural Sciences 2 (2011) 518-525

519519

water needs of a continuously growing population. Both

circumstances relaxed the demands on the volumes

originating in the Upper Vinalopó area for many years,

and it was even sugg ested that the waters from the Tajo-

Segura could alleviate the pressure on the aquifers of

Vinalopó, contributing to balancing out the system.

However, the supplies from the Tajo-Segura were un-

stable (experiencing restrictions in supplies and irriga-

tion for some years), the costs of extracting resources

from the Vinalopó aquifers were lower than the rates

applied by the MCT and there was a gradual increase in

the extractions from the Vinalopó to be used for the ex-

tended irrigated land in the Upper and Middle areas of

the Vinalopó. All of these factors gave rise to the re-

emergence of the historical demands, this time, from the

inland towns of the area of the Vinalopó.

2. THE JÚCAR VINALOPÓ WATER

TRANSFER SYSTEM IN TERMS

OF THE ECONOMICJUSTIFICATION

OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT

Do water transfer systems make sense from an eco-

nomic point of view? Does the Júcar-Vinalopó Transfer

System (JVT) make sense? What are the reasons that

justify undertaking works of this size? If the existing

literature agrees on anything in this field it is the dis-

crepancy in both the alternatives to the problems raised

and in the solutions.

This type of infrastructure is not new in Spain (the

Tajo-Segura water transfer system, the largest in Spain,

has been op er ating fo r mor e th an 30 years), neith er is the

debate in terms of its appropriateness and whether it

should be publicly financed [4]. Some authors provide

support for the hypothesis that private infrastructure

owners operate more efficiently than public ones [5].

In general terms, the public decisions regarding the

creation of water transfer systems attempt to address the

structural problems of receiving basins, where structural

water problems are understood as those where ordinary

needs and their provisions exceed current and forecast

resources. Although this concept seems simple as a gen-

eral criterion, contemplating it in Spain, where the dis-

tinction between a dry and wet Spain implies more than

one variable, and where prices applied to water far from

acknowledge the water scarcity indexes in each case,

makes it a highly complex task.

But this question is not so far removed from the issue

of costs and prices applied to the use of water. Can the

crops in the receiving areas assume all the costs incurred

by transferring water from one territory to another? If we

only contemplate this variable (and set aside other issues

such as environmental costs or the repercussions on ar-

eas from where the water originates)—to what extend

should the construction costs of the Transfer System be

subsidised with public funds?

3. THE FINANCIAL ECONOMIC

PROBLEM OF THE

JÚCAR-VINALOPÓ WATER

TRANSFER SYSTEM

Although the issues surrounding the need to supply

the Vinalopó basin with external sources have been on-

going for some time, as previously mentioned, the con-

servation of the new areas transformed into irrigated

land in the area since the 1960s is one of the key argu-

ments for justifying the transfer pro ject.

Nevertheless, while the problem of water resources

imbalance and the overexploitation of the Vinalopó basin

has predominantly been caused by private enterprises,

although strongly p romoted by p ublic in itiativ e [6,7 ], the

solution to the p roblems basically lie in the hands of the

public sector. Although this public involvement has not

been a determining factor in the medium and long-term

unsustainability of these systems3, it has been incapable

of implementing limiting measures.

The fundamental milestone in th e recent history of the

Júcar-Vinalopó water transfer system was the Júcar Ba-

sin Plan in 1998 which not only sought to resolve the

Vinalopó problem but also included the neighbouring

area of Marina Baja as a water receiving area.

It should be taken into account that the authorities of

the Marina Baja area responded to their own problem

independently of the possible solution derived from the

provision of external supplies from the Júcar. As already

demonstrated [7,9], the action taken by the Consorcio de

Aguas de la Marina Baja (CAMB) in the integrated

management of all of its water resources has ensured

that no external water resources are requ ired to cover its

needs4. However, the same does not apply to the Vi-

nalopó basin. Neither the new organisations of users, nor

the combining of uses has reduced the demand for ex-

ternal supplies. The State has also expressed its com-

mitment to constructing the system, basically because it

3Neither the IGME [8] (Spanish Geological and Mining Institute)

Reports during the 1970s that raised the need to adjust the uses to

renewable resources of the water resource system of Vinalopó, nor the

new Water Law of 1985, or the declarations regarding some overex-

loited aquifers forming part of this system (Sierra de Crevillente y

Jumilla-Vilena) led tothe incorporation of measures to resolve the

roblems, and are still not being dev eloped today, 201 1.

4A centralised management of the different resources and an internal

compensations system between all the users has enabled the problems

to be resolved with relatively low costs compared to those incurred by

transferring external supplies. In practice, although there is still a

demand for external resources, this demand corresponds to a safety

margin to cover water needs in an extraordinary situation. It is for this

ose that external water is demanded, not for ordinar

water needs.

M. Sevilla et al. / Agricultural Sciences 2 (2011) 518-525

520

considers it to be essential for so lving the problem of the

overexploitation of the Vinalopó aquifers and partly be-

cause it fulfills the directives of the Júcar Basin Plan of

1999.

There are no common norms in terms of the financing

of investments or the setting of rates to cover the oper-

ating expenses incurred in constructing the different hy-

drological infrastructure works in Spain. Therefore, on

what parameters should the economic system be based in

order to make the works feasible and sustainable in the

long term? We will consider two asp ects: the investment

and operating expenses of the system and the payment

capacity of users.

These terms are associated with the concept of “cost

recovery” since the transposition of the European Water

Framework Directive into Spanish legislation in 2003.

However, its application in Spain has been irregular and

vague. As different exceptions and interpretations of the

law are used, a single criterion cannot be applied by the

Spanish public authorities with respect to water re-

sources so as to recover the cost of these operations.

Different percentages of financing are distributed among

users and author ities in a different way for each use with

no known objective justifications other than the discre-

tional power of the acting au thority.

The action taken by Sociedad Aguas del Júcar S.A.

(Table 1), the instrumental company that has carried out

the construction works of the JVT, shows the extent to

which different criteria are adopted for different actions,

with no valid behavioural model for all types of action.

The inclusion of the Júcar Vinalopó Water Transfer

Project in the Operational Programme for Valencia

2000-2006 [10] gave rise to the granting of European

finance (ERDF Funds) for its construction, which re-

duced the costs attributable to the Central Government,

with the level of private participation in applying this

principle of cost recovery still to be determined. The

Generalitat Valenciana (Regional Government of Valen-

cia) also committed to carrying out the works of the

Postrasvase (post transfer works), essential for the dis-

tribution of water between all users, although without

contemplating the participation of users in the financing

or maintenance of this infrastructure, so the cost recov-

ery principal in this case disappears with no explanation.

4. PUBLIC SUPPORT AND FINANCING

OF THE JÚCAR-VINALOPÓ

TRANSFER SYSTEM FROM

AZUD DE LA MARQUESA,

THE NEW INTAKE LOCATION

As in many other cases of public intervention in the

economy, modifying the intake location of the Júcar-

Vinalopó Transfer System from “Cortes de Pallás” to

“Azud de la Marquesa” was not due to economic and

financial reasons. Therefore, this alteration in the project

did not rigorously contemplate the increase in invest-

ments that the new route required or the new operating

expenses models of the system to maintain its sustain-

ability.

The General Election of March 2004 and the subse-

quent change in government gave rise to a change in

water policy in Spain, including the reconsideration of

the transfer systems, even though the public works con-

tracts for the different sections of the piping of the Júcar

Vinalopó from “Cortes de Pallás” location to Villena had

already been awarded to the corresponding contractors.

From the outset, the new government considered the

modification of the National Hydrological Plan by eli-

minating the Ebro Tr ansfer System and creating the new

Water Programme through which it sought to satisfy the

water demands principally in the Segura and Júcar ba-

sins by way of desalinating sea water and promoting

reuse and making improvements in the management of

hydrologic al resources.

The issue of the Júcar-Vinalopó Transfer became cen-

tral to the debate in terms environmental questions and

issues raised by user and irrigation organisations of the

latter sections of the Júcar basin, which, until then had

not been taken into account, together with the need to

adopt the ruling of the Supreme Court of 2004 which

modified the Júcar Basin Plan.

Table 1. Investments made by Aguas del Júcar S.A. (millions of €).

Users Contributions AJS.A. Contributions European Funding Total %

infrastructure/financing Mill € % Mill € % Mill € % Mill € %

Júcar Vinalopó Water Trans fer 6960 3000 7650 3300 8580 3700 23200 100

Water supply system to Albacete 440 1500 2460 8500 2900 100

Marina Baja Pipes 190 2500 560 7500 750 100

Camp de Turia Irrigation Pipe 1500 5000 1500 5000 3000 100

M. Sevilla et al. / Agricultural Sciences 2 (2011) 518-525

521521

The change in intake location also generated conflict

with the Junta Central and altered the whole financing

model which had been agreed with this organisation

through the 200 1 Agreement on 28/2/2005, which estab-

lished:

1) The Syndicated Loan will not be awarded to cover

the part corresponding to the users for the construction

works of the Júcar-Vinalopó Transfer until the adminis-

trative and legal controversies regarding the availability

of water to transfer from the Júcar that justifies the pro-

ject are resolved. The forecast annual transferred vol-

umes and their use (irrigation and supply) should be

maintained at the levels stipulated in the Júcar Basin

Plan and in the Agreement sign ed with AJSA on 13 July

2001. The content of the ruling (…) passed by the Su-

preme Courte on 20-10-2004 (…) advises that the syn-

dicated loans should not be granted until the availability

of the water resources for the Júcar-Vinalopó Transfer

has been guaranteed through the corresponding legal

provision.

2) To urge the modification of the Agreement signed

with Aguas del Júcar S.A. so that the agreed contributio n

of the users is produ ced through pricing the water that is

effectively received.

This new situation led the Ministry to modify the

“Direct management agreement with respect to the con-

struction and/or operation of hydrological works be-

tween MIMAM-Aguas del Júcar SA”. Modification No.

1 of March 2006, changed the financing system of the

works, which from that moment and at the expense of

the new contributions of the ERDF funds from the EU

were distributed as follows: 26.4% with EDRF Funds

(€80 million); 24.7% (€75 million, the same amount as

in the preceding agreement) would be financed by Aguas

del Júcar through a loan operation passed onto the users

during the operation of the transfer through prices; and

48.9% of the cost of the activity (€148 million) would be

financed throug h funds coming from the share capital of

Aguas del Júca r.

The EC took the Decision on the 12/12/2006 to mod-

ify both its final contribution to the “Júcar-Vinalopó

Transfer” which increased to €120,121,000 (50% of the

total subsidisable cost), and the corresponding condi-

tions, which were extend ed basically to ensure the effec-

tive improvement of the aquifer recovery in Vinalopó

and the eastern part of Castilla-la Mancha, the resources

supplied to the Júcar, the situation of Albufera and the

savings in the traditional irrigated areas of the Júcar. It

also proposed the creation of a technical monitoring

group, dependent on the Monitoring Committee for the

Operating Programme of the Region of Valencia [10],

composed of representatives from the government, users,

NPO and the Commission, in order to determine the

degree of compliance with clauses of the Decision.

The greater participation from the EDRF funds re-

duced the contribution of Aguas del Júcar, which now

amounted to €108 million. Also at that time the company

calculated the operating expenses according to the fol-

lowing table, which show that the repercussion of the

transferred water costs with average transferrable vol-

umes of 70 Hm3 was €0.196/m3.

This calculation of costs transferred to the users is

possibly one of the key elements in the ensuing discus-

sions which have taken place in public debate. The most

critical opponents of t he change in intake locati on claimed

that these calculations were unreal, especially those cor-

responding to energy costs, because with the new intake

there are parts above sea level that must be overcome in

order to carry the water from “Azud de la Marquesa” to

the “San Diego” reservoir in Villena.

As the change in intake location to “Azud de la Mar-

quesa” was rejected by the Junta Central, this organisa-

tion did not sign the new Agreement necessary for set-

ting the new project into operation, which could lead to

the absurd situation of carrying out infrastructure works

that did not have any final users. During this period,

Aguas del Júcar S.A. tried to sign individual contracts

with final users of the water in order to ensure the exis-

tence of a demand for these resources, although only a

few of them (including the Town Council of Elch e or the

Main Irrigation Channel of the Elche Reservoir, which

are not represented by the Junta Central) signed these

agreements.

The final solution to th is dilemma was sought through

the signing in January 2007 of an Agreement between

the Júcar Hydrological Confederation (CHJ) and Aguas

del Júcar S.A. which includes in its explanatory pream-

ble: “That to facilitate the investment recovery of this

project, the CHJ, as the competent body responsible for

the management of the hydrological resources of the

Basin which it administrates does not oppose to being

the intermediary between Aguas del Júcar S.A. and the

final holders of the rights to use the transferred water, or

the final users of the afore-mentioned project” [11-13].

In this way it is the CHJ who is obliged to assume the

operating and conservation costs of the project, which

subsequently recovers these expenses from the final us-

ers of the water.

5. THE IMPLICATIONS ON FINANCING

OF THE COSTS OF THE

JÚCAR-VINALOPÓ WATER

TRANSFER SYSTEM

We have already seen that the change in the water in-

take location of the Júcar altered the whole balance

M. Sevilla et al. / Agricultural Sciences 2 (2011) 518-525

522

which had been so painstakingly configured by the users

of Vinalopó. It was not only a question of the different

investment and operating costs derived from the new

route (higher than the initial route). The final users were

also altered, as the new model excluded the users of the

water supply, eliminating the possibility of cross subsi-

dies which would have financed the waters used for irri-

gation through the higher prices applied to water sup-

plies. Although the former type of users would receive

larger volumes of water, they would be at higher prices

than in the initial project. That argument together with

water prices that are many times set by water managers

and, in some cases like the one we present here, politi-

cians, the effectiveness of water prices as an instrument

to rationalise water consumption is more than doubtful

[14].

Furthermore, the new situation created the paradox

whereby when water from the transfer was received for

irrigation, resources would no longer be extracted from

the Vinalopó aquifers, which would now be used for

supplying water to the towns which would not have to

finance works of the transfer project, even if this possi-

bility remained open5.

One of the issues relating to the Júcar-Vinalopó

Tranfser which is being tiptoed around is that referring

to the prices which are to be applied to the consumption

of the transferred water. This is not surprising, especially

as the economic questions relating to water have always

been characterised as being “less” important in almost

all the public projects related to water management6.

However, since the approval of the European Water

Directive of 2000 an d th e in corpo r ation of the concep t of

“cost recovery”, the panorama has partly changed. From

this moment, all the institutions were now required to

contemplate cost recovery in their budgets and if this

could not be done then the reasons should be appropri-

ately justified. However, what are these costs?

The EU Water Framework Directive distinguishes

between operating expenses, environmental costs and

resource costs. The first are defined as those costs re-

lated to extracting, piping and making water available to

users. Environmental costs are those related to the op-

erations necessary to ensure the conservation of envi-

ronmental conditions through processes such as water

treatment or aquifer recovery. However, in the case of

resource costs or the opportun ity costs of their use, there

is no consensus with respect to the meaning of this con-

cept [17].

Furthermore, the introduction of subsidies or privi-

leged financing in terms of the interest rates applied or

the repayment terms (in the case of the Júcar Vinalopó

Transfer, the repayment terms are 35 and 50 years, while

the repayment of th e capital prov id ed b y Aguas d el Júcar,

SA is interest-free), makes it difficult to set objective

criteria for the real efficiency of the projects and to de-

termine which costs should be taken into account to es-

tablish the final total prices.

In the case of the Júcar-Vinalopó Transfer Project

many of the previously-mentioned elements are present.

Both in the current project from “Azud de la Marquesa”

and in the previous one from “Cortes de Pallás”, the

economic restrictions have been regarded as a factor of

secondary importance, after the ultimate objective wh ich

was and is to transfer water to the Vinalopó Basin for its

subsequent distribution among users. We could sum up

by saying that the real costs of the Transfer and Post

Transfer infrastructure project and their operating ex-

penses are highly condition ed by the political restriction s

to which they are subject which means that the solutions

must also be political.

It is useful to bear this in mind when seeking an ex-

planation for the possible prices to apply and also to find

a solution which makes its functio ning feasible.

5.1. The Issue of Water Costs According to

Their Origin

We have previously mentioned the repayment and op-

erating rates of the JVT, contemplated in the 2007

Agreement between AJSA and the JHC. If we consider

this point as being independent from the functioning of

the whole system we run the risk that the Transfer will

not work at all. The explanation is simple: the rates

5Despite the legal difficulty in creating a new financing model which

contemplates the contributions of those users that indirectly benefit

from the improvement of the state of the Vinalopó aquifers (especially

the water supply users of the Vinalopó), the MIMAM included this

ossibility in the documentation submitted to the EC in 2005 in orde

to secure the financing of the project. As stated in the Supreme Court

Ruling of 10/12/2009, the grounds of the sixth point: “Precisely in the

rocedure processed by the Commission for the application of Com-

munity subsidies for the new route and to which the Decision refers, as

indicated by the State Lawyer in processing the conclusions, it has

always been stated that the objective of the Project is to palliate the

overexploitation of the aquifers and to correct the deficit of water sup-

lies, indicating that the great majority of the transferred resources will

e for agricultural use, although this does not mean that there may be

other beneficiaries. It was made clear to the EU’s Directorate. General

for Regional Policy, clarifying all doubts, that the arrival of the trans-

ferred waters would favour urban supply in the towns of the upper and

middle areas of the Vinalopó and the environmental regeneration of the

aquifers. Therefore, it was considered that the farmers who consumed

the transferred water through supply rates and the entities with rights

over the water as well as the users who continue to extract water from

the aquifers should parti c ip a te in the financing of the proj ect.”

6This comment is by no way unfounded. In the two reports sent to

Brussels by the MMAMRMin 2007 and 2009 [15,16], despite the

importance of this issue, the problem of rates or the prices of the water

extracted from the aquifers are hardly mentioned. Neither do these

reports analyse the question of how to resolve the compensations to the

entities which will have to close their wells and substitute their re-

sources with water from the Júcar-Vinalopó Transfer, desalinating

lants or the reused treated water.

M. Sevilla et al. / Agricultural Sciences 2 (2011) 518-525

523523

passed on to the agricultural users in some years may

reach 0.80 Euros per m3, including the repayment and

operating costs, a figure that is way above the price of

obtaining water through other methods and one which is

unacceptable for irrigation.

Openly accessible at

In the following Table 2 we have made an estimate of

these rates in accordance with the forecast of costs made

by AJSA in 2006 for a Transfer of 70 Hm3 (the operating

costs are at this year’s prices) and applying them to hy-

pothetical trans fers of between 10 and 50 Hm3.

The actual prices for this system may be higher than

the values obtained herein depending on variations in

actual costs.

5.2. The Implications of Reorganising Water

Extractions in the Vinalopó Basin

The Public Authorities responsible for water-related

issues have always taken into account that in developing

the Júcar-Vinalopó Transfer the transfer of resources

should imply a reduction in the pressur e on the Vinalopó

aquifers and, therefore, the closing of many wells in the

area. All of the reports and studies carried out in order to

obtain European Commission funds have observed this

question [15,16 ,18,19]

From a technical and hydrological point of view, the

overexploitation of the aquifers may only be resolved by

adapting extractions to replenishments, therefore, the

optimum operating level would be that which produces a

long-term equilibrium between the two. While some

studies explore the possibilities that replenishing the

aquifers would generate [8], this alternative would only

work in situ ation s when ther e was exce ss water an d with

the government assuming the costs of the whole opera-

tion7.

In the two projects contemplated (“Cortes de Pallás”

and “Azud de la Marquesa”), the logic of the solution to

overexploitation is the same: to reduce the pressure on

the aquifers and increase their sustainability, although

the ways of doing this have changed considerably.

In the Transfer Project from “Cortes de Pallás”, the

water was to be used for both agriculture and urban sup-

ply (in the Vinalopó region, Alicante and the Marina

Baja area), whereby the water that was no longer ex-

tracted from the closed wells was substituted by that

from the Transfer at the prices agreed by the users and

AJSA in 20018. With respect to the Transfer Project from

“Azud de la Marquesa”, the extractions for urban con-

sumption are not replaced by the transferred waters as

their quality is inferior, with resources generated by the

desalinisation plants on the coast being used for this

purpose, particularly those of Mutxamel and Alicante I

and II. Although from a material point of view they may

be equivalent, their costs can vary considerably. Fur-

thermore, the negotiations for resolving these exchanges

involve several Central Government bodies9; namely the

CHJ and the Water Agency, ACUAMED and the MCT.

While the former are concerned with harmonising the

water rights of the users, the MCT are responsible for

providing alternative supplies and closing wells and es-

tablishing consumer prices.

According to the Rep orts issued by the European C o m-

mission, the plans for closing wells have changed (Table

3).

As we can observe, the planned substitutions have

risen from 65 Hm3 for 2003 to 76.76 Hm3 for 2007 and

are calculated at 79.5 Hm3 for 2009. These changes have

not been explained in the ensuing reports.

Table 2. Costs transferred to the users of the Transfer.

70 Hm3 50 Hm3 30 Hm3 10 Hm3

Return of Investment (€/year) 3,490,000 3,490,000 3,490,000 3,490,000

Energy (€/año) 7,351,449 5,251,035 3,150,621 1,050,207

Turbine stations incomes (€/year) 711,030 507,875 304,725 101,575

Conservation and maintenance (€/year) 3,559,867 3,559,867 3,559,867 3,559,867

Total exploitation costs (€/year) 10,200,286 8,303,027 6,405,763 4,508,499

Total retroceded costs (€/year) 13,690,286 11,793,027 9,895,763 7,998,499

Retroceded Costs (Hm3/year) 0.20 0.23 0.33 0.80

7Although it may seem far removed from reality, this situation could arise if the possibilities of transferring water from the Júcar were higher than the

irrigation demands in the area. In this case, these studies would be useful to ascertain which aquifers could store this water which could be subse-

quently used. The issue of the costs (which in this case are double due to the Transfer rates and the cost of its construction) and quality would deter-

mine the feasibility of the operation.

8It should be noted t h a t t h e s e r a tes ar e out of d ate, although they are still used as a reference.

9Part of this problem has been eliminated with the integration of AJSA into ACUAMED in 2010.

M. Sevilla et al. / Agricultural Sciences 2 (2011) 518-525

524

Table 3. Programmed well closures 2003-2007 in the Vinalopó-Alacantí System.

V inalopó Alacantí System.

Hydrogeologica l Unit s 2003 Replacement Proposal

(Hm3) 2007 Replacement Proposal

(Hm3)

32. Sierra Grossa 0.32 0

33V Alm ansa 0 1.02

34. Sierra Oliva 0 0

35. Jumilla-Villena 15.00 20.64

36. Villena-Benejama 16.50 17.21

40. Sierra Mariola 1.35 2.83

41. Peñarrubia 4.50 2.59

42. Carche-Salinas 6.50 6.14

43. Argue ña-Maigmó 4.00 1.64

44. Barrancon e s-Carrasqueta 0.86 0.11

48. Orcheta 0 0

49. Agost-Monneg re 0.45 0.07

50. Sierra del Cid 1.00 1.65

51. Quibas 3.60 3.23

52. Crevillente 10.07 10.27

99. Impermeable 0.85 9.39

Total 65.00 76.76

Source: [19,20]

The 2009 Report [15] highlights the implications of

these substitutions for both agricultural uses and supply

uses with the latter reaching 27.8 Hm3. If we take into

account that the Transfer waters are not appropriate for

human consumption and therefore the towns of the Up-

per and Middle Vinalopó areas continue to extract un-

derground water for this use, practically all of the sub-

stitutions will corresp ond to what has b een called “water

exports” to the coast and especially to the wells of Aguas

Municipalizadas de Alicante, The Local Government of

Elche (through its contract with Finca Los Frutales) and

Sociedad Canal de la Huerta de Alicante S.A.

The change in costs produced by substituting the wa-

ter from the aquifers, whose prices vary between 0.20

and 0.30 €/m3, with those obtained through theses alter-

native supplies on the coast is considerable. With 2008

data, we have included the rates applied by the MCT,

which were 0.5446 €/m3 and the costs which the same

organisation estimates that the different desalinisation

plants that it manages, which in the case of Alicante

reached 0.70 €/m3.

The new situation will bring with it a considerable in-

crease in the prices charged to final users in the towns on

the coast, which are currently supplied, in part, by the

water from the Vinalopó aquifers. The case of Sociedad

Canal de la Huerta S.A. is special because its hydrologi-

cal resources should only be used for agricultural con-

sumption.

According to this model, th e towns that would benefit

are those of the Upper and Middle areas of the Vinalopó,

because due to the lack of other alternatives they will

continue to be supplied by their wells, and at the same

time their water masses will improve with the reduction

in extractions of water for irrigation (which is substituted

for the transferred water) and the extractions used to

supply the coast will d isappear.

6. CONCLUSIONS

Without doubt, the implementation of the Júcar-Vi-

nalopó Transfer system will represent an historical mile-

stone in terms of water in the south of Alicante. The

transformation of the traditional aspirations of a specific

project has been surrounded in controversy, which is

evident in the decisions that have been taken in recent

years to this respect.

The issues relating to the appropriateness of one in-

take location or another in the Júcar will take second

place to the need to specify how its water is to be shared,

how the costs are to be distributed and how all the re-

sources and uses are to be organised in such a complex

hydrological system.

The new challenges that have arisen are also related to

the coordination of the different agents that operate in

this field and the need for them to be capable, with a

M. Sevilla et al. / Agricultural Sciences 2 (2011) 518-525

525525

maximum level of responsibility, to obtain the highest

profitability from this project and share the profits and

the costs equally.

The final solution will not be easy, especially due to

the enormous politicization that the hydrological issues

in this region have acquired. However there is no doubt

that the questions related to the costs and prices that are

finally applied will be decisive for a possible solution.

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