Students’ Estimates of Others’ Mental Health Demonstrate a Cognitive Bias

doi:10.4236/psych.2011.25067

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Psychology

2011. Vol.2, No.5, 433-439

Students’ Estimates of Others’ Mental Health Demonstrate a

Cognitive Bias

Larry D. Reid

Department of Cognitive Science, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Troy, New York, USA.

Email: [email protected]

Received April 27th, 2011; revised June 13th, 2011; accepted July 24th, 2011.

Students of five USA-campuses were surveyed concerning their use of prescription drugs to improve mental

health. They were asked whether they had ever been prescribed medicines to treat various disorders and if they

were currently taking the prescribed medicines and to estimate the percent of the students on their campus re-

sponding similarly. The incidence of being prescribed and currently taking medicines for the disorders was not

markedly different than what might be expected from knowing published incidence rates. The students’ esti-

mates of their fellow students’ rates of being prescribed and currently taking the medicines was considerably,

sometimes dramatically, larger than the actual rates. Further testing rejected some potential explanations of the

tendency to make overestimations. The conclusion was eventually drawn that the tendency to overestimate the

mental distress of fellow students was a special case of superiority bias and had features of an implicit social

cognition enhancing their own self-esteem.

Keywords: College Stude n t s , Prescription Drugs, Illusory Superi ority, Depression, Implicit Social Cognition

Introduction

As a result of discussions with undergraduates, I learned that

some students had a very distorted view of their fellow stu-

dents’ use of prescribed medicines for the treatment of depres-

sion and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). To

see how widespread those views were, a questionnaire was

distributed asking students if they had ever been prescribed

medicines for treating a number of psychiatric disorders. They

were also asked to estimate the percent of the students at their

university that had been prescribed the same medicines. Their

answers provided an index of the actual incidence of having

been prescribed a kind of medicine as well as students’ esti-

mates of the percent of students that had been prescribed those

medicines. The results indicated that the proportion of the sam-

ple that had received a prescription for the disorders was similar

to reported incidences of the disorders in national surveys (for a

more recent survey see, e.g., Olfson & Marcus, 2009) or diag-

nostic and statistical manuals (e.g., American Psychiatric Asso-

ciation, 2000). The students’ estima te s of the proportion of the i r

fellow students who had received prescriptions were much

larger than the actual number. The results were, from my per-

spective, so peculiar that I merely set them aside. Yet, further

discussions with students continued to confirm that they had,

on average, a distorted view of the mental health status of their

fellow students.

About six years after the first survey, another was developed

that focused on the incidence of being prescribed a medicine for

six disorders. This one was answered by students at five

American colleges or universities. This article begins with a

summary of their answers. As will be seen, the students clearly,

and often dramatically, overestimated the use of prescribed

medicines for the disorders.

One idea germane to the issue of American students’ overes-

timation of their fellow students’ use of prescription medicines

is related to the idea that Americans are exposed to consider-

able advertising in an attempt to get them to ask health care

providers to prescribe a medicine. A test of the idea that adver-

tising is germane is to compare the estimates of college students

from a country that does not allow advertising to induce use of

prescription medicines to the estimates from colleges in the

USA. Consequently, students from a university in Singapore

were asked to take the same survey as the one given to Ameri-

can students. These students, who are not as exposed to adver-

tising of prescription drugs, also overestimated the incidence of

their fellow students’ use of the drugs, thereby, providing no

support for the idea that exposure to TV-ads was germane.

Because the results indicated that students have a very pes-

simistic opinion concerning their fellows’ use of prescription

drugs for mental health problems, I wondered if their pessi-

mism was confined to drug-use or, perhaps, a pessimism con-

cerning the actual status of their fellows’ mental health. I took

advantage of work we were doing concerning the development

of ways of measuring prevailing moods to get relevant data.

First students were asked to describe their prevailing mood

on a scale with anchors of very depressed to very happy. They

were then asked to estimate the percent of students on their

campus who were very depressed and very happy. There was a

marked overestimation of the incidence of depression. They

also underestimated the number of students who were very

happy.

The question that comes into focus is: Why do students have

a markedly distorted view of their fellow students’ mental

health? An answer is offered as the results are discussed.

Methods

The American students taking the survey about prescription

L. D. REID

434

drugs were undergraduates from a science and technology fo-

cused university, from a small liberal arts college in the Mid-

west, from a small liberal arts college in upstate New York,

from a university in the southwest, and undergraduates and

graduate students from an eastern university (total N = 912).

Each survey conformed to the rules and procedures for con-

ducting human research extant at their respective institutions.

Some of the respondents had opportunities for being informed

concerning the incidence of the various disorders for which

medicines might be prescribed (e.g., by currently taking a

course concerning relevant topics). However, those students’

estimates were similar to those without the educational oppor-

tunity; consequently, what limited knowledge that was avail-

able about the specifics of their education was not taken into

further consideration. The students from Singapore were un-

dergraduates from a science and technology focused university

(N = 122). The students (N = 389) reporting their prevailing

mood were from the same science and technology university in

the USA whose students responded to the survey concerning

prescription drugs.

The samples of students from the various colleges or univer-

sities are not random, representative samples of their respective

populations. They are convenience samples, i.e., samples from

courses being taught by professors who were willing to process

the survey. Because of this limitation, what might be statisti-

cally significant differences among the samples from the vari-

ous campuses are not reported here. This summary focuses on

the disparity between the actual rate of prescriptions of drugs to

correct mental health problems and current use of those pre-

scribed drugs (as reported by the students) and the students’

estimates of the incidence-rate of those prescriptions and the

estimates of current use.

The drug-survey began with this introduction: “There are

many surveys of students’ use of illicit drugs and we are not

interested in doing another one. On the other hand, there is very

limited information concerning the extent of use of prescribed

drugs (drugs indicated for use by a professional health care

provider) by college-age adults. To learn about the extent of the

use of prescribed drugs relevant to mental health issues, we are

asking you the following questions.” In addition, there were

directions to ensure that the student’s responses were to be

given anonymously. Students were asked to report their age and

sex.

The first four items of the survey were as follows.

1) Have you ever been prescribed medication for depression

(an antidepressant)? YES NO

2) What percent of the population of your college (university)

do you estimate have been prescribed an antidepressant? ___%

3) Are you currently taking an antidepressant? YES NO

4) What percent of the population of your college do you es-

timate are currently taking a prescribed antidepressant? ___%

This pattern of questioning was repeated with students being

asked about prescriptions for anxiety, bipolar disorder (manic

depressive disorder), insomnia, chronic pain (lasting pain) and

attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder.

The survey with respect to the descriptions of depression was

given to students (N = 389) at one American university, the

university that had the most students completing the survey

concerning prescription-drug use.

A 9-unit scale was devised that was a list of nine paragraphs

(see Appendix A). The first paragraph was a description of

major depressive disorder. The second was also a description of

depression but the description indicated a slightly less severe

depression than the first. At other end of the list were descrip-

tions of prevailing happy moods featuring attributes associated

with being generally very happy such as finding pleasure in

work and interacting with family. The ninth unit of the list was

a description of not only being happy, but being happy and

flourishing. The middle of the scale was a statement about be-

ing neither happy nor depressed, i.e., having a generally neutral

mood.

Students were asked to indicate which of the descriptions

best described their prevailing mood. On a second page, they

were asked to estimate the percent of students on their campus

that would indicate that their prevailing mood was given by

either of the two descriptions of depression and to estimate the

percent of students whose prevailing mood was given by either

of the two descriptions of being very happy. The issue was

whether they would overestimate the number being depressed

(corresponding to their estimates of taking medicines for de-

pression) and, perhaps, also overestimate the number being

happy.

Results

In brief, nearly all students markedly overestimated the inci-

dence of their fellow students being prescribed and currently

taking a drug for the disorders (Tables 1 and 2). All means for

estimates of use are considerably larger than percents for actual

use and very few students’ estimates were similar to averages

of the actual prescription-rate and current use. For example,

81% estimated over twice the actual current use of antidepres-

sants. Many students’ estimates were wildly different from the

actual incidents of use of the prescribed-drugs (see Figure 1). In

comparison to American men, American women consistently

overestimated the incidence of prescriptions for each of the

drugs, as well as the current use of the drugs (ps < 0.003 com-

paring women to men’s estimations across all 12 comparisons).

In contrast to the marked disparity in mean estimates between

American men and women, men and women from Singapore

over estimat e d similarly.

There are, at least, two ideas concerning how those receiving

a prescription for an antidepressant would estimate their fel-

Table 1.

USA students’ use and estimates of use of prescribed drugs.

Ever prescribed

medicines for : depression anxiety bipolar insomniapainADHD

Males’ actual

(n = 523)4.4 4.0 1.1 2.7 13.45.7

Females’ actual

(n = 389)9.8 10.8 1.3 4.9 12.64.6

Males’ estimates20.9 19.5 8.5 16.9 19.327.3

Females’estimates30.3 28.1 12.3 22.1 23.233.4

Currently taking

medicines for : depressionanxiety bipolar insomniapainADHD

Males’ actual 1.5 1.5 0.0 1.7 1.1 4.6

Females’actual 4.4 4.1 0.8 1.5 2.1 3.1

Males’ estimates16.5 15.7 6.9 13.4 14.323.1

actual estimates24.9 24.1 9.9 18.5 20.329.2

Note: val ues are % of the sample.

L. D. REID 435

Table 2.

Singapore students’ u s e a n d e s t i m a t e s o f u s e o f p r e s c r i b e d d r u g s .

Ever prescribed

medicines for : depression anxietybipolar insomnia painADHD

Males’ actual

(n = 31) 0.0 3.2 0.0 0.0 12.90.0

Females’ actual

(n = 91) 2.2 3.3 0.0 5.5 8.8 0.0

Males’ estimates 13.2 14.5 4.6 23.8 19.27.7

Females’ estimates 16.5 13.8 5.2 23.9 19.010.4

Currently taking

medicines for : depression anxiety bipolar insomnia painADHD

Males’ actual 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.5 0.0

Females’ actual 1.1 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

Males’ estimates 10.4 10.9 3.2 20.5 14.16.0

actual estimates 11.8 11.7 3.7 20.2 14.76.2

Note: val ues are % of the sample.

lows’ use of antidepressants. By virtue of their prescriber’s

instructions, the person prescribed an antidepressant is apt to be

more informed about the actual incidence of such prescriptions.

Or, by virtue of their own curiosity, students may have checked

on the incidence of persons getting antidepressants. Conse-

quently, the students who have been prescribed antidepressants

may be better informed and be less prone to overestimation.

Another idea is that the students having been prescribed antide-

pressants will have the idea that such an event is common and

will be more prone to overestimations. This latter idea has been

dubbed “a false consensus effect” (Wolfson, 2000).

The USA-students’ responses were sorted into two groups:

those prescribed an antidepressant and those who had not (ns =

61 and 851, respectively). Those who had been prescribed an

antidepressant estimated that the percent of all students who

had been prescribed an antidepressant as 39% whereas those

who had not been prescribed an antidepressant estimated 24%

(p < 0.0001). Except for estimates related to anti-anxiety drugs,

those having a prescription for antidepressants did not markedly

differ in their estimations from those having a prescription. The

results support the general idea of “a false consensus effect”

Figure 1.

The distribution of responses for the estimates by American college

students of their fellows’ current use of antidepressants. The actual

reported current use was 2.7%.

and lend no support for the notion that those getting a prescrip-

tion for antidepressants are more informed concerning the inci-

dence of such prescriptions.

As mentioned in the introduction, a survey was developed

concerning the moods of students with a scale using descrip-

tions of moods ranging from depression to happy and flourish-

ing. We then asked each student to pick the one description that

best described the student’s prevailing, usual mood. In concor-

dance with extensive literature concerning peoples’ reports of

their prevailing mood as being positive (see, e.g., Diener &

Diener, 1996), 85% of our sample rated their prevailing mood

as positive in contrast to neutral or some variant of depressed or

sad. Over 50% of our sample rated themselves in a way con-

cordant with t he way other scales’ rating of very happy and 2%

indicated that they were depressed (Figure 2).

Did those who rated themselves depressed estimate greater

incidences of depression? Also, are those who rate themselves

happy less apt to estimate others as being depressed? When

tabulating their estimates, the responses of the two groups who

reported themselves depressed were combined because there

were very small numbers in each of those two categories. The

two categories at the happiest end of the scale were also com-

bined to make the scale symmetrical. The results yield re-

sponses to a scale of seven self-reported prevailing moods

ranging from depressed to neutral to very happy. Students were

asked to estimate the percent of all students that would rate

themselves as depressed (the two descriptions of clear depres-

sion) and the percent of all students that would rate themselves

as very happy (the two description of happy). Figure 3 summa-

rizes the estimates.

Those who rated themselves depressed (2%) clearly overes-

timated the percent of all students who would indicate they

were depressed (35%) thereby providing support for “a false

consensus effect.” Those who rated themselves as very happy

(53%), however, did not overestimate the percent of all students

who would rate themselves as very happy; in fact, they under-

estimated the percent of students who would rate themselves as

very happy (38%). The estimates of those who were happy

provide no support for the general idea that there is “a false

consensus effect.”

Figure 2.

The estimates of those depressed and those very happy in comparison

to those who rated themselves depr es s ed a n d ve ry ha pp y.

L. D. REID

436

Figure 3.

The dark bars depict the average estimates of percent of students who

would rate others as depressed as a function of their own prevailing

mood (designated by numbers along the x-axis). For example, those

who reported their own mood as depressed (designated 1&2) estimated

that 35% of their fellow students would be depressed. The actual num-

ber of students reporting they were depressed is about 2%. The gray

bars depict the average estimates of the percent of students who would

rate others as very happy as a function of their own prevailing mood.

Those who reported their own mood as very happy (designated 8&9)

estimated that 38% of their fellows would be very happy and only

slightly less than 16% would be depressed. The actual number report-

ing they were very happy is 53%.

There were general trends suggesting that the more negative

a self-reported mood, the larger the estimates of other students

who would rate themselves as depressed. Concurrently, the

more positive a self-reported mood, the smaller the estimates of

others who would rates themselves as depressed (Figure 3).

Given these trends, however, notice that the average estimate of

all levels of self-reported moods estimated that 15% or more of

others were depressed (Figure 2).

Discussion

Prescriptions for pain were provided most often, but that may

not be out of line with the incidence of pain among college

students. College-age students have a surprisingly high inci-

dence of chronic pain with back-pains and migraine headaches

being frequent complaints. Thomas, Roy, Cook and Marykuca

(1992) tabulated available data and estimated that 3 to 10% of

students probably saw a physician for treatment of pain and

likely received a medication for it. A large survey of students

(ACHA-NCHA, 2009) indicates that 12.6% of college students

were treated within the year preceding the survey for back pain

and 7.9% for migraine headache. Presumably, those treatments

often involved prescription of analgesics. Our survey indicates

that about 13% of both American men and women students

have, at some time, received a prescription for pain. It appears

that the prescriptions for pain are, in rough, concordance with

the instances of pain. Only a few students, taking our survey,

were currently using the prescribed analgesics (1.2% for men

and 2.1% for women) and were probably still treating their pain.

The use of medications for pain is roughly similar for the sam-

ples from the USA and Singapore (Tables 1 and 2).

The students from Singapore also overestimated the number

of other students taking medicines for the disorders. The over-

estimations of students from a country that widely advertises to

encourage persons to use prescription-drugs and from a country

that has no such advertising does not support the idea that ad-

vertising is salient with respect to the tendency to overestimate

the incidence of prescription-d r ug use.

The extensive survey of college students (ACHA-NCHA,

2009) asked about 25,000 students about their use of alcoholic

beverages and use of illicit drugs. The survey also asked stu-

dents to estimate other students’ use of these agents. Students’

estimates of alcohol use and illicit drug use were larger than the

students’ reports of their use. These data extend the data of the

ACHA-NCHA survey by indicating that students also overes-

timate the rate of being prescribed drugs that modify feelings

and overestimate the extent of depression among their fellow

students.

The surveys were not designed to assess the appropriateness

of prescribing medicines for the listed disorders; the interest

was in the apparent misperceptions concerning other students’

use of prescription drugs. The extraordinary differences in the

rates of being prescribed medicines for the listed disorders, with

the exception of medicines for pain, between the American and

Singapore samples does, however, lead to a number of interest-

ing questions. Although we do not have random samples of

students from Singapore and the USA, the differences in rates

of use of prescriptions for mental health problems is so striking

as to deserve some notice (compare Table 1 to Table 2). There

are surely plenty of physiological and experiential differences

between the typical USA and Singapore college student that

might be relevant to the fact, for example, that USA students

have been prescribed medicines for ADHD at a high rate

whereas that is evidently not the case for Singapore students.

Perhaps, however, the following observation is relevant. The

USA has about 5% of the World’s population but buys about

50% of the drugs produced (Hart, Ksir & Ray, 2009). Further,

drugs for treating depression, anxiety, insomnia and ADHD are

among the best selling drugs in the USA. The USA apparently

has become acculturated to the idea that pharmacological solu-

tions are an acceptable means of dealing with emotional/ be-

havioral problems whereas other societies have not.

American college students reported substantial rates of de-

pression, 11.2% (ACHA-NCHA, 2009). Perhaps, students pro-

ject that their fellow students must also be depressed suffi-

ciently to get medical help. However, they estimated the inci-

dence of being prescribed an antidepressant at 22.7%, over

twice the reported incidence of feeling depressed. Many stu-

dents are likely calling “being depressed” somewhat differently

than the symptoms meeting the criteria for major depressive

disorder as indexed in our extant diagnostic and statistical

manuals. Presumably, health care providers are not prescribing

antidepressants to individuals who do not meet some standard

of severity of mood disorder. These data, although surely not a

random sample of college students in the USA, does indicate a

conservative rate of prescribing medicines for depression ac-

cording to the ACHA-NCHA (2009) survey’s tabulation of

students’ claims of being depressed. Less than half of the

American students prescribed a medicine for depression con-

tinued taking the medicines once prescribed which opens many

questions concerning compliance, adverse drug-reactions and

the healing power of the drugs.

Perhaps, knowing about psychiatric disorders is so esoteric

that one should not expect students’ estimates to be close to

accurate. If that were the case, one would expect some sort of

L. D. REID 437

random set of estimates; but, that did not occur. There was a

consistent trend toward overestimation, indeed, even extreme

overestimation. Further, the estimates roughly follow a pattern

with estimates for the least prevalent disorder being estimated

as having the least incidence. The idea that they just are not

aware of prescription drug-use and, therefore, are just making

unfounded guesses is not supported by the survey of moods.

The descriptions were straightforward and simple and students

readily judged their own mood. They, however, were far from

accurate in guessing the percent of other students’ ratings of

themselves. The students’ estimates are not unfounded in the

sense of being random, but seem to be founded in something

similar to prejudice; other students are just judged to be less

healthy, less happy than they are.

The data were collected during a period of extremely diffi-

cult economic circumstances. One wonders if the pessimistic

prevailing view of their fellow students’ mental health reflects a

prevailing pessimistic view of the extant circumstances in the

USA. The survey done 6 years before this one found the same

degree of overestimation, yet it was during better economic

times.

In some games of trust, it is profitable to trust that ot hers will

be equitable and seemingly fair. Most persons do respond equi-

tably. When, however, asked to estimate the percent of persons

that can be trusted to be equitable, they underestimated the

level of trust, i.e., they seemingly believe that they are more

generous and trustworthy than their fellows (Fetchenhauer &

Dunning, 2010). Students’ estimates of trust and their estimates

of the mental health of their fellow students might be a mani-

festation of a similar process.

Among those studying the relationship between cognitions

(e.g., beliefs or memories) associated with depression, there is

considerable support for the idea that those who are depressed

have a bias that colors their beliefs and memories (e.g., Hertel

& Brozovich, 2010; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). In situations

reported here, we asked people to estimate the prevalence of

being prescribed medicines for mental disorders and the preva-

lence of moods (including depression). Presumably, those esti-

mates reflect cognitive habits (beliefs, attitudes, biases that

become manifest in situations of ambiguity). These data add to

that literature. The data support the notion that depressed peo-

ple have a negative bias whereas happy people have less of a

negative bias. Further, the data indicate that the relationship has

a “dose-response” characteristic, the greater the severity of

depression the greater the bias toward negative opinions. Inter-

estingly, however, even the happiest severely overestimated the

prevalence of depression. The generalization is that students

generally think poorly of their contemporaries (a negative bias

toward persons not exactly strangers but not their closest asso-

ciates either). Being happy does not eliminate the general ten-

dency to overestimate the prevalence of depression, but it does

seem to prevent the estimates from being extremely off of the

mark.

The idea of “a false consensus effect” was not supported by

the estimates of the very happy as they estimated the rates of all

students’ happiness. Rather than concluding that persons tend

to overestimate their own circumstance, it seems more correct

to say that persons tend to estimate that others are less mentally

healthy, less trustworthy, more likely to use drugs and exten-

sive use of alcoholic beverages and probably a number of less

favorable characteristics.

The research started with a simple question: do more than a

few students on one college campus have a markedly distorted

few of the use of prescription-drugs for mental health? The

answer is yes. Because similar surveys were given six years

apart, the results do not seem to be peculiar to one specific time.

The next question was: were the distorted views observed on

one campus peculiar to that campus? The answer is no. The

next question was: were the distorted views related to the

American practice, which is rare in the World, of advertising

for prescription drugs. The answer is probably not. The next

question was: was the distorted view, the bias, peculiar to

drug-use? The answer is no, students distort the incidence of

depression as well as the incidence of use of prescription-drugs.

The data support the idea that there is a pervasive cognitive

bias. The bias is similar to the superiority bias that has attracted

considerable attention among social psychologists. The superi-

ority bias, however, is a conclusion (derived from some rather

simple experiments but bolstered by confirmatory data) that

people have an almost inherent bias that distorts their view

toward believing that they are better than average.

Garrison Keillor’s characterization of the folks in his fic-

tional home town (Lake Wobegon) as “all the women are

strong, all the men are good looking, and all the children are

above average” has provided a colorful label, the Lake Wobe-

gon Effect, for what social psychologists have called illusory

superiority, superiority bias or a sense of relative superiority.

The illusory superiority is a pervasive tendency to overestimate

one’s achievement, characteristics and capabilities in relation to

others or to overestimate the better qualities of one’s own group.

This cognitive bias is, indeed, pervasive and can be demon-

strated in a wide range of circumstances (Illusory superiority,

2011) or as Harris (2010) said “there is nothing more common

than the belief that one is above average in intelligence, wis-

dom, honesty, etc.” (p. 188). Because a superiority bias is rarely

founded in fact, there is cognitive dissonance associated with

sustaining it. Flattery might support the idea of superiority,

hence be welcome a nd also b e a potential reason why flattery is

remarkably effect in influencing people even when it is an ob-

vious ploy.

The students made prejudicial judgments that are unflattering

and often grossly wrong. One might surmise that such judg-

ments follow from the Lake Wobegon Effect hence might be

labeled Lake Wobegon Effect prejudice or merely Wobegon

Prejudice. Wobegon Prejudice is the tendency to attribute nega-

tive attributes to others supposedly to sustain the belief that “I

and mine are superior.” Wobegon Prejudice has its own kind of

logic: “If I am better than the average person (i.e., most others),

most of them must be worse than me.”

If the superiority bias in nearly universal, and many believe

that it is, and it is accompanied by Wobegon Prejudice, the

tendencies inherent to such a cognitive bias helps explain why

someone would denigrate persons or groups that they have

never interacted with or never met. It is not about the others, it

is about a threat to illusory superiority. The superiority bias

makes problematic prejudices, such as racism, likely. The idea

of a Lake Wobegon Prejudice seems to be somewhat different

than the kinds of prejudice enumerated by the classic discussion

of the sources of prejudice (Duckitt, 1992). The students’ re-

sponses are not overtly prejudicial; they seem to be more akin

to an implicit social cognition in support of their own

self-esteem or a superiority bias (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).

L. D. REID

438

Although the research was done to merely try to understand the

gross overestimation of college students’ estimates of their

fellow students use of psychopharmacological drugs, the find-

ings provide strong support for the almost universal prevalence

of a cognitive social bias, whether that be called Lake Wobegon

Prejudice, the inverse of a superiority bias, or an implicit social

cognition in service of self-esteem.

Characterizing the overestimations of other’s difficulties as a

process of a superiority bias also makes some sense of why

persons become so upset and so defensive when facts are stated

indicating their group is not superior, and their country is not

exceptional (Hornsey, 2003). In reality, the stated facts are not

threatening (to know that many countries have a better health

care system, does not, in fact, make one’s own health care sys-

tem any better or worse), but the stated facts may impinge upon

one’s illusionary superiority and, thereby, becomes a threat.

Threats are usually met with something akin to hostility.

As Ashdown, Gibbons, Hackathorn, and Harvey (2011) sta-

ted, Social Identity Theory posits that in-group sympathies

often lead to out-group derogation which, in turn, increase the

risk of discrimination against the out-group. Ashdown et al. go

on to say “If one follows the logic of Social Identity Theory

that in-group sympathies will often lead to out-group deroga-

tion, then prejudice, racism, and discrimination can be ex-

plained in terms of simple group dynamics” (p. 78). Their hy-

pothesis that in-group sympathies will often lead to out-group

derogation is similar to my pointing out that if individuals be-

lieve that they are superior to others than it logically follows

that others are somehow inferior (Wobegon Prejudice). The

findings presented here indicate that it is not necessary for one

to have a specific out-group to reference to have a cognitive

bias with regard to others; one just has to sustain a superiority

bias to be at risk for prejudice.

One of the major findings of recent investigations centered

about the study of happiness, within the context of the broader

positive psychology approach, is that most people rate them-

selves as happy. Further, there seems to be a marked resistance

to the acceptance of that fact. The finding is that “most people

are happy, and most people do not acknowledge that.” Perhaps,

the knowledge that most people are happy is dissonant with a

superiority bias and leads to the implicit social cognition: “If I

am better than the average person, and if I am happy, then most

others must be unhappy.”

Acknowledgments

The following colleagues were instrumental in accumulating

the data reported here and provided interesting discussions

concerning the outcomes. Thank you Monica Amin, Rebecca P.

Ang, MaryAnn Bush, Daniel Calcagnetti, Ryan Callery, Sa-

matha Cheong, Tamir Dannon, Christopher Hubbell, James

Hunsicker, Nikki Johnson, David Pukalski, Larry Sensenig, and

Meta Reid.

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L. D. REID 439

Appendix

A survey of the Laboratory for Psychopharmacology, Survey

NS-2, page 1

Do not put your name or any other identifying marks on

the survey. We want your responses to be anonymous. When

you finish taking the survey, fold it so that your responses are

hidden from others. We will only report aggregate data, e.g.,

means and measures of variability. We sincerely appreciate

your willingness to help us understand some important issues.

Thank you.

Moods are something you have every conscious moment.

Moods vary, both throughout the day and across days, weeks,

months and years. Despite some variations, most people have a

mood that characterizes most of their existence. In this simple

survey, we ask what your prevailing mood is. Please read the

following descriptions of people’s moods, i.e., their prevail-

ing circumstances with respect to their usual feelings. Please

read them twice. After reading them, please check the one

description which be st fits your prevailing mood.

___ I am almost always very sad, very depressed. I often

wonder whether life is worth living and have contemplated

suicide. I am pessimistic and view nearly all decisions as being

a choice between awful and terrible. Across a period of a week;

I have few, if any, pleasurable moments.

___ I am usually sad, I do not find pleasurable what I for-

mally found pleasurable and what others seem to find pleasur-

able. I believe that my current situation and the general state of

things are depressing. I find it difficult to get involved with the

activities I am supposed to engage during the week, but I gen-

erally work through them.

___ I have periods (even weeks or months) when I am ec-

static, but those periods are followed by periods of depression,

sometimes deep depression. During the periods of euphoria, I

feel that I can accomplish great things and often overestimate

my capabilities. During the periods of euphoria, I am very ac-

tive and can work and play hard. During the periods of depres-

sion, I am very sad, lethargic and often regret the things I said

and did during the periods of euphoria.

___ I am somewhat sad. My life is best described as having

little or no meaning. I have more disappointing days than satis-

fying days. My relationships with family and friends are O.K.,

but not particularly happy and often characterized by low-level

conflict. I get little satisfaction from my weekly activities and

engage them routinely.

___ I have a neutral mood; not sad, not happy; not depressed,

not particularly satisfying. My “highs” and “lows” are not in-

tense.

___ I am more happy than sad, but there are a number of as-

pects of my life that are distressing. The distressing aspects of

my life often, but not always, keep me from being happy with

work, family and friends. Nevertheless, I seem to have my

share of pleasurable moments.

___ Most of the time, I am happy, but there are a few aspects

of my life that are distressing. My weekly activities are routine

work, and I find them somewhat satisfying. My relationships

with family and friends are O.K. I have my share of pleasurable

moments.

___ Over all, I am generally happy. My life is O.K. My

weekly activities are, for the most part, satisfying. I believe

most people think of me as a good, upstanding person. My

relationships with family and friends are O.K. I have my share

of periodic periods of enjoyment and have no more than usual

instances of distress and sadness. If the rest of my life was

similar to what it is now, I would not be greatly disappointed.

___ Over all, I am happy. My life is satisfying. I get great

satisfaction from my weekly activities. I engage in a wide vari-

ety of enjoyable activities. My relationships with family and

friends are good, and a great source of satisfaction. I believe

that I am a respected member of my community. I have the

usual instances of distress and sadness, but seem to recover

from them faster than most.

A survey of the Laboratory for Psychopharmacology, Survey

NS-2, page 2

Please estimate the % of students on your campus that rated

themselves as having the first two moods in the list of moods

provided on page 1, i.e., the items that begin with “I am almost

always very sad” and “I am usually sad.” ___%

Please estimate the % of students on your campus that rated

themselves as having the last two moods in the list of moods

provided on page 1, i.e., the items that begin with “Over all, I

am generally happy” and “Over all, I am happy.” ___%