A Critique of Recent Criticisms of Freud on Religious Belief

doi:10.4236/ojpp.2011.11002

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Open Journal of Philosophy

2011. Vol.1, No.1, 11-15

A Critique of Recent Criticisms of Freud on Religious Belief

Thomas W. Smythe

Department of Engl ish, North Car olina Central Univer sity, Dur ham, USA.

Email: [email protected]

Received July 1st, 2011; revised J uly 20th, 2011; accepted July 25th, 2011.

The paper is a critique of recent criticisms of Sigmund Freud’s theory that religion is based on wishful thinking.

The criticisms made by authors such as Alvin Plantinga, John Hick, William P. Alston, William Rowe, and

Merol Wes tp hal are c riti call y examin ed. I defen d Freud ’s c ritiqu e of reli gion a s a sati sfacti on of our deep est de-

sires for a heavenly father showing inductively that those desires render religious belief as unlikely to be true.

Keywords: Wish Fulfillment, Unconscious Desires , Psychoana lysi s, Illusion

Introduction

Sigmund Freud famously attacked religious beliefs of all re-

ligions as forms of wish fulfillment. Religious beliefs are moti-

vated by the wish to have a father figure in heaven to take care

of us, and to protect us, just like an earthly father who protects

us from harm and punishes us to keep us in line. I think that

Freud, unlike careful, painstaking analytical philosophers today,

directed a variety of salvos against religion. He was like a

gunman shooting from the hip hoping that some of his shots

would hit the target even though he realized some of his shots

would miss. Freud was convinced that religion was somehow

an illusion, and that it harmed human beings more than it bene-

fits them. I tend to agree. I will develop some Freudian themes I

think are plausible arguments against the truth of religious be-

liefs while ignoring much of what Freud says on the subject.

I do not intend to rehash Freud’s theories against religious

belief, since such expositions are more than amply provided in

the literature (Palmer, 1997). Instead, I will concentrate on

rebutting some of the critiques of Freudian arguments given by

philosophers of religion of late. I do not profess to cover all of

the criticisms in the literature.

Discussion

A basic place to start is with Freud’s assertion that religious

belief is a fulfillment of our deepest wishes, therefore wishful

thinking. Alvin Plantinga takes issue with Freud here by alleg-

ing that Freud fails to provide any evidence for this assertion.

Plantinga argues that it is dubious that theistic belief arises

from wishes because many people dislike the idea of a God

monitoring their every thought, and judging them. Others like

being autonomous and dislike the unfriendly comparison to a

greater being that we must obey and worship. The obvious

reply to this is that Plantinga is hardly describing the believer,

and that such preferences do not seem to be incompatible with

wishing there was a God on the part of theists. Plantinga is

hardly describing a typical unthinking, uncritical believer.

Plantinga then asks where the evidence is for Freud’s

claim that theistic belief is wishful thinking. People do not

report having such wishes. (Does Plantinga think we should

take a poll of believers? People surely do express their wishes

in prayer and other exhortations to gods. Why should they be

required to “report” them?) Plantinga then points out, correctly,

that Freud postulates unconscious mechanisms that are respon-

sible for such beliefs that are unreachable from first-person

self-knowledge of one’s beliefs. It is true that Freud famously

thought that most people do not know all the reasons why they

believe what they believe, and this has been borne out in recent

psychology. Freud himself demonstrated this fact in his early

work with subjects who were hypnotized. Religion is a lot like

hypnotism. Plantinga goes on to say

“How woul d Freud…establish that th e mechanisms whereb y

human beings come to believe in God…is not aimed at truth?…

Freud offers no arguments or reasons at all…he simply takes it

for granted that there is no God…then casts about for some

kind of explanation of this…mistaken belief. Freud’s… criti-

cism really depends on his atheism: it isn’t an independent

criticism at all, and it won’t…have any force on anyone who

doesn’t share that atheism” (Plantinga, 2000: p. 198).

A better point here is that Freud has an entire theory of the

origin of religious belief. Philosophers of science have often

pointed out that hypotheses can rarely be confirmed or discon-

firmed in isolation, or one at a time. Theories are bunches of

propositions, assumptions, or statements that are not subject to

decisive falsification in isolation (Hempel, 1966). In light of

this, I think Freud’s theory of religious belief should be evalu-

ated as a whol e, and not as a single assertion .

Another consideration is that there is evidence in the litera-

ture by ardent theists who admit that religious beliefs are influ-

enced by our wishes. Richard Taylor, for instance, begins his

treatment of arguments for the existence of God by saying

“Belief in the gods seems to have its roots in human desires

and fears, particularly those associated with self-preservation.

Like all other creatures, human beings have a profound will to

live, which is mainly what gives one’s existence mean-

ing…Human beings are capable of the full and terrible realiza-

tion of their own inevitable decay…It is probably partly in re-

sponse to fear that human beings turn to the gods, as those be-

ings of such po wer that they can overturn this verdict of nature

(Taylor, 1992).”

This seems to provid e evidence and reason for thinki ng that

T. W. SMYTHE

Freud is on to something in his theory about the roots or origins

of theistic belief. Further evidence comes from sources on

which religious belief is based. Faith is compatible with evi-

dence and reason, but it is also compatible with no reasons or

evidence. Faith without reasons or evidence is like hoping or

wishing by the very concept of faith. If I have faith that my

daughter will live to see her 80th birthday, that amounts to hop-

ing or wishing that it be so. Freud was aware of how we use

religious language. Many philosophers of religion point out that

religious belief is based on hope (Pojman, 2003).

There is further reason for supposing revelation, or revealed

truths, on which the various and sundry holy books are based,

has a great amount of wish fulfillment in it. This is not the

place for an epistemological investigation of revelation as a

source of information about God, but it can be pointed out that

the alleged reliability of revelation as a source of knowledge is

extremely dubious and fraught with controversy.

Although it is controversial, many philosophers and scien-

tists have argued that the Bible and the Koran are filled with

contradictions and inconsistencies, scientifically false pro-

nouncements, immoral precepts, and confusions. The literature

on this by philosophers and scientists is vast (Smythe, 2008;

Burr, 1987). There is good and sufficient reason to believe the

revelations on which the Bible is based are hopes and wishes.

Revelation, I believe, is not, never was, and never will be a

reliable source of knowledge or truth.

Consider, for example, the book by Richard Swinburne on

revelation. He is constantly saying that both humans wrote the

Bible, and that God is the ultimate author. For instance, he says

“God inspired the human authors to see things which had quite

a lot of truth in them; but what they wrote down, taken on its

own, had quite a lot of falsity too. However, what they wrote

down was ambiguous in the sense that a fuller context could

give it a different meaning from what it would have been on its

own. God did provide a later context…to express statements

which were literally true (Swinburne, 1992: p. 197).” He also

says whatever is clearly false is to be taken as metaphorical.

The advocate of revelation as a source of truth clearly has his

hands full, and it is just as clear that the burden of proof is on

the theist. Swinburne continually cites the fact, that in the end,

“the church” decides what is true in revelation, and what is

metaphorical. Two pages later, with respect to the role of

women in the chu rch, Swinburne says some “passages must b e

regarded as ones…not fully open to divine inspiration and

so..false.” Or they could be historically true (but not now), or

metaphorical (Swinburne, 1992: p. 199). My assertion that

revelation is not a source of knowledge or reliable truths is

quite plausible in the light of such glaring ambivalance. The

burden is clearly on the believers, and there is precious little

reason to believe that any enlightenment is ever going to be

forthcoming. To think “the church” will ever have “the right

interpretation of scripture” with the help of God is itself wishful

thinking. Even if, per impossible, the church did reach such a

consensus, it would not necessarily be by revelation. It would

be plausible to regard su ch a consensus as a p ower struggle, and

more authoritarianism.

Rachel B. Blass has noted that although Freud spoke of re-

ligion as an illusion, he was very much concerned with the truth

value of religious beliefs. Freud distinguished between delu-

sions and illusions. An example of a delusion is our thinking

there are snakes in the room, which is false. An example of an

illusion is a young woman who believes she will someday

marry a prince and be happy forever. She could marry a prince,

but it is unlikely. The belief in the second coming is on a par

with that. Freud said that religious belief is illusory (Blass,

2004).

Based on the foregoing we can give the following argument

against the truth of religious belief:

1) Religious beliefs tend to be based on wishful thinking.

2) Wishful thinking is not conducive to true belief.

3) Therefore, religious belief is not conducive to true belief.

The argument is deductively valid via hypothetical syllogism.

I think the first premise has good evidence from the foregoing

considerations. The second premise is part of the concept of

wishful thinking. There is good reason to believe that wishing

something is the case has little or nothing to do with whether it

is the case. Hence, the argument is a deductively sound argu-

ment. Religious belief is like astrology and reading tea leaves.

I will now treat some more critiques of Freud’s theory. Some

philosophers accuse Freud of committing some sort of genetic

fallacy. Here is a popular passage from the philosopher of re-

ligion John Hick:

Perhaps the most interesting comment to be made upon

Freud’s theory is that in his work he may have uncovered one

of the mechani sms by which God creat es an id ea of the deity in

the human mind. For if the relation of a human father to his

children is, as the Judaic-Christian tradition teaches, analogous

to God’s relationship to humanity, it is not surprising that hu-

man beings should think of God as their heavenly Father and

should come to know God through the infant’s experience of

utter dependence and the growing child’s experience of being

loved, cared for, and disciplined within a family. Clearly, to the

mind that is not committed in advance to a naturalistic explana-

tion there may be a religious as well as a naturalistic interpreta-

tion of the psychological facts.

Again, then, it seems that the verdict must be “not

proven”; …the Freudian theory of religion may be true but has

not been shown to be so (Hick, 1990: p. 35).

Many other philosophers of religion have pointed out that

Freud ’s acco unt of th e psycho lo gical o rigi ns o f religio us beli efs

are logically compatible with theistic belief, and that it has not

been “proven” otherwise. Plantinga says “Perhaps God has

designed us to know that he is present and loves us by way of

creating us with strong desires for him, a desire that leads to the

belief that he is in fact there (Plantinga, 2000: p. 198).”

William P. Alston says that Freudian theory hardly shows

that “no rational grounds could be produced” for theistic belief,

and that Freudian theory is not “logicall y incompatib le with th e

truth, justifiability, and value of traditional religion (Alston,

1967).”

I reply that such consi derations fail to appr eciate the force of

the Freudian theory of religion. If every scientific theory had to

meet the standards of producing truth so that no other theory or

alternative that was logically incompatible with it could possi-

bly be true, then there would be no science. Science is not in

the business of producing theories for which alternative expla-

nation s are logically impo ssible. These philo sophers are sett ing

too high a bar for Freudian explanations of religion; a standard

they would never dream of setting for any normal scientific

theory. This is why claims that Freud and others have not

T. W. SMYTHE 13

“proven” that religious beliefs are false have to be taken with a

grain o f salt. What woul d coun t as a “proo f”? Woul d th ere have

to be a universal consensus? If so, practically no theory has

ever been proven. Do we need a deductively sound argument in

order to “prove” something? If so, we have given one above.

Here is another one.

1) If God existed, people would not be so mediocre and ig-

norant.

2) Most human beings are mediocre and ignorant.

3) Therefore, God does not exist.

The argument is a straightforward application of modus tol-

lens, thus is deductively valid. The second premise is based on

sound observation. The first premise is plausible. If God cre-

ated us in his image with free will so we would seek him, and

choose to obey him then why do most people refuse to do so?

There are plenty of people with pathological tendencies they

cannot control, and the church calls us all “sinners” by our very

nature. If the first premise is plausible, and we think it is, then

this is a deductively sound argument. Without going into

Freudian theory, we can say that the mediocrity and ignorance

of most human beings is a Freudian theme. Here is one

quote:”…it would be more remarkable still if our wretched,

ignorant and downtrodden ancestors had succeeded in solving

all the difficult riddles of the universe (Freud, 1961: p. 53).” I

submit that Freud had a low opinion of human beings, and that

this kind of argument is in keeping with his views.

Adolf Grunbaum, a savant commentator on Freud, has pro-

vided another deductive argument that he says reconstructs the

logical framework or argument Freud is likely to defend.

1) All archaic, evidentially ill-supported illusions are very

probably false.

2) Anyone’s belief in theism is an archaic, evidentially

ill-supported illusion.

3) Therefore, anyone’s belief in theism is very probably false

(Grunbaum, 2003).

Grunbaum remarks that the argument is deductively valid,

and that the first premise is justified because “the methods of

the scientific enterprise…are the only means of choosing theo-

retical beliefs that allow observational evidence to override,

sooner or later, the appeal to wish-fulfillment.” The second

premise “see ms to be the weak lin k.” But Grunbau m conclud es

his paper by saying: “Still, we can allow that all cases of belief

in God may perhaps be inspired by conspicuous favoritism for

consoling beliefs over ominous ones, combined with any re-

pressed wishes…” (Grunbaum, 2003: p. 121) So, I take Grun-

baum to be an ally by endorsing Freud.

I turn now to another feature of the Bible that Freudian the-

ory illuminates for us. The fear of the Holy Father is like the

small child’s fear of its father, and Freud’s conception of the

death wish. The God of the Old Testament is threatening to kill

people, and actually killing them, on almost every other page.

This is true of Revelations as well. Fortunately for us, Freud

contends that such a monster as the God of the Old Testament

is an illusion, thus unlikely to exist. The Koran is full of similar

passages. God punishes us and rewards us just like an earthly

father in the holy texts of various religions. I think Freud gives

a good account of why this i s the case.

I am leaving out a lot of Freudian theory. The Oedipal Com-

plex account of the origin of theistic belief is controversial.

Freud’s contention that religion is the obsessional neurosis of

mankind is also being left out here (Alston, 2003). However, I

do believe that Freud’s contention that believers often regress

to the condition of a helpless child who is afraid of the forces of

nature, and seeks the love of, and fears their father, has a sig-

nificant role to play in the etiology of religious belief. I do think

this t akes the form of an uncon scio us wish for a heavenl y father.

I want to make it clear that wishful thinking is not the only

cause of religious belief, nor do we think Freud is committed to

that. There is reason to think that what people believe has to do

in large part with their accu lturation, such as their paren ts, their

peers, their teachers, the churches, the media, politics, and the

like. Wish fulfillment is compatible with these sources, and

illuminates them.

I do not claim the Freud gives us “the” explanation of reli-

gious belief, or a “complete” account. Nor would we call it a

“partial” account. I hold that Freud gives a good explanation of

theistic belief that is more likely to be true than not. That he has

not “proven” theism is false, or produced a consensus, is rather

platitudinous. No one else has either. By induction, such a

knock down, undisputable demonstration is impossible. But I

think Freud has given us reason to believe that theism probably

IS false.

I do not think that Freud has given both necessary and suffi-

cient causal conditions for religious belief. It is arguable that

such an achievement is impossible in the social sciences. Cau-

sation is a difficult topic in philosophy. I think Freud’s view is

more like the claim that smoking causes lung cancer. It is a

kind of statistical or probabilistic causation. It is more likely to

be true than not. Pointing out that it is logically compatible with

theism cuts very little ice. Logical compatibility with a theory

by itself is not a reliable indicator of truth.

Many philosophers of religion are fond of pointing out that

Freud does not address the theistic arguments for the existence

of God, such as the ontological, cosmological, and design ar-

guments. It is true that he does not try to refute the traditional

arguments. However, we think that Freud’s views do have a

bearing on them. If Freud is right that religious belief is wishful

thin king, then t here is good reason to be highly skept ical of any

traditional attempts to prove the existence of God. They are

likely to be attempts to rationalize what theists already wish to

be true. Since anyone who has studied philosophy of religion

knows that all the traditional proofs are highly controversial

and often vexed, we have additional reason to be skeptical.

Attempts to show there is life after death, or the immortality

of the soul, are equally suspicious. The fact that we fear death,

and have a longing for existence beyond the grave, is additional

reason to regard attempts to show we survive our deaths as

wishful t hi nking. The con cep tion of heaven as a p lace where all

our wants are satisfied is arguably a desire for a second child-

hood and a return to the mother’s womb, where all our needs

are met.

The philosopher William R. Rowe, in his writings on Freud

and religion, says it is important to distinguish between the

causation of a belief and the justification of belief. Rowe con-

tends that religious believers who follow Freud’s line of think-

ing can agree that it is “unlikely” that religious beliefs are true,

but can hold that “this is not sufficient reason for rejecting

those beliefs.” Freud, Rowe says, has not “shown” that no one

has good grounds for those beliefs, only that many who accept

them do not. Freud’s arguments are “not compelling (Rowe,

T. W. SMYTHE

2001: p. 120) .”

Here again I would like to know what philosophers of relig-

ion would find compelling short of absolute Cartesian logical

certainty. Freud “shows” that theistic beliefs are “unlikely” to

be true, and that is sufficient in our eyes to “show” they are

illusions in the probable sense of “show.” (Can we “show”

smoking causes lung cancer?)

The burden of proof rests solely with the theist. Faith, reli-

gious traditions, revelation, and religious authority have been

called into serious question. Freud is saying we want to believe

in God, and that is our only justification for doing so. THAT is

an argument that our belief has no justification other than it is

wha t we wi s h we r e t rue.

I shall now treat in some detail a reply to Freud in a book by

Merold Westphal.

Westphal attempts to defend the religious believer against

‘the hermeneutics of suspicion’ that appears to offer a reply to

Freud (Westphal, 1993). I will comment on it.

Westphal speaks of Freud’s scientism, which I take to be the

view that all and only scientific inquiry can reveal what is real,

or what exists. Westphal rightly points out that rejection of this

kind of view was later borne out in the philosophical literature

on Logical Empiricism in the 20th century. Such scientism, as

defined above is untenable. I do not think Freud needs this as-

sumption, which he clearly makes, to achieve his criticisms of

religion (Freud, 1961). What Westphal neglects in Freud is that

Freud realized that religion and science are in constant conflict.

Freud says “in the long run nothing can withstand reason and

experience and the contradiction which religion offers to both is

all too palpable (Freud, 1961: p. 69).” I find this to be true, and

a sound part of Freud’s foray.

Westphal argues that Freud only succeeds in raising suspi-

cion or doubts about religious beliefs, but that his arguments do

not show that religious belief distorts reality. He points out that

Freud’s failure to make good the thesis of “obsessional neurosis

as a pathological counterpart to the formation of religion” thus

making”religion as a universal obsessional neurosis.” I grant

that Freud has not made good his hypothesis about religion

being the obsessional neurosis of mankind, and that Westphal’s

criticisms on this topic are well taken.

Westphal points out the difficulties Freud has in Totem and

Taboo in his speculations about the cultural and historical ori-

gins of religion. I grant this to Westphal as well. I think that

Westphal is successful in criticizing Freud in failing to show

that religious belief is a distortion using these hypotheses.

However, what Westphal calls the suspicion of doubt that Freud

raises is sufficient to make it likely that religious belief is, in

fact, a distortion because it is only consoling. Pointing out that

many people believe in God because they yearn for a benevo-

lent guardian who watches over them, and provides them with

rewards for good conduct, and punishments for misconduct, is

exactly the kind of point that tends to undermine religious be-

liefs. If religious belief is based on illusion, then there is some

good reason to believe it is probably a distortion of reality as

well.

I agree with Westphal and others that the wish fulfillment

critique by Freud does not entail the falsity of religious beliefs.

It is quite compatible with there being such a benevolent deity.

What it does explain is the origin of religious belief in such a

way that does not require that God exists. This undermines any

temptation to think that the existence of widespread belief in

God is an incontestable reason, or a good reason, to think there

is a God. Freud’s psychological explanation leaves us free to

seek reasons for denying there is any such being, and renders

the exist ence of such a b eing unlikel y. Unlike Westp hal, I th ink

the wish fulfillment hypothesis itself is reason to believe that

religious belief is false. Westphal muddies the waters by de-

manding that Freud show that religious beliefs are “distor-

tions.” Freud argues that they are illusions, and probably false.

Westphal is making unreasonable demands for Freud.

Westphal seems to think that the wish fulfillment hypothesis

needs to be supplemented by the hypothesis that religious be-

liefs are “the disguised fulfillment of repressed wishes (West-

phal, 1993).” I do not think that Freud needs to bring in his

controversial theory of repression into the picture at all in order

to show that religious beliefs are improbable, and likely to be

false.

Westphal does have an interesting argument against Freud

that I believe is a better argument than he gives himself credit

for. It is a form of tit for tat or a tu quoque against Freud.

Westphal argues, very interestingly, that Freud is telling us we

think it would be very nice if there were a heavenly father to

take care of us. Westphal then says

But th ere are very powerful forces at work within u s t hat lead

us in exactly the opposite direction. God…would be a power

we would envy and an authority we would resent: Wouldn’t it

be nice…if there were no God. We could be in charge without

any unsolicited divine interference, …Freud calls attention to

both these forces both biographically and theoretically. When

he interpreted his own dreams in the years following his fa-

ther’s death, he discovered a powerful resentment and hatred of

his father. And his theory of the Oedipus complex insists that

the phenomenon is virtually universal, portraying parents as

resented rivals of children, whose death wishes towards their

parents are one of the first texts of psychic life to be censored

and therefore rendered unconscious (Westphal, 1993: p. 68).

Freud’s belief that there is no God is an equally infantile

(Oedipal) wish fulfillment superimposed on adolescent rebel-

lion against authority.

I think this is an ingenious argument. Westphal may have

uncovered a reason for Freud’s rejection of the father figure.

But, and this is important, this is, again, logically compatible

with th ere being n o higher father. Freud coul d be pleased by the

outcome because o f his own rebellious view on authority with-

out that in the least undermining his rejection of religious be-

liefs. What the objection does is explain his zeal in pursuing

anti-religious themes in his work.

Freud was no doubt someone who was motivated to be open

to arguments against God’s existence because of his own per-

sonal psychology. Suppose this were a general condition

amongst people. If so, it would be difficult to understand why

disbelief is not cheerfully accepted by a wider section of hu-

mankind. Westphal’s psychological explanation is wholly

compatible with Freud’s being right about religious belief, and

its unlikelihood of being true.

It seems Westphal sets the bar too high for Freud by requir-

ing that all aspects of his theory about religious belief be true.

Westphal does show that a lot of the theory is problematic at

best. I think a partial acceptance of Freud’s writings on religion

effectively undermines religious belief.

T. W. SMYTHE 15

Conclusion

Let me clarify what I am claiming in this paper. It is gener-

ally agreed that Freud was an atheist. He thought there is no

god, and thought there remains a puzzle about why people be-

lieve. There is no similar puzzle about why people believe in

the moon or Mars. I think Freud is saying: There is no god, and

this is why people believe that there is. I can give a naturalistic

explanation of that phenomenon. In that sense Freud’s citing

wish fulfillment is a sensible part of his overall view. This is

strongl y supported b y the fact that what is b elieved in thi s case

is the sort of thing human beings are likely to wish for—a

strong father figure who is able to control the bad and the good

that happens to us. We do not have a similar motive for believ-

ing in, say, UFOs. Given this, I maintain that his account is

more likely to be true.

Why then do people challenge Freud? Westphal, Plantinga,

Hick, Alsto n , an d Taylor see m to b e attacki ng t hat id ea b ecause

it does no more than assume that there is no god. But wish ful-

fillment is logically compatible with the existence of God. I am

maintaining that Freud’s account casts a damaging blemish on

the usual arguments for th e existence o f God that are so fraught

with controversy. If Freud is right, and I think he is, it is more

likely that there is no God, or heavenly father. Freud gives us

good reason to doubt the claims of theists who opt for the exis-

tence of a personal, heavenly father. It does not follow that

religion is not important, or that spirituality is not an inescap-

able part of human life (Compte-Sponville, 2007). But the per-

sonal father image conception of God in Western religions is

seriousl y affected by Freudian criticisms.

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