Pretense Theory and the Imported Background

doi:10.4236/ojpp.2011.11004

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Open Journal of Philosophy

2011. Vol.1, No.1, 22-25

Pretense Theory and the Imported Background

Jeffrey Goodman

Department of Philosophy and Religi on, James M adison University, Harrisonburg, USA.

Email: [email protected]

Received June 22nd, 2011; revised July 15th, 2011; accepted July 20th, 2011.

Kendall Walton’s pretense theory, like its rivals, says that what’s true in a fiction F depends in part on the im-

portation of background propositions into F. The aim of this paper is to present, explain, and defend a brief yet

straightforward argument—one which exploits the specific mechanism by which the pretense theory says propo-

sitions ar e imp or ted into fictions—for the falsity of the p r etens e theory.

Keywords: Fiction, Truth in Fiction, Pretense, Make-Believe

Introduction

One of the most influential accounts of truth in fiction is

pretense theory, and the foremost proponent of this account is

(Walton, 1990)1. All of the major theories of truth in fic-

tion2—Walton’s included—say that it is crucial to understand

the mechanism by which propositions which constitute a back-

ground for a fiction are imported into the story. That is, all of

the major theories say that for ever y fiction F, there is some set

of propositions S that plays a fundamental role in determining

what is true according to F, yet the members of S are not di-

rectly constitutive of F nor are they entailed3 by any proposition

(or set of propositions) directly constitutive of F. A proposition

p is directly constitutive of a fiction F, let’s say, when p is ex-

pressed by a token of a sentence in an F story-copy. (For sim-

plicity’s sake, I will focus my discussion on literary fictions,

but my remarks will apply to non-literary fictions as well.)

Background propositions, then, are propositions that may bear

on the content of a fiction in an indirect way. On the pretense

theory (as well as its rivals), a proposition p in the background

set S may become true in a fiction F in virtue of p’s being im-

ported into F by any person or group appropriately related to F.

When p is not directly constitutive of F or entailed by any of

the propositions directly constitutive of F, but rather when p is

true in F in virtue of being imported into F, let’s say that p is

indirectly constitutive of F.

The aim of this paper is to present, explain, and defend a

brief yet straightforward line of reasoning—one which exploits

the specific mechanism by which the pretense theory says

propositions are imported into fictions—for the falsity of the

preten se t heory4.

The Argument

Here is the argument I have in mind:

1) If the pretense theory is correct, then for every literary fic-

tion F, what’s true in F and what’s not true in F will be deter-

mined in part by what background propositions are imported

into F by those people appropriately related to F.

2) If what’s true in F and what’s not true in F is determined

in part by what background propositions are imported into F by

those people appropriately related to F, then it’s possible that

there be some fiction F such that it’s true in F that p and it’s no t

true in F that p.

3) It is not possible that there be any fiction F such that it’s

true in F that p and it’s not true in F that p.

4) Therefore, t he preten se theory is no t correct.

Premise 1 is supported by some pretheoretic intuitions as well

as Walton’s account of truth in fiction. Pretheoretically, what’s

true in a fiction F is not merely a matter of which propositions

are directly constitutive of F. For instance, it is true in A Study

in Scarlet th at Sherlock Holmes’ pip e was not manufactured by

a wizard, yet the sentence, “Holmes’ pipe was not manufac-

tured by a wizard”, is neither tokened in any story-copy of A

Study in Scarlet nor is it entailed by any of the sentences in any

story-copy of A Study in Scarlet. According to the pretense

theory (as well as its rivals), the proposition that Holmes’ pipe

was not manufactured by a wizard is true in A Study in Scarlet

because it is a proposition in the background for the story that

is imported into the story. What does the pretense theory say

must occur for a proposition to become true in a fiction in vir-

tue of being imported into that fiction from the background?

And when is it not the case that some proposition is true in a

fiction? In order to answer these questions, let us first briefly

state some of the fundamental tenets of the pretense theory.

1Other prominent defenders of (some version of) pretense theory include

(Byrne, 1993), (Kroon, 2000), (Crimmins, 1998), and (Kim &Maslen,

2006).

2The main ri vals being those of (Lewis, 1983) and (Cu rrie, 1990).

3When I say “entai led” here, I mean : deriva b le using eithe r classi c al or some

non-classical (e.g., relevance) logic.

4Other philosophers have criticized Walton at length, e.g., (Richard, 2000).

But I ha ve seen no on e make the very straight forward criticism that I make

here. (Walton, 1990) himself addresses the main issue I raise in this paper,

ut his c omments, n o matt er how th ey’re un derst ood, see m not t o constitut e

an adequate response to my argument against pretense theory (or so I shall

argue below).

According to Walton, a literary fiction (like all fictions) is a

prop in a game of make-believe. (A copy of) A Study in Scarlet,

e.g., is a prop that we use to engage our imagination about a

fictional detective; we make-b elieve that Hol mes is a flesh and

blood, pipe-smoking crime-solver via some novel (just as a

child may, via the use of mud, make-believe he is making a

genuine chocolate pie). Via certain conditional principles,

Walton explains how props generate truths in fiction. That is,

for every fictio n there are pri nciples that prescri be what is to be

J. GOODMAN 23

imagined, hence what is to be true in a fiction, when certain

circumstances obtain. The principles that generate fictional

truths appeal to the germane conventions (conversational, be-

havioral, etc.) present in the population of people engaged with

the story. So, for example, it may be prescribed that one imag-

ine that there exists a pipe-smoking detective named ‘Holmes’

whenever one reads a sentence in A Study in Scarlet that ap-

parently quantifies over such a detective (just as it may be pre-

scribed that one imagine that there exists a chocolate pie

whenever one sees a round clump of mud).

So, any proposition p that is rightly prescribed to be imag-

ined by the conventions present in the population engaged with

a literary fiction F is something that is true in F. Some of these

propositions will be directly constitutive of F (e.g., the ones

expressed by sentences originally tokened by Sir Conan Doyle),

but not all of them. Some of the propositions that a population

is prescribed to make-believe are propositions that are culled

from the background. One rightly imagines that London is the

most populous city in England when reading A Study in Scarlet

even if “London is the most populous city in England” is no-

where tokened in any story-copy. In virtue of its being imported

in this way into the story, this proposition is just as true in the

fiction as a ny proposition tha t is dire c tly c onstitutive of the story .

Of course, not all propositions in the background of a story

ought to be imagined by those engaged with the story. The

propositions that are not prescribed to be imagined are those

that the conventions in place make irrelevant to the subject

matter of the story; if there is no convention that generates the

approp riate imagin ative acts i n the po pulat ion engaged with th e

story regarding some background proposition p, then p is not

true in the story. For example, one ought not imagine that

Holmes’ pipe was manufactured by a wizard when reading A

Study in Scarlet. The relevant proposition is utterly irrelevant to

the subject matter of the story. Thus, the proposition is rightly

not imported into the story, is thus not indirectly constitutive of

the fiction, and is thus not true in A Study in Scarlet5.

So, it is via the appropriate conventions present in a popula-

tion that propositions in the background for a fiction F become

true in F. We should also note that the members of the back-

ground that are eligible for importation need not be true propo-

sitions; some false propositions may rightly be imported into

some stories6. What’s central to the pretense account is simply

whether the person engaged with the fiction is indeed pre-

scribed to imagine p by the appropriate conventions of the

game of which that fiction is a prop. A person may be engaged

with a fiction F and mistakenly think that p ought to be im-

ported, but let us say that when p is rightly imported by some-

one into F given the germane co nventions in place, that p erson

is compet ently engaged with F.

Premise 2 is obviously the crux of the above argument, and

its force can now be made clear. It’s possible that there be dis-

tinct people, each of whom are competent readers of some fic-

tion F, yet some proposition p is prescribed by F given the

relevant conventions in the population to which the first person

belongs, while it is simultaneously not the case that p is pre-

scribed by F given the relevant conventions in the population to

which the second person belongs. On Walton’s account, it thus

follows that p will be both true in F and it will not be the case

that p is true in F7. (I of course will not be arguing for the claim

here that there are no fictions in which p is both true and not

true; of course there are “fictional worlds” that internally in-

volve contradiction in this way. But if there is any case in

which ‘in fiction F, p’ is true yet it’s also not the case that “in F,

p” is true, then we are left with a “real world” contradiction.

And dialetheist8 views notwithstanding, this seems to me be to

be an intolerable breach of lo gic.)

Consider the following short work of fiction. Call it Earth

Story.

“Once upon a time on planet Earth, the very planet we live

on, there were intelligent non-human creatures that walked,

talked and behaved very much like we behave. The end”.

Suppose Alex is part of a population of people here on Earth

and Alex engages himself with Earth Story. And suppose fur-

ther that everyone in Alex’s population has reason to believe

that Earth is the shape of a flat disc roughly 10,000 miles in

diameter resting on the back of a turtle. The above copy of

Earth Story never includ es any sent ence token s about the shape

of the Earth, nor do any of its sentence tokens entail anything

about its shape. Part of what’s true in Earth Story, though, by

virtue of what’s directly constitutive, is the proposition that

intelligent non-humans once lived on Earth. Given the relevant

conventions present in Alex’s population, Alex is competently

engaged with Earth Story; he thus rightly imports into the story

the background proposition that intelligent non-humans once

lived on a disc that is roughly 10,000 miles in diameter resting

on the back of a turtle. So, the proposition that intelligent non-

humans on ce walked o n a disc t hat rests on t he back o f a turtle,

e.g., will be true in Earth Story .

5The issues surrounding which propositions are relevant or irrelevant to a

story and the mechanisms by which a proposition gets rightly imported o

rightly fails to get imported are ones that are incredibly complex. At the very

least, Gricean conversational maxims and other subtle conventions of com-

munication and behavior must be appealed to in order to do these issues

ustice. However, I do not think these matters are hopelessly complex, and

they are ones that, in principle, could be dealt with coherently and com-

pletely. For my purposes here, however, all we will need is an example

whereby—no matter what the specifics are surrounding the germane con-

ventions in the relevant populations—Walton’s theory entails that some par-

ticul ar proposition bo t h s ho uld a n d s ho uld no t be im po r t e d in to some s to r y.

6Philos ophers ofte n speak of background facts th at get import ed into stori es.

However, as (Lewis, 1983: p. 274) points out, the proposition that there

exists an animal that breathes fire, e.g., may rightly be imported into a typi-

cal story about dragons. Lewis would call this a case of “inter-fictional

carry-over” of a proposition into a story rather than a case of importation o

a proposition from the background. However, the false proposition that

something breathes fire, I assert, may be true in a fiction F even when that

proposition is not imported from any other fiction G (or even any genre o

fiction). A population may (wrongly) believe in fire-

reathing animals for

scientific reasons. What seems to matter is merely whether or not the proposi-

tion in question is relevant in the right sort of way to the subject matter of F.

Now consid er Boris. He en gages h imself with Earth Story as

well, yet Boris is part of a population who (reasonably) all be-

lieve that Earth is an oblate spheroid. Given the relevant con-

ventions present in Boris’s population, Boris is competently

engaged with Earth Story; he thus rightly imports into the story

the background proposition that intelligent non-humans once

lived on an oblate spheroid. Further, it will not be prescribed by

any convention in Boris’s population that Boris imagine that

intelligent non-humans once lived on a flat and finite disc

roughly 10,000 miles in diameter resting on the back of a turtle.

So, the proposition that intelligent non-humans once walked on

7(Lewis, 1983: p. 272) addr esses thi s sort of problem for hi s own view, but

manages to cut off this worry by rigidly tying what’s imported into a story to

the prevailing beliefs of the community in which the story originated.

8See, e.g., (Priest, 1987) .

J. GOODMAN

a disc that rests on the back of a turtle, e.g., will not be true in

Earth St o r y .

Objections and Replies

By my lights, there are only two sorts of replies that can be

made to premise 2. Let us call the first the non-competency

reply. On this rep ly, premise 2 is false b ecause it’s n ot tru e that

the relevant proposition is both true in Earth Story and not true

in Earth Story. It must be the case that ei ther Alex or Boris fails

to be competently engaged with the fiction.

I can’t see any way to make this reply plausible. No matter

what the relevant (conversational, behavioral, etc.) conventions

are in the populations of Alex and Boris which govern what

they ought to imagine, I can see no reason to suppose that ei ther

must be violating any of those conventions when they engage

with Earth Story .

The second sort of reply to premise 2 we may call the con-

text-dependency reply. Walton goes to great lengths to explain

this line of response9; his reasoning has been summarized by

(Kim and Maslen, 2006):

Sometimes there are two (or more) incompatible yet per-

fectly reasonable readings of a novel. Applying Walton’s term

“auth orized game” to th ese cases, there are two kind s of games

authorized by the story, and in each kind of game, different

background facts are imported.

…[T]he facts th at are impo rted into a stor y are generated in a

similar way to the way that facts that are merely implied in a

conversation are generated. Sometimes the context in which a

conversatio n occurs determines on e readi ng over anoth er… In a

similar way, different contexts in which a story occurs may

determine different readings of the story by determining which

background facts are legitimately imported or brought into the

story in t hat context 10.

A nice example is Henry James’s The Turn of the Screw.

Some literary critics argue that the ghosts in the story are real,

and others that the ghosts are the governess’s hallucinations.

These two incompatible readings may well both be reason-

able11.

I have a hard time figuring out the most charitable way to

understand this reply. However, no matter what Walton means

by “authorized games”, and no matter how different contexts

generate different conventions governing what we ought to

imagine, it seems to me that there are o nly three po ssible ways

to construe this response to premise 212.

First interpretation of context-dependency reply: whenever

contexts of interpretation differ in the way that I described

above regarding Alex and Boris, it turns out that one is dealing

with two distinct stories. Premise 2 is not supported by the ex-

ample above because in such a hypothetical case you wind up

with one story that Alex is competently engaged with and a

distinct story that Boris is engaged with. We may have just one

name for both stories, and the stories may have much in com-

mon, but it’s just not the case that it is both true and not true

according to some unique story that intelligent non-humans

once walked on a disc that rests on the back of a turtle. When-

ever different conventions are in place that prescribes different

imaginings to different people engaged with a fiction, this is

enough to make for a difference in the stories that each en-

gages.

This interpretation of the context-dependency reply seems to

accord well with the idea t hat fictio ns are socially de fined enti-

ties. But this reply does violence to the idea that there can be

two incompatible yet reasonable interpretations of one and the

same fiction. It seems perfectly reasonable to say that both Alex

and Boris are engaged with a unique fiction, viz., Earth Story,

and they are in disagreemen t about what i s true in it.

Second interpretation of the context-dependency reply: when-

ever contexts of interpretation differ in the way that I described

above regarding Alex and Boris, it turns out that each must be

dealing with two distinct background propositions. Premise 2 is

not supported by the example above because in such a hypo-

thetical case you wind up with one proposition that Alex rightly

imports into Earth Story in virtue of the prevailing flat-earth-

belief circumstances he is in, and a distinct proposition that

Boris rightly fails to import into Earth Story in virtue of the

prevailing spheroid-earth-belief circumstances he is in. So, it’s

just not the case that it is both true and not true according to some

unique story that intelligent non-humans once walked on a disc

that rests on the back of a turtle; it’s true according to Earth Story

that intelligent-non-humans-once-walked-on-a -dis c -that-rests -on-

the-back-of-a-turtle-in-Alex’s-context but it’s not the case that

this very proposition is a ls o not tru e in the s tory.

This version of the context-dependency reply seems to be the

one that is best supported by the Kim and Maslen summary

from above. However, this version of the reply seems to me to

fare no better than the first. If this reply were correct, then it

would turn out that two reasonable people—whenever they

disagree about the correct interpretation of a work of fiction in

virtue of being in different circumstances where different con-

ventions are generated—can never be disagreeing about whe-

ther or not one and t he same proposi tion is true in some fiction

F. Suppose Alex and Boris meet. The question is posed to them:

“Is it true in Earth Story that intelligent non-humans once

walked on a flat disc with a 10,000 mile circumference resting

on the b ack of a turtle?” One will say yes, one will say no . This

seems to me to be reflective of a genuine disagreement about

the inclusion or non-inclusion of a unique proposition in Earth

Story by two people competently engaged with the fiction.

Third interpretation of the context-dependency reply: when-

ever contexts of interpretation differ in the way that I described

above regarding Alex and Boris, it turns out that the unique

fiction each is competently engaged with is one that makes two

incompatible background propositions true. Premise 2 is not

suppo rted by the example abo ve because in such a hypoth etical

case you wind up with a story in which it is true that intelligent

non-humans once walked on a flat disc with… and it is also

true in the story that no intelligent non-humans ever walked on

a flat disc with … Whenever two people di sagree based on con-

text in the way the example relies on, each is competently en-

gaged with an impossible fiction; Alex rightly imports one

proposition p into Ea rth St ory while Boris rightly imports not-p

into Earth Story.

9See (Walton, 1990: pp. 285-287).

10(Kim & Ma sl en, 2006: p. 90).

11(Kim & Maslen, 2006: p. f22).

12Let us note fi rst, th ough, that however th is rep ly is to b e const rued, it simp l

cannot amount to the claim that “in fiction F, p” and “not: in fiction F, p”are

both true whenever either the right understanding of proposition por the whole

fiction F is context dependent. No matter how context dependency is construe

that w o ul d s till am o unt to t he endorsement of a true c o ntra diction.

J. GOODMAN 25

This version of the reply does, of course, allow the pretense

theorist to avoid the contradiction. Negation does not always

push throu gh “acco rdin g to” or “it is true in the sto ry” operat ors,

so if it is true in Earth Story that no intelligent non-humans

ever walked on a flat disc…, that does not entail that it is not

true in Earth Story that intelligent non-humans once walked on

a flat disc… However, this version of the context-dependency

reply just does not present a plausible account of what’s going

on in the case of Alex and Boris. There are many impossible

fictions to be sure, but Earth Story is just not one of them. Alex

and Boris are in disagreement in a very straightforward sort of

way regardi ng the shape o f a thing t hat, accordin g to the story,

was once walked on by some intelligent non-humans; neither

would assent to the idea that the story says that such creatures

both did and did not walk on a flat disc…

Conclusion

My aims here were not to introduce any novel account of

truth in fiction or argue for any alternative to pretense theory.

My goal was a more modest one; I simply wished to maintain

that that while Earth Story is a unique fiction, the lesson to be

learned from it is perfectly general. The example demonstrates

that t he pretense account of truth in fiction cann ot be correct.

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