But You Promised: Children’s Judgments of Broken Promises

doi:10.4236/psych.2013.412152

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Psychology

2013. Vol.4, No.12, 1046-1050

Published Online December 2013 in SciRes (http://www.scirp.org/journal/psych) http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/psych.2013.412152

Open Access

1046

But You Promised: Children’s Judgments of Broken Promises

Karen Hussar, Jared Horvath

Fisher College, Boston, USA

Email: khussar@fisher .edu, [email protected]

Received May 1st, 2013; revised June 3rd, 2013; accepted July 2nd, 2013

Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,

provided the original work is properly cited. In accordance of the Creative Commons Attribution License all

Current conceptions regarding children’s understanding of promises (and promise breaking) rely upon

absolute distinction: namely, a promise versus a non-promise. The current study expands the understand-

ing of children’s judgments of broken promises to include more nuanced, refined descriptions. Utilizing a

four-point rating scale—ranging from “OK” to “very bad”—forty children aged 6 to 10 judged story cards

depicting characters breaking commitments not to engage in specific behaviors across three different do-

mains (moral, social-conventional, and personal). Analyses indicated that children judge broken promises

in the moral domain more severely than those in the social-conventional domain and broken promises in

the social-conventional domain more severely than those in the personal domain. Therefore, children ap-

pear to judge broken commitments on a sliding scale in much the same way they judge actions from the

moral, social-conventional and personal domains. Results from the current study also suggest an inverse

pattern of judgment with regards to broken commitments. Specifically, it appears that the more severely

an initial action is judged, the less severely its concurrent commitment condition is judged; and vice versa.

These findings help refine our understanding of childhood interpretations of broken promises and engen-

der several unique ideas for future research in this field.

Keywords: Commitment; Promises; Morality; Social Domain Theory

Introduction

A hallmark of childhood psychological research is the pro-

gression from diametric classification to a more detailed spec-

trum of designation. For instance, Piaget and Kohlberg, pio-

neers in the field of moral development, focused on a near ab-

solute emergent moral distinction between right and wrong.

Subsequent social domain theorists expanded this perception

and developed a more nuanced prescriptivity scale that allowed

children to judge various actions according to a spectrum, typi-

cally ranging between “OK” and “very bad”. The introduction

of this refined rating system advanced research in the field of

moral development by revealing the ability of young children to

reliably distinguish between moral transgressions, social-con-

ventional transgressions, and personal choices (Nucci & Turiel,

1978; Smetana, 1981; Smetana & Braeges, 1990).

Similarly, early research examining lying among young chil-

dren focused on the ability of these children to distinguish be-

tween lies and truth. Only when these initial boundaries were

delineated were researchers able to examine children’s refined

distinctions between different types of lying. Presently, there is

strong evidence to support the idea that children as young as 7

can readily distinguish between antisocial lies (lies intended to

conceal or mislead—“It was like that when I got here.”), proso-

cial lies (lies intended to be polite—“I love your new haircut.”),

and trick lies (lies intended to elicit joy or laughter—“Got your

nose!”). By age 9, children often judge “antisocial” lies more

severely than “prosocial lies” and “prosocial lies” more se-

verely than “trick lies” (Bussey, 1999; Fu, Xu, Cameron, Hey-

man, & Lee, 2007; Lee, Xu, Fu, Cameron, & Chen, 2001; Xu,

Boa, Fu, Talwar, & Lee, 2010).

The present study continues this progression from dichoto-

mous classification to nuanced designation with regards to

children’s understandings of promises. Through the use of a

sliding rating scale—similar to one employed by social domain

theorists—we expand the current understanding of children’s

judgments of broken promises.

Promises and Children

Philosopher John Searle (1969) outlined a series of condi-

tions that must be met in order for a successful “promise” to be

made. These conditions include obligation (a “promiser” makes

a commitment to undertake a certain action), controllability (a

promise must be physically and/or mentally possible to per-

form), and advantage (a promise must prove advantageous or

beneficial to the “promisee”—promise to harm is no longer a

promise; it is a threat). Perhaps the most important aspect of

Searle’s description of promising is the nugatory nature of out-

come. Whether fulfilled or not, the very act of saying “I prom-

ise” engenders an expectation in the listener. Accordingly, the

“promiser” is held accountable and the promise remains valid

regardless of the outcome. For example, a mother’s failure to

appear at a class play she promised to attend does not negate

the previously made promise. The claim that individuals view a

promise as valid irrespective of outcome has been confirmed in

K. HUSSAR, J. HORVATH

several studies using adult subjects (Astington, 1988, 1990;

Gibbs & Delaney, 1987).

Searle’s notion of an explicit obligation points to an impor-

tant distinction between lying and promise breaking. Lying is

an act of verbal and/or emotional deception meant to engender

a false belief. Conversely, a broken promise reneges on a prior

commitment. Whether or not a promise is kept, the initial inten-

tion to perform the promised act (obligation) is inherently dif-

ferent from the initial intent to deceive by lying. We highlight

this point because, although there is a long tradition of research

exploring children’s understanding of lying, research exploring

children’s understanding of promises and their ensuing com-

mitments did not emerge until quite recently—and, even today,

the literature is q u ite sparse and diametri c.

In one of the first looks at promissory understanding, Ast-

ington (1988), through the use of utterances embedded in oral

narratives, determined that children between the ages of 5 - 7

were unable to grasp the concept of obligation. As a result, the

children classified a statement as a promise only if the promised

event occurred. More specifically, participants in this study

considered the statement, “I will take you [to the store], I prom-

ise,” as a valid promise only if the characters went to the store.

Astington concluded that the ability to recognize that a promise

remains valid regardless of outcome does not begin to emerge

until age seven.

While ultimately confirming Astington’s findings, several

researchers have demonstrated that the distinction between

promise and outcome is somewhat tenuous even beyond the age

of 7. For instance, using stories that featured characters making

and breaking promises to one another, Maas and Abbeduto

(2001) found that 9-year-olds, although able to assign respon-

sibility to the “promiser” for the outcome, often acknowledged

obligation only if a clear and involuntary obstacle impeded the

said “promiser” from fulfilling the promise. For example, when

Nevin did not show up to play on the swings with Corrinda

after he had promised he would do so, many 9-year-old partici-

pants saw this as a broken promise even when it was explained

Nevin failed to show up due to illness. However, when Nevin

simply went home to play alone, these same participants did not

view this act as a broken promise. Similarly, Mant and Perner

(1988), using oral narratives featuring characters breaking

promises for various reasons (both intentionally and uninten-

tionally in much the same manner as the Nevin character de-

scribed above), concluded that the ability to consistently and

accurately assign obligation to the “promiser” does not emerge

until the age of 9 or 10.

In order to further define the boundaries of young children’s

understanding of promises, Maas (2008) used videotaped sto-

ries employing thought bubbles to reveal the inner-thoughts of

characters. Utilizing this methodology, Maas examined the

impact of “promiser” sincerity and intention on 4- to 6-year-

olds’ ability to correctly identify promises. As an example, after

promising to help rake leaves, a “sincere” character’s thought

bubble might say, “I DO want to help—I ALWAYS like to

help,” while an insincere character’s thought bubble might say,

“I DO NOT want to help—I will NEVER want to help.” Mass

determined that although children as young as 4 can—and

do—successfully identify promises made with sincere inten-

tions, the ability to identify promises regardless of intention

begins to emerge by age 6. In her conclusion, Maas argued that

childhood understanding of promises progresses from a focus

on outcome to a focus on the belief promises create in the lis-

tener.

When combined with Maas’s earlier work, it appears prom-

issory comprehension evolves from responsibility to obligation

and ends with expectation. Unfortunately, as noted above, due

to the dearth of research examining this topic, such syntheses

can only be hypothesized. In addition, it is important to note

that each of the aforementioned studies utilized a diametric

scale rather than a more nuanced “sliding” scale. More specifi-

cally, participants were asked to categorize each scenario as a

broken promise or not.

Synthesizing Moral D e v elopment and U nderstandin g

of Promises

Piaget and Kohlberg’s foundational research in the field of

moral reasoning focused on stage-like moral development;

however, succeeding developmental psychologists—namely

Turiel, Nucci and Smetana—investigated the reasoning behind

children’s moralistic categorization of specific actions. Based

on a series of studies (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Nucci, 1981;

Nucci, Turiel, & Encarnacion-Gawrych, 1983; Smetana, 1981;

Smetana, 1985; Turiel, 1983; Turiel, 2002), these domain theo-

rists concluded that children as young as three years old can

readily differentiate between moral transgressions (actions that

cause physical or psychological harm to others, such as hitting

or teasing), social-conventional transgressions (actions that

violate the social order, such as not sitting in an assigned seat or

cutting in line), and personal choices (actions that reflect per-

sonal preference, such as wearing a certain brand of clothing or

participating in a particular sport).

Hussar and Harris (2009) utilized this non-diametric moral

domain-theory framework to examine children’s understanding

of personal “promiser” commitment. More specifically, this

research examined whether children viewed a failed promise

made to one’s self (in this case, “I will not eat meat.”) as a

binding commitment. Using story cards in which characters

made and broke promises not to eat meat for moral reasons

(e.g., “Animals are my friends and I don’t want to hurt them.”)

and personal reasons (e.g., “I just don’t like the taste.”), they

found that both vegetarian and non-vegetarian participants did

indeed judge failure to adhere to a commitment to vegetarian-

ism as wrong. However, participants judged the breaking of a

commitment more severely if it was made for moral as opposed

to personal reasons. Thus children varied in their judgments of

this broken commitment depending on whether the person’s

initial motive for making it fell into the moral domain or the

personal domain.

The Current Study

The current study aimed to expand Hussar and Harris’s re-

search (2009). Participants in the current study were asked to

judge individuals who broke commitments across various do-

mains. Specifically, participants were asked to judge individu-

als who broke personal commitments (e.g., a commitment to be

physically active), social-conventional commitments (e.g., a

commitment to be tidy) and moral commitments (e.g., a com-

mitment to stop bullying classmates) using a scale comparable

to the one utilized by social domain theorists. The authors hy-

pothesized that children would judge broken commitments in

the same manner they judge actions from the moral, social-

conventional and personal domains. Specifically, participants

would judge broken commitments from the moral domain more

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K. HUSSAR, J. HORVATH

severely than broken commitments from the social-conventional

domain and broken commitments from the social-conventional

domain more severely than broken commitments from the per-

sonal domain. By establishing children’s judgments toward

various broken commitments, we hope to determine if children

judge the breaking of a commitment in terms of the initial

grounds for making it.

Method

Participants

Participants were 40 middle-class children ranging from 6 to

10 years of age (M = 7 years 7 months, SD =1.37). There were

an equal number of boy and girl participants; all were Cauca-

sian. Participants were recruited in suburban neighborhoods

surrounding two major northeast metropolitan areas in the

United States.

Design and Procedure

The first author conducted all interviews individually with

each participant during a single visit to either the participant’s

home or school. Before the interview began, participants were

told that the researcher was “talking with kids like you to find

out what things different children think are OK to do and what

things children think are bad to do.” Each interview lasted be-

tween 30 - 45 minutes and was audio-taped and subsequently

transcribed.

To provide an initial assessment of children’s evaluation of

actions falling into the moral, social-conventional, and personal

domains, children were presented in a random order with

twelve story cards depicting four moral transgressions (stealing

a quarter from a classmate; pushing a classmate out of the way

so as to be first in line; grabbing a toy from a classmate; hitting

a classmate); four social-conventional transgressions (eating

salad with fingers; not pushing in a chair upon dismissal from

class; leaving a dirty wrapper on the table after a snack; not

sitting in an assigned seat in class); and four personal choices

(reading during recess; coloring a drawing with a purple crayon;

eating junk food; sleeping in on a Saturday morning). The gen-

der of the story card character matched the gender of the par-

ticipant (Susan for girls, Sam for boys). Children were asked to

judge each depicted action as “OK”, “a little bad”, “bad”, or

“very bad”. Initially, the interviewer did not provide any back-

ground information about the story character. Thus, children

were left to make their own assumptions about the individual.

After this initial exercise, children were asked to judge the

twelve events again; however, this time the interviewer told

participants that the story character had made a commitment

not to engage in the action in question before performing it (e.g.,

Sam promised not to take things that did not belong to him, but

stole a quarter from his classmate’s desk; Susan promised to be

more active, but decided to read a book during recess). Once

children learned about each prior commitment, they then

judged each depicted action as “OK”, “a little bad”, “bad”, or

“very bad”.

Results

Figure 1(a) reveals that participants judged moral transgres-

sions more severely than social-conventional transgressions and

rarely condemned personal choices. To analyze these results, a

repeated measures ANCOVA of Domain (moral, social- con-

ventional, personal) X Age (6, 7, 8, 9, 10) was conducted with

the participants’ gender included as a covariate. This analysis

produced a significant main effect of Domain, F(1, 34) =

229.69, p < 0.001, but no main effect of Age, F(4, 34) = 1.25, p

= 0.31. The covariate, Gender, was not a statistically significant

predictor of the outcome (p = 0.14).

Figure 1(b) indicates that when participants were told that

the story character made a commitment (promise) not to engage

in the action in question, they typically judged moral transgres-

sions more severely than social-conventional transgressions and

social-conventional transgressions more severely than personal

choices. To analyze these results, a repeated measures AN-

COVA of Domain (moral, social-conventional, personal) X

Age (6, 7, 8, 9, 10) was conducted with the participants’ gender

included as a covariate. This analysis produced a significant

main effect of Domain, F(1, 34) = 288.19, p < 0.001, but no

main effect of Age, F(4, 34) = 0.93, p = 0.46. The covariate,

Gender, was not a statistically significant predictor of the out-

come (p = 0.25).

Figure 1(c) demonstrates that within each of the three do-

mains, participants’ judgments were more severe if they were

told that the story character initially made a promise not to

engage in the action in question. Contrast analyses confirm that

participants judged identical moral transgressions more se-

verely when it was made explicit that the character had prom-

ised not to transgress prior to acting, F (1, 34) = 12.49, p < 0.01,

identical social-conventional transgressions more severely when

it was made explicit that the character had promised not to

transgress prior to acting, F (1, 34) = 16.01, p < 0.001, and

identical personal choices more severely when it was made

explicit that the character promised not to transgress prior to

acting, F (1, 34) = 43.51, p < 0.001.

In summary, participants were sensitive to the domain under

consideration, both when they were given no background in-

formation on the story character’s intentions and when they

were told that the story character made a promise not to engage

in the action in question. Nevertheless, within each of the three

domains, participants consistently judged the story character

more severely for his/her actions when the story character ini-

tially made a commitment not to engage in the action in ques-

tion.

Discussion

The goal of this study was to determine if children consider

the breaking of commitments (promises) to vary in degree of

wrongness. Specifically, we asked whether children would

judge any form of failed commitment similarly or whether they

would differentially judge broken commitments according to

the initial basis for the commitment. We began our analyses by

confirming that our participants judged events within the moral,

social-conventional and personal domains in a pattern identical

to what domain theorists have established (e.g., Smetana, 2006;

Turiel, 2006). On average, participants judged moral transgres-

sions more severely than social-conventional transgressions and

judged social-transgressions more severely than personal

choices. In fact, participants were reluctant to pass judgment on

personal choices in general (see Figure 1(a)).

With respect to commitments broken within each of these

three domains, our results indicate that children judged broken

promises in the moral domain more severely than those in the

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K. HUSSAR, J. HORVATH

(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 1.

(a) Participants’ average judgments of three domains (moral, social-

conventional, and personal) (N = 40). Responses reflect a four-point

scale where 0 = OK, 1 = a little bad, 2 = bad, 3 = very bad. (b) Partici-

pants’ average judgments of three domains (moral, social-conventional,

and personal) after learning that the story character promised not to

transgress prior to acting (N = 40). Responses reflect a four-point scale

where 0 = OK, 1 = a little bad, 2 = bad, 3 = very bad. (c) Participants’

average judgments of three domains (moral, social-conventional, and

personal) across two conditions (no background information on story

character and committed story character) (N = 40). Responses reflect a

four-point scale where 0 = OK, 1 = a little bad, 2 = bad, 3 = very bad.

social-conventional domain and broken promises in the so-

cial-conventional domain more severely than those in the per-

sonal domain (see Figure 1(b)). Therefore, it appears that chil-

dren judge broken commitments on a sliding scale in much the

same way they judge actions from the three specified domains.

Below, we consider two plausible explanations as to why chil-

dren do not judge broken commitments in a uniform manner.

A comparison of the promise/non-promise scenarios reveals

that across all three domains, participants’ judgments were

more severe when the story card character initially made a

promise not to engage in the action in question (see Figure

1(c)). On average, judgments shift by approximately one rating

on the ordinal scale: from “OK” to “a little bad” within the

personal domain; from “a little bad” to “bad” within the social-

conventional domain; and from “bad” to “very bad” within the

moral domain. Under this interpretation, participants judge the

breaking of all promises similarly. What differs is the initial

judgment of the actions in question (as evidenced in Figure

1(a)). This explanation is reinforced by several participants’

unprompted comments. For instance, in reference to the sce-

nario where Susan breaks her promise to be more active at re-

cess, one child replied, “It wouldn’t have been so bad…but she

breaks a promise so it goes down one [italics added].” Another

participant expressed a similar viewpoint: “I guess all the ones

where [Susan] promises might be one worse…because she

made a promise and broke it [italics added].” These references

to intensifying a judgment by “one” suggest a consistent judg-

ment assigned to the act of breaking a promise, regardless of

the associated behavior.

Although this interpretation is compelling, a closer examina-

tion of the data casts doubt on this theory. If this explanation

were correct, we would have expected to see a near identical

judgment differential (“one”) between the non- and broken-

promise scenarios across each domain. However, when nu-

merically calculated (as opposed to simply assigning an ordinal

rank), this difference appears to shift between scenarios—

reaching, on average, 1 point in the personal domain, 0.50

points in the social-conventional domain, and 0.25 points in the

moral domain. Accordingly, despite the homogenous ranking

method alluded to by several participants, it appears that, on

average, our participants differentially judged commitment

conditions according to each unique circumstance.

These numerical calculations suggest an alternative explana-

tion for our results, one we believe corresponds with the pattern

of results initially established by domain theorists. As previ-

ously noted, our participants were reluctant to assign any judg-

ment to the personal choices made by the story card characters.

However, once the character made and broke a promise not to

engage in the described personal action, participants negatively

judged their behavior (“a little bad”, on average). Accordingly,

these negative judgments can be understood to exclusively re-

flect the act of breaking the promise. Conversely, our partici-

pants, on average, initially judged moral transgressions as “very

bad”. However, when a promise condition was introduced and

broken within the moral domain, this judgment shifted only

slightly (0.25 points). This small shift in judgment suggests that

our participants viewed the breaking of a promise not to engage

in a moral transgression as almost inconsequential, particularly

as it compares to the moral transgressi on itself. In other words,

it appears that the more severely an initial action is judged, the

less severely its concurrent commitment will be judged. Ac-

cordingly, the less severely an initial action is judged, the more

severely its concurrent commitment condition will be judged.

Although certainly suggested by our data, we believe this

“inverse commitment” theory could be better tested with a

more sensitive sliding scale upon which participants judge

non-promise/promise scenarios. Whereas our scale may have

led to a ceiling effect within the moral domain, a five-point

scale ranging from “OK” to “very, very bad” would allow re-

searchers to better determine judgments toward broken moral

commitments and perhaps confirm this relationship between

original action and related commitment. Regardless, the data

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K. HUSSAR, J. HORVATH

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1050

collected in the current study supports this hypothesis.

In addition, it is important to note that the age range of our

participants (6 - 10 years old) may have influenced participants’

judgments of the actions in question. As demonstrated by ear-

lier researchers (i.e., Maas & Abbedutio, 2001; Mant & Perner,

1988), mature comprehension of made-, kept- and broken-

promises emerges around age 7 but remains somewhat fragile

until later adolescence. Perhaps the vacillation in our proce-

dures between traditional moral-domain judgments and broken

commitment judgments is a symptom of this maturation. Future

research could also determine if the aforementioned results are

replicated with older children (i.e., 11 - 12 years old) or if var-

ied judgments towards broken commitments stabilizes with

age.

In the end, this study has generated some unique and inter-

esting results. It initially appeared that young children were

differentially rating commitment scenarios (e.g., judging those

broken commitments that result in physical or psychological

harm towards others more severely than those broken commit-

ments that result in a disruption to the social order). However,

when the promise scenario is decoupled from its related event,

the opposite may actually be true: young children judge broken

commitments to moral transgressions less severely than broken

commitments to personal choices. The message presented seems

to be one of caliber: when one breaks a promise not to engage

in a moral transgression, the broken promise is superseded by

the moral transgression itself and, accordingly, is not judged

harshly (e.g., “S/he should have known better.”). Conversely,

when one breaks a promise not to engage in a personal choice,

the broken promise is the only true transgression and, accord-

ingly, is judged somewhat severely (e.g., “Why did s/he say it if

s/he didn’t mean it?”). This concept implies children are sensi-

tive to personal commitments, particularly broken personal

commitments. As such, our findings suggest that educators and

other professionals working with young children may need to

mitigate the judgments children are likely to bestow on others

when personal commitments are broken (e.g., dropping out of a

school club; quitting a sports team; canceling a scheduled social

activity).

Therefore, with regards to our research question, children do

consider the initial basis for which a commitment was made in

determining the severity of their judgment of the broken com-

mitment in question. However, their judgments appear to be

more sophisticated that initially theorized. The more severely

an initial action is judged, the less severely its concurrent com-

mitment will be judged. Accordingly, the less severely an initial

action is judged, the more severely its concurrent commitment

condition will be judged. Although certainly suggested by our

data, we believe this “inverse commitment” theory should be

confirmed through future research that includes a more sensi-

tive judgment scale as well as a wider age range of participants.

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