Does System 1 Process both Local and Nonlocal Information in Intuitive Judgment and Decision Making? Available Evidence and a Research Agenda Proposal

doi:10.4236/psych.2013.411114

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2013. Vol.4, No.11, 798-803

Published Online November 2013 in SciRes (http://www.scirp.org/journal/psych) http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/psych.2013.411114

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798

Does System 1 Process both Local and Nonlocal Information in

Intuitive Judgment and Decision Making? Available Evidence and

a Research Agenda Proposal

Patrizio Tressoldi

Dipartimento di Psicologia Generale, Università di Padova, Padova, Italy

Email: [email protected]

Received July 31st, 2013; revised September 1st, 2013; accepted October 2nd, 2013

tribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the

original work is properly cited.

This paper argues that System 1, (the mental processing system mainly involved in the processing of un-

conscious information) in contrast to System 2, (mainly involved in the processing of conscious informa-

tion), processes not only local information conveyed by sensory organs, but also nonlocal ones, that is,

those beyond the detection range of sensory organs. The striking similarities observed between the char-

acteristics of local and nonlocal information processing by System 1, offer the possibility of using most of

the experimental protocols used to investigate local information for the nonlocal information. Available

evidence is presented and a research agenda is outlined that could raise fascinating questions and answer

about the functioning of the human mind.

Keywords: System 1; System 2; Unconscious Information Processing; Nonlocal Information

Introduction

Dual-Process Model of Information Processing:

System 1 and Sy stem 2

Although some authors have traced the dual-process theory

of information processing to William James, a consensus has

been achieved on the theoretical and empirical definition of two

distinct ways of perceiving and thinking that characterize the

functioning of human mental activity, System 1 and System 2

as defined by Epstein (1994, 2008); Stanovich (1999); Kahne-

man, (2003, 2011); Kahneman & Frederick (2002); Evans &

Stanovich (2013).

These information processing systems can be summarised as

the extremes of a continuum with System 1 as a fast, automatic,

emotional, stereotypic, large capacity, sub- and unconscious way

of processing at one end, and System 2 as a slow, effortful, ca-

pacity limited, controlled and conscious way of processing in-

formation at the other.

There is some evidence that System 1’s unconscious cogni-

tive activity influences consumer preferences (Friese, Wänke,

& Plessner, 2006), interpersonal processes (Fitzsimons &

Bargh, 2003), emotional reactions (Tamietto et al., 2009) and

the pursuit of specific goals (Custers & Aarts, 2010).

A useful and clearly expressed comparison of the main char-

acteristics of System 1 and System 2 within four different clus-

ters, is offered by Evans (2008)1, see Table 1.

At present, the theoretical and empirical investigation is lar-

gely devoted to the exploration of the conditions that trigger the

activation of one system or the other, (e.g. Greifeneder, Bless,

& Pham, 2011; Bolte & Goschke, 2005; Evans & Stanovich,

2013), defining which problems can be solved more effi-

ciently by using one system or the other, (e.g. Usher et al., 2011),

and determining if and how these two systems can interact to

exploit their characteristics for increasing information process-

ing efficiency (e.g. Evans, 2008; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer,

2011).

What information do these two systems use? The general

consensus is that all the information is received only by the sen-

sory organs.

As strange as it may seem, there is a research line more than

80 years old, which investigates whether the human mind can

process information received by bypassing the sensory organs

(see Tressoldi, 2011, for a review) although it has only recently

been theoretically and empirically examined within a dual-sys-

tem framework. Even if it pursued under different names and

theoretical approaches, we can define this as the study of Sys-

tem1 nonlocal information processing. In the following sections

we define the characteristics of this information processing sys-

tem. We then outline the empirical findings obtained so far and

conclude with a proposal for a research agenda to pursue inves-

tigation of the interactions in the processing systems of both lo-

cal and nonlocal information.

Could System 1 Process No nlocal Information2?

Suppose our brain and consequently our mind could receive

information related to objects, people, emotions, natural envi-

2The meaning of “nonlocal” is used here only as presented in the text and

not as physical or biological quantum-like properties. An interpretation o

mental nonlocal functions as possible physical or biological quantum-like

properties is presented in Tressoldi & Khrennikov (2012).

1A similar comparison has been done by Epstein (2008).

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Table 1.

Clusters of attributes associated with dual systems of thinking follow-

ing Evans (2008).

System 1 System 2

Cluster 1—Consciousness

Unconscious (preconscious) Conscious

Implicit Explicit

Automatic Controlled

Low effort High effort

Rapid Slow

High capacity Low capacity

Default process Inhibitory

Holistic, perceptual Analytic, reﬂective

Cluster 2—Evolution

Evolutionarily old Evolutionarily recent

Evolutionary rationality Individual rationality

Shared with animals Uniquely human

Nonverbal Linked to language

Modular cognition Fluid intelligence

Cluster 3—Functional char acteristics

Associative Rule based

Domain speciﬁc Domain general

Contextualized Abstract

Pragmatic Logical

Parallel Sequential

Stereotypical Egalitarian

Cluster 4—Individual differences

Universal Heritable

Independent of general intelligence Linked to general intelligence

Independent of working memory Limited by working memory capacity

ronment, etc., from beyond the constraints of our sensory or-

gans by acting like an information detector. In simple terms,

this would involve expressing nonlocal perception characteris-

tics in different ways from the perception of information trans-

mitted by our sensory organs which are limited by their bio-

logical detection range.

We will call this System 1 nonlocal information processing

(S1_nip) postulating that its activity precedes System 1 local

processing (S1_lip) and obviously System 2 activity.

The hypothesis of a mind or consciousness without space and

perhaps time constraints is not new and we can trace its roots

back to certain philosophical theories, such as idealism, panp-

sychism, neutral or mental monism and more recently non-

physical realism (Staune, 2013) and the dual-aspect monism

(Antmaspacher, 2012).

For example, Idealism is the family of views which assert

that reality, or reality as we know it, is fundamentally mental,

mentally constructed, or otherwise immaterial (e.g. Bolender,

2001).

Panpsychism states that mind is a fundamental feature of the

world which exists throughout the universe. Unsurprisingly,

each of the key terms, “mind”, “fundamental” and “throughout

the universe” is subject to a variety of interpretations by panp-

sychists, leading to a range of possible philosophical positions

(Pihlström, 2008).

Mental Monism holds that all is mind and that the ultimate

constituents of the world are individual momentary experiences

which in themselves are neither mental nor physical, but of

which, differently arranged, both minds and material things are

composed. In other words, the concept of nature itself is a con-

struct of mind that can only be known through hypotheses test-

ed by reference to experience (Velmans, 2012).

Non-physical realism refers to the assumption that reality

cannot be explained exclusively by observable causes in space-

time and consciousness and matter stem from a unique sub-

stance that would “ante-date the scission between the subject

and the objet” (Staune, 2013) a theoretical approach similar to

the dual-aspect monism (Antmaspacher, 2012) elaborated after

a detailed reconstruction of the Pauli-Jung conjecture which

yields a psychophysically neutral, unitary reality beyond the

distinction of the mental and the material.

In psychology, the term and characteristics of nonlocal mind

or consciousness were first proposed by Dossey (1989) and

more recently by Clarke (1995) and Carpenter (2004, 2012) in

his First Sight Model.

This paper is the first systematic proposal to introduce this

model of processing within the dual-model framework.

Which nonlocal information can be received by S1_nip? In

theory it should be all the information available in the universe

regardless of distance and perhaps time constraints. But how

can a living mind survive this massive flow of information?

One possibility, supported by evidence (see Section 2), is that

this information has a very low signal-to-noise ratio and in the

normal condition of the mind functioning in a waking status of

consciousness, System 2 and S1_lip functioning will almost

completely mask nonlocal information signals. A good analogy

is our daily immersion in the ocean of information transmitted

by electromagnetic waves that we are unaware of until we de-

cide to perceive them by tuning our detectors, radio, smart-

phones, etc. to amplify their signal strength to a level compati-

ble with our sensory organs’ detection characteristics.

If this assumption is correct, we should observe better detec-

tion of nonlocal information reducing or bypassing the activity

of S1_lip and System 2 processing of local information. How is

it possible to reduce or bypass S1_lip and System 2 activity?

One possibility is to reduce or eliminate completely the flow

of information sent by the sensory organs and the information

processing of S1_lip and System 2. For example, to reduce the

flow of information sent by the sensory organs, participants in

experiments have been immersed in a ganzfeld environment

(see a description of a typical protocol in the Appendix). An-

other alternative to bypassing S1_lip and System 2 activity is to

record the neuro- or psychophysiological signals correlated with

nonlocal information (see description in the Appendix). With

these two experimental protocols, the supposedly non-local in-

formation may be detected consciously because any other

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P. TRESSOLDI

mental activity of S1_lip and System 2 is maximally reduced in

a ganzfeld environment, whereas with the second protocol it is

possible to detect directly the purported nonlocal information at

an unconscious level when it impinges on the central or periph-

eral nervous system.

Evidence3

It is relevant at this point to ask what the differences are in

S1_nip detection accuracy for nonlocal information with dif-

ferent degrees of S1_lip and Sensory 2 involvement. In Table 2,

we list the best evidence available from meta-analyses in de-

creasing order of effect size (ES) values expressed as Cohen’s d

standardised difference. Except for the “anticipatory physio-

logical signals” where ES is the difference between the two sti-

mulus categories, in all of the other experimental conditions, ES

is the difference with respect to the expected chance.

From the data presented in Table 2, it is clear that the detec-

tion of information of S1_nip decreases almost linearly, passing

from a condition where S1_lip and System 2 are bypassed, i.e.

in dream status or when recording neuro- and psychophysiolo-

gical signals, to a condition where S1_lip and System 2 activity

is reduced, i.e. in a ganzfeld environment or in an altered state

of consciousness, to conditions in which nonlocal information

is almost completely lost, i.e. in normal status of consciousness

when S1_lip and System 2 are both active, independently if free

or forced-choice procedures are used. In summary, the more

System 2 and S1_lip are activated, the more nonlocal informa-

tion is destroyed (suppressed) in analogy with a situation where

we try to understand what a friend is telling us in a disco.

If we compare the efficiency of S1_lip in some experimental

conditions, we can see how much stronger is its detection ac-

curacy with respect to S1_nip (see Table 3).

Similarly to what has been observed for S1_nip, we can see

Table 2.

Experimental evidence obtained from meta-analyses of S1_nip detec-

tion accuracy in decreasing order of ES values.

Experimental

condition Source N. Studies

Weighted random

effect ES (95% CI)

Dream Sherwood and

Roe (2003) 22 .24 (.20 - .28)

Anticipatory

physiological signals

Mossbridge et al.

(2012) 26 .21 (.13 - .29)

Free response in

Ganzfeld Tressoldi (2011)108 .13 (.09 - .17)

Free-response in

ASC* Storm et al. (2010)16 .11 (.03 - .19)

Implicit behavioral

anticipation effects

in NSC**

Tressoldi et al.

(submitted) 82 .09 (.06 - .12)

Forced-choice in

NSC Tressoldi (2011)72 .01(.006 - .015)

Free-response in

NSC Storm et al. (2010)14 −.03 (−.06 - .002)

Note: *ASC = altered states of consciousness, like hypnosis, deep meditation;

**NSC = normal state of consciousness.

Table 3.

Some Experimental evidence obtained from meta-analyses of S1_lip

detection accuracy in decreasing order of ES values.

Experimental

condition Source N. Studies

Weighted random effect

ES (95% CI)

Semantic

categorization

priming

Van den Bussche

et al. (2009) 23 .80 (.60 - 1.00)

Lexical and

naming priming

Van den Bussche

et al. (2009) 32 .47 (.36 - .58)

Problem solving

Incubation effect

Sio & Ormerod

(2009) 117 .29 (.20 - .38)

Unconscious

thought theory

Strick et al.

(2011) 92 .22 (.14 - .30)

that the S1_lip efficiency decreases when passing from condi-

tions where System 2 is bypassed, i.e. priming, to conditions

where System 2 is temporarily inhibited (Van den Bussche et

al., 2009) or made busy during System 1 processing, i.e., prob-

lem-solving incubation and unconscious complex problem-sol-

ving tasks (i.e. Sio & Ormerod, 2009; Strick et al., 2011).

The comparison of ESs presented in Tables 2 and 3, clearly

shows the superior efficiency of S1_lip where the information

is sent to the sensory organs in any case, with respect to S1_nip.

The smallest efficiency values of S1_lip are close to the largest

values of S1_nip, supporting the hypothesis that the nonlocal

information signal-to-noise ratio is weak and hence its detection

can easily be suppressed by S1_lip or System 2 processing ac-

tivity, even if we cannot exclude the possibility that it still has a

weak influence both of them.

System 1 Local and Nonlocal Information

Processing Comparison

At this point it is possible to compare the characteristics of

S1_nip and S1_lip using the same template used to compare

S1_lip with System 2 (see Table 4).

The characteristics in bold are those assumed to be specific

only to S1_nip. Those with a question mark, need to be tested.

A striking similarity emerges with regard to the characteris-

tics of the two information processing systems. A few basic dif-

ferences obviously exist in terms of their origin, receptive ca-

pacity, constraints imposed by sensory organs for S1_lip, un-

bounded for S1_nip and different interference vulnerability,

partly consequent on the different signal-to-noise ratios that are

higher for S1_lip.

A Research Agenda

The analysis of the characteristics of S1_lip and S1_nip,

suggests that, apart from the basic difference in the source of

information, they should function in a very similar way even if

the effects on behaviour and System 2 are stronger for S1_lip

and interference of System 2 is stronger for S1_nip than S1_lip.

It follows that most of the experimental protocols that are

used to study S1_lip can be used to study S1_nip. For example,

all the protocols used to study the priming effects with S1_lip

can easily be adapted to study these effects, presenting both

subliminal and completely masked priming information. For

example, Figure 1 shows a classical example of semantic prim-

ing where the priming, the picture of a hammer in this case, is

presented subliminally. If we present the picture of the hammer

3We are aware that the interpretation of this evidence (as support to the

reality of nonlocal perception) is hotly debated, but there is not sufficient

space in this paper to discuss all alternative explanations.

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Table 4.

Similarities and differences between S1_nip and S1_lip.

S1_nip S1_lip

Cluster 1—Consciousness

Unconscious (preconscious) Unconscious (preconscious)

Implicit Implicit

Automatic Automatic

Low effort Low effort

Rapid Rapid

High capacity High capacity

Default process Default process

Holistic, perceptual Holistic, perceptual

Cluster 2—Evolution

Evolutionarily innate Evolutionarily old

Evolutionary rationality Evolutionary rationality

Shared with animals Shared with animals

Nonverbal Nonverbal

Modular cognition Modular cognition

Cluster 3—Functional char acteristics

Associative Associative

Domain speciﬁc Domain speciﬁc

Contextualized?? Contextualized

Pragmatic Pragmatic

Parallel Parallel

Stereotypical?? Stereotypical

Cluster 4—Individual differences

Universal Universal

Independent of general intelligence Independent of general intelligence

Independent of working memory Independent of working memory

Cluster 5—Interaction with System 2

Affect System 2 Affect System 2

Affected by System 2 Affected by System 2

Cluster 6—Sens orial charac teristics

Unbounded by sensory organs

detection characteristics Bounded by sensory organs

detection characteristics

Interference from information

out of sensory detection No influence by information

out of sensory detection

Very low signal/noise ratio

Signal/noise ratio depends

from the duration and the

strength of sensory organs

stimulation

Figure 1.

Classical example of a procedure to investigate uncon-

scious semantic priming.

completely covered, we can investigate whether naming can be

primed by the nonlocal perception.

If our premises are valid, we should observe similar priming

effects in both conditions even if they are weaker (i.e. lower

effect sizes) associated with the presentation of nonlocal infor-

mation.

One example on how to combine subliminal and nonlocal

information, is offered by Carpenter, Simmonds-Moore and

Moore (2012) that studied the Mere Exposure Effect, that is the

tendency for persons to experience a greater liking or attraction

for things as a function of having been exposed to them previ-

ously. These authors used both subliminal and nonlocal infor-

mation by simply masking them completely during their pres-

entation in a way that no sensory information is available.

Other functioning similarities are expected. For example it

could be tested if semantic and perceptual object features pre-

sented out of the range of the detection of sensory organs, dif-

ferentially modulates the sensitivity of unconscious processing

pathways, producing similar effects of attentional induction

such as those studied by Martens, Ansorge, & Kiefer (2011).

The core of this research agenda should be the study of the

relationships between these three information processing sys-

tems. Thus some of the main questions that need to be asked

are:

 What are the adaptive advantages of having both an S1_lip

and an S1_nip?

 Can an S1_lip and an S1_nip be used cooperatively to en-

hance their specific properties?

 What are the neuro- and psychophysiological correlates of

an S1_lip and an S1_nip?

 How can we exploit the information processing of S1_nip,

for example by detecting and amplifying the signal strength

of its neuro- and psychophysiological correlates, to assist

System 2 information processing?

 Are some so-called “anomalous” or “exceptional” percep-

tual and cognitive experiences a sign of enhanced S1_nip

(e.g. Fach et al., 2013)?

 What is the role of implicit goals pursuit (Custers & Aarts,

2010) and basic needs (see Epstein, 2008) in the facilitation

or inhibition of S1_nip detection accuracy?

 Which individual differences facilitate the use of S1_lip and

S1_nip information in avoiding the interference of System 2

(e.g. the role of Zen meditation, Strick et al., 2012)?

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Open Access

802

Many more questions are obviously possible, but their reso-

lution depends on how many scientists are interested in explor-

ing this frontier of the human mind.

Acknowledgements

English was independently revised by the Proof Reading Ser-

vice and the Professional Editing Services

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Appendix

Synthetic Description of a Typical Experimental

Protocol for the Study of S1_Nip Perception in a

Ganzfeld Environment

In a typical ganzfeld experiment, the “receiver” is left in a

room relaxing in a comfortable chair with halved ping-pong

balls over the eyes, and with a red light shining on them. The

receiver is asked to keep his/her eyes open, and to wear head-

phones through which white or pink noise is played. The re-

ceiver is exposed to this state of mild sensory homogenization

for about a half hour.

During this time a target usually a photograph or a short

videoclip randomly drawn from a set of four possible targets

(each as different from one another as possible) is projected on

a screen located in a distant room isolated from the “receiver’s”

room without any possibility to receive sensory information (a

common variant is the use of a “sender” who observes the cho-

sen target).

During the ganzfeld stimulation period, the receiver verbally

describes any impressions that come to mind. These “menta-

tions” are recorded by the experimenter (who is also blind to

the target) via an audio recording or by taking notes, or both.

After the ganzfeld period ends, the receiver is taken out of the

ganzfeld state and is presented with four photos or video clips,

one of which was the target along with three decoys. The re-

ceiver is asked to choose which target best resembles the image

sent by the distant sender.

The evaluation of a trial is based on (a) selection of one im-

age by the receiver, based on his/her assessment of the similar-

ity between his/her subjective impressions and the various tar-

get possibilities, possibly enhanced by listening to his/her men-

tation recorded during the session, or (b) an independent ju-

dge’s assessment of similarity between the various targets and

the participant’s mentation recorded during the session. The re-

sults are then collected in the form of “hit rates” over many

trials, (i.e., the proportion of trials in which the target was cor-

rectly identified). Because four possible targets are typically

used in these studies, the chance hit rate is normally 25%. After

many repeated trials, hit rates that significantly exceed chance

expectation are taken as evidence for nonlocal information trans-

fer. Most of these experiments are now fully automated, elimi-

nating the possibility of data recording errors.

Synthetic Description of a Typical Experimental

Protocol for the Study of S1_Nip Perception

Recording Ne uro and/or Psychophysiological

Correlates

Two paradigms are used: 1) randomly ordered presentations

of arousing vs. neutral stimuli, or 2) guessing tasks for which

the stimulus is the feedback about the participant’s guess (cor-

rect vs. incorrect). In arousing vs. neutral stimulus paradigms,

participants are shown, for example, a randomly intermixed se-

ries of violent and emotionally neutral photographs on each

trial, and there is no a priori way to predict which type of sti-

mulus will be viewed in the upcoming trial. In guessing tasks,

on each trial participants are asked to predict randomly selected

future stimuli (such as which of four cards will appear on the

screen) and once they have made their prediction, they then

view the target stimulus, which becomes feedback for the par-

ticipant.

Because participants perform at chance on these tasks, gues-

sing tasks generally create a random distribution of events pro-

ducing separable physiological responses that reflect brief states

of positive arousal (following feedback indicating a correct

guess) and negative and/or lower arousal (following feedback

indicating an incorrect guess). Regardless of the paradigm, phy-

siological measures [skin conductance, heart rate, blood volume,

respiration, electroencephalographic (EEG) activity, pupil dila-

tion, blink rate, and/or blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD)

responses] are recorded throughout the session, and stimulus

times are usually marked in the physiological trace itself. These

continuous data are later portioned according to a pre-deter-

mined “anticipatory period” designated for analysis (generally

0.5 - 10 s preceding stimulus presentation, depending on the

temporal sensitivity of the physiological measure and the inter-

trial interval). The portioned data are marked according to the

type of stimuli they precede (arousing or neutral stimuli for the

arousing vs. neutral paradigm, feedback indicating correct or

incorrect guesses for the guessing paradigm). Pre-stimulus data

are then compared across stimulus types.

It has been known for some time that arousing and neutral

stimuli produce somewhat different post-stimulus physiological

responses in humans. However, what is remarkable is that

many of the studies examined here make the claim that, for ins-

tance, the same physiological measure that yields a differen-

tial post-stimulus response to two stimulus classes also yields a

differential pre-stimulus response to those same stimulus class-

es, prior even to the random selection of the stimulus type by

the computer. Authors of these studies often refer to the effect

as presentiment (sensing an event before it occurs) or unex-

plained anticipatory activity; we favor the latter terminalogy as

it describes the phenomenon without implying that the effect

truly reflects a reversal of the usual forward causality.

Open Access 803