Maduabuchi Dukor and the Legacies of Ontological Practices in African Thought System

doi:10.4236/ojpp.2013.31A028

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Open Journal of Philosophy

2013. Vol.3, No.1A, 168-173

Published Online February 2013 in SciRes (http://www.scirp.org/journal/ojpp) http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojpp.2013.31A028

168

Maduabuchi Dukor and the Legacies of Ontological

Practices in African Thought System

Adebayo Aina

Department of Philosophy , Olabisi Onabanjo University, A go -Iwoye, Ni ge ria

Email: bayo_k of [email protected]

Received September 11th, 2012; r evised October 10th, 2012; accepted October 25 th, 2012

A challenge human existence is confronted in contemporary society is the justification of a coherent so-

cial order. Most of these justifications have been grounded, over time, on natural approach to the neglect

of the African ontological practice. This natural reference fails to account for the ontological practice

premised on African belief system which reconciles the natural and spiritual aspects of human existence.

The study adopts the analytic approach in philosophy which evolves a clarification of the ontological

concept within the African context. The African ontological practice hinges on Dukor’s perspective which

provides for a coherent interconnection among social structure, law and belief system towards the certi-

tude and trust making for harmonious human well-being. Social order is enhanced by this African onto-

logical practice and should, therefore, be incorporated into the public sphere.

Keywords: African Ontology; Analytic Approach; Dukor; Human Existence; Social Order

Introduction

The paper aims to discuss the legacies of African ontological

practice through the contribution of Maduabuchi Dukor within

the confine of Igbo thought system. Dukor is a professional

African philosopher whose corpus of work is a formidable task

that permeated logic, ethics, epistemology and metaphysics,

with special focus on comparative discourse, with a view to

promoting African scholarship in the public space. Little won-

der that his justification of African ontological practice pro-

vokes a concern for a viable social justice in complementing the

administrative structure bequest on Africans by the colonial

system. However, it should be noted that Africa’s cultures share

certain core concepts, values and beliefs in common. The work

is structured thus: A clarification of African ontological prac-

tice; Dukor on African ontological practice; and the implica-

tions of Dukor’s African ontological practice to contemporary

society.

Clarification of Concept: African

Ontological Practice

Ontology means the study or concern about what kinds of

things exist or what entities there are in the universe. An entity

is an existing or real thing. The fact that something exists seems

to imply its separateness from other existence or entities. So the

ontological idea attempts to identify the ultimate cosmic princi-

ple by which things come into existence (Uduigwomen, 2002; p.

154). The nature of these entities revolves around the relation-

ship between two planes of existence: the spiritual existence

and the natural existence. According to the Yoruba, the spiritual

is housed by supernatural forces including Olódùmarè (the

Supreme Being), the Òrìsà (divinities), the Ajogun (anti-gods

or malevolent gods), the Àjé and the ancestors; while the natu-

ral world (Ìsàlú-Àyé) is the domain of human beings, animals

and plants (Abimbola, 2006: p. 52). It is pertinent to note that

the relationship between these two realms is not exclusive in

nature. Rather, the natural and spiritual planes of existence

form the same continuum. Dukor corroborates that all entities

have a spiritual cause which engenders the belief in the per-

sonification of nature in form of gods or spirits, and this he

refers to as Theistic Panpsychism (Dukor, 2010: p. 24). By

Theistic Panpsychism, he means that “the Supreme Being is the

creator, and the smaller gods, who were created by the same

Supreme Being intermingle with mankind as the guardian of

public order, morality and justice” (Dukor, 2010: p. 24).

Hence, the African belief system regards the spiritual realm

as essential to the welfare of man. As such, it is believed to

provide the natural existence with a useful overarching system

which assists human being to organise reality and impose sanc-

tions to his life. This emanates through the people’s religious

beliefs. As a result of this, according to Sodipo (2004: p. 88),

“its explanation must be given in terms of persons or entities

that are like persons in significant respects. For it is explanation

like this that can reveal the motives that lay behind particular

happenings; they alone answer the emotional question why the

thing happened here, now and to me in particular”. Thus mis-

haps, based on observation and knowledge of natural processes

without remedy, are consigned to punishment by the super-

natural forces. It is to say that the spiritual realm serves as “a

means of resolving some of the significant puzzles of the hu-

man conditions” (Gbadegesin, 1984: p. 182). The inhabitant of

the spiritual realm is endowed with extra-ordinary powers

which cannot be perceived by man. It becomes imperative for

man to continue to curry their favours for security and knowl-

edge purposes. This is well summarised by Sodipo (2004: p. 89)

thus:

The lorry driver who ties a charm to his lorry-seat and a

magical object under the lorry’s windscreen is not deny-

ing or trying to frustrate any of the general laws by which

the motor-vehicle operates. He knows, as well as any sci-

A. AINA

entific man, that if the brakes fail while the vehicle is

moving at high speed there could be a serious accident.

He is aware too that if the accident is serious enough,

some of the passengers could die. But the general laws

cannot answer for him the question where and when the

brakes will fail, whether they would fail when the lorry is

travelling at high or low speed and, should that happen,

who of the passenger will be fatally wounded. The scien-

tific man will push the application of general laws as far

as it can go; after that chance takes over. But not so in

Yoruba traditional thought. Even if a general law says that

only one person out of a hundred passengers in a lorry

involved in an accident would be saved the Yoruba be-

lieve that the gods, not chance, decide who that lucky one

shall be and it is certainly worth trying to make oneself

the lucky one through a charm or through the necessary

sacrifice to some god or gods.

From this viewpoint, the African attributes to Supreme Being

through the gods those things for which they “cannot find natu-

ralistic explanation” (Oladipo, 1992: p. 49). This belief is also

found in Akan culture in Ghana. Kwasi Wiredu (1980: p. 19)

gives an interesting illustration to show how people explain

away some metaphysical issues, with the story of an imaginary

traveller who dies in a bus crash, thus:

When he originally tried to get on the bus, the bus was al-

ready filled to capacity with passengers but just as he de-

cided to postpone his journey and as he is turning to go, a

seat is vacated. One passenger, for one reason or the other,

has to get off in a hurry. So he gets on. His destination is

the very first stop on the bus, and he is in fact, the pas-

senger travelling the shortest distance. But just one mile

from his destination the calamity occurs: a puncture and

the bus crashed. Unbelievably, everyone on board escapes

with minor bruises except one. Alone, of fifty passengers

our traveller dies.

However, three points, among others, may be raised from

Sodipo and Wiredu’s narrations. First, the Yoruba will attribute

the ill fatedness of our traveller, out of helplessness, to the wish

of the spiritual realm, perhaps Olódùmarè’s sanctions. This is

reflected in sayings like bo se yan tì e nìyen (That is how he has

chosen his portion from spiritual world) or ibi ti àyànmo e gbé

é dé ni yèn (That is the extent of his chosen portion). Also, this

may be the consequence of an inherited family curse. Sanctions

of this nature might have been out of ill-treatment of fellow

human beings in the time past. That is why the Yoruba say á o

be èsè baba wó lára omo (we shall revisit the father’s punish-

ment on the children). Besides the above instances, further

justification of ontological practice may generate out of the

practice of cursing through the aid of some gods. For example,

a farmer may curse anyone who steals from his farm and by the

invocation of the god’s power inflict punishment on the thief.

At other times, the victim of some robbery would go to a shrine

and ask a god to sanction the culprit in a particular fashion and

would promise rewards to the god. The culprit possessed by the

god, perhaps by the Ayelala shrine, would make his way to the

shrine and confess. Most often series of strange death may oc-

cur in the culprit’s family (Adegbola, 1998: pp. 171-172).

Hence, the belief in the deities only serves as a means of avert-

ing earthly havoc as well as a kind of comfort in the time of

adversity. So prayers often said through a deity to Supreme

Being are, to borrow the words from the Akan tradition, meant

mostly:

For material well-being and earthly blessings, such as

riches, health, social peace and harmony, fertility, birth of

many children, and continuity of life and vitality, and

protection from evil, danger or death, petition for healing

and longevity (Gyekye, 1996: p. 16).

It implies that the African is not particularly attracted to the

union of human soul with Supreme Being in the spiritual realm

but rather aspire for the promotion of human welfare and hap-

piness through some mystical way of fulfilling these needs. So

in the event where a god failed to “deliver on a request sought

in prayer, that deity will be censured, treated with contempt,

and ultimately abandoned by the people” (Gyekye, 1996: p. 16).

In short, the spiritual realm serves as a referent point to the

sustenance of the social solidarity, harmony and cooperation

values. In addition to this social role, the spiritual realm sanc-

tions moral obligations and responsibilities of the members of

the community. These sanctions used to be very effective in-

struments for the enforcement of morality in society. We should

note that it is not so much the physical hardship of going

through the punishments that confine people to observe the

moral codes but rather the threat of disgrace to one’s family,

and above all to one’s offspring (Adegbola, 1998: p. 173). It is

believed by the people that whenever misfortunes and disaste rs,

as experienced by our traveller, occurs they most often interpret

them as punishment sent by the Supreme Being for bad conduct

or inability to act on some moral obligation to the community.

Similarly, misfortunes suffered could then be the product of

“unethical behaviour” which serves as lesson for thorough ex-

amination of moral behaviour in the community (Gyekye, 1996:

p. 18). There is then the need to show that it is the responsibil-

ity of man, as a sensible being, to maintain the delicate balance

between the two realms of existence. This manifests in Dukor’s

discussion of the humanistic orientation in African, perhaps

Igbo, ontological practice.

Dukor on African Ontological Practice

Thus far, we are informed that the African appeal to the ex-

tra-human powers, in the spiritual realm, is merely with the

motive of furthering the maintenance of social harmony in the

natural realm of existence. Dukor (2010: p. 34) affirms this in

the Igbo parlance that sometimes people were reported to have

been pushed to the point of warning a particular god of injustice

to the extent that some gods, goddesses, and spirits may not

after all be the true manifestation of the Supreme Being. Bewaji

(2004: p. 399) compliments that it is “mainly intended to lend

legitimacy through an already available reinforcement mecha-

nism to what is often taken for granted as morally obligatory”.

Indeed, it is what assures the happiness and prosperity of indi-

viduals and community. But this harmonious cooperation in

this belief system depends on humanistic basis of the people’s

moral value.

Hence, we may tarry a while to discuss the meaning of moral

value in order to boost the understanding of the humanistic

orientation. According to Kwame Gyekye (1996: p. 55), moral

value involves:

A set of social rules and norms intended to guide the con-

duct of people in a society. The rules and norms emerge

A. AINA

from … people’s beliefs about right and wrong conduct

and good and bad character. Morality is intrinsically so-

cial, arising out of the relations between individuals; if

there were no such a thing as human society, there would

be no such thing as morality. And, because morality is

essentially a social phenomenon … consideration for the

interests of other and, hence a sense of duty to others are

intrinsic to the meaning and practice of morality.

This viewpoint on moral values draws attention to two im-

plications. First, it attempts to affirm that moral discourse is

primarily a “this-worldly” affair in which one focuses on issues

of cooperation, actions, attitudes, emotion, public order and

character, Secondly, it espouses social morality wherein hu-

manistic practice is grounded. This represents an ascending

order from the austerely commitment to social sympathies of

rigorous individualism to the pervasive commitment to social

involvement. Now, on “this worldly” conception of moral value

in Igbo thought system, man is equated to maintain an interac-

tive course of duty where love, patronage, recognition, compas-

sion, companionship are not only generated but also equitably

distributed in the community. Most of these precepts show

“that members of the community are endowed with reason and

intention to show responsibility in preserving the sacrosanct of

moral values and ethos of the society” (Dukor, 2010: p. 17)

Thus the harmonization of these interests account for what is

good. The absence of this ethic of responsibility in man’s be-

haviour is an act of injustice in African parlance. And this may

provoke in Igbo belief system the infractions against man qua

man, as well as the spiritual beings. It involves the descending

from “communal covenantal grace into isolated individualism”

(Amponsah, 1974: p. 71). Dukor (2010: p. 18) adds that these

values include,

One shall not kill or steal. Killing or taking of another’s

life is an abomination and contrary to the will of the god-

dess, Ani and the Almighty, Chukwu. Nemesis of death or

madness normally trail after any person who commits

murder … Stealing of any sort which is an infringement

on someone else’s right and contrary to the spirit of

communalism is seriously frowned by the society …

Stealing in the society attracted the wrath of the god or

goddess or outright banishment.

In this respect, its consequence brings the calamities not only

on the culprit(s) but on the family and the community in gen-

eral, and these are often seen as punishment. That is why the

Igbo critically frown at unruly behaviour as its disgrace termi-

nates not at the recalcitrant. Thus the proverb “when a man

dances badly in public, it is his brothers that get the itching

brow” (Dukor, 2010: p. 17).

Nevertheless, the second implication of the moral values in

African culture strongly recommends the principle of social

practice. By this we mean social reverberations of an individ-

ual’s conduct of good character in the community. It is due to

the fact that a human being is part of a social whole. This social

practice, that an individual does not and cannot exist alone

except corporately, is illustrated by Segun Gbadegesin (1991:

pp. 61-62) thus:

The new baby arrives into the waiting hands of the elders

of the household. Experienced elderly wives in the house-

hold serve as mid-wives, they see that the new baby is de-

livered safely and the mother is in no danger after delivery.

They introduce the baby into the family with cheerfulness,

joy and prayer: “Ayo abara tintin” [This is a little thing of

joy]. From then on, the new mother may not touch the

child except for breast feeding. The baby is safe in the

hands of others: Co-wives, husband’s mother and step-

mothers and a whole lot of others, including senior sisters,

nieces and cousins. On the seventh or eight day, the baby

gets his/her names, a ceremony performed by the adult

members of the household … The meaning of this is that

child, as an extension of the family tree, should be given a

name that reflects his/her membership therein, and it is

expected that the name so given will guide and control the

child by being a constant reminder for him/her of his/her

membership in the family and the circumstance of his/her

birth.

The above excerpt implies that an individual cannot run

adrift from the community that nurtures him/her. Rather the

individual, through socialization and the love and concern

which the community extended to him/her, cannot now see

him/herself as an isolated being. This social character is intrin-

sic to the notion of morality in Igbo culture. This is grounded in

human experiences in living together. Even the Republican

nature of the Igbo culture recognises with strong emphasis on

the respect and promotion of individual rights to the communal

institutions and properties but with some limitations, which are

theoretical and practical in nature (Dukor, 2010: pp. 19-20).

The Igbo do not hesitate to say, in compliment of communi-

tarianism, thus: Egbe belu ugo belu, Nke si-ibeya-ebena, nku

kaa-ya (Kite perches and eagle also perches; if any one says the

other will not perch on the tree, her feather will be broken). It

implies that wisdom is not limited to a given class of people in

traditional Igbo society. Rather, it recognises the contr i b u tion of

every rational being, old and young, towards the betterment of

the whole community. The point here is that every person

should have a chance to contribute to the development of the

society. This implies that no point of view should be suppressed

in the process of deliberation and no arbitrary exercise or power

should be allowed. The importance of cross fertilization of

ideas in decision making is germane in this society. Hence,

man owes his existence to other people, including those of

past generations and his contemporaries. Whatever happens to

the individual is believed to happen to the whole group, and

whatever happens to the whole group is the responsibility of

the individuals. Thus the brotherhood concept: onye aghana

nwannie.

It shows that in realising this objective of communalism,

“every … child is given moral instruction during the process of

socialisation to inculcate a sense of community” (Gyekye, 1987:

p. 46). Hence the saying by John Mbiti, “I am because we are,

and since we are, therefore I am” (Mbiti, 1982: p. 106). But this

Mbiti’s epithet is wrongly interpreted by Nyasani to merely be

the frustration of individual’s creativity and ability to innovate,

by the communal dictatorship as “relatively unilinear, uncritical,

lacking in initiative and therefore ‘encapsulated’” (Lassiter,

1999). He further adds that,

[W]hat we experience in the practical life of an African is

the apparent stagnation or stalement in his social as well

as economic evolution … It is quite evident that the social

consequences of this unfortunate social impasse (encap-

170

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sulation) can be very grave especially where the process

of acculturation and indeterminate enculturation is taking

place at an uncontrollable pace … By and large, it can

safely be affirmed that social encapsulation in Africa

works both positively and negatively. It is positive in as

far as it guarantees a modicum of social cohesion, social

harmony and social mutual concern. However, in as far as

it does not promote fully the exercise of personal initiative

and incentive, it can be regarded as negative (Lassiter,

1999).

Nyasani missed the point here. “Personal initiative and in-

centives” are encouraged in this thought system. This will un-

fold in the course of analysis. An Igbo man has an obligation to

maintain harmonious relationship among all the members of the

community and to do what is necessary to correct every breach

of harmony and to strengthen the community bonds, especially

through the principle of justice. Dukor explicates further with

his allusion to the unadulterated pre-colonial conception of

justice which is similar in content to the social contractarians:

John Locke and J. J. Rousseau’s ideas. Dukor depicts the Igbo

justice system to the state of nature where peace, goodwill,

mutual assistance and preservation of lives reign supreme in

contrast to the Hobbesian principles (2010: pp. 21-22). Hence,

Justice, in this thought system, hinges on the combination of

moral law, divine law and natural law; and what is moral can-

not be illegal and what is illegal cannot be immoral because

that which is bad from the beginning does not improve by

length of time (Dukor, 2010: p. 24). What Dukor attempts to

emphasise here is the necessary and sufficient connection be-

tween law and morality which is rooted in the ontological belief

system discussed in the last section. Justice strongly holds

where the instruction of the spiritual realm is abided by and

grounded on the moral belief. As a result, any adjudication that

does not toll this line will be met with calamitous consequences

in the community. This shows that justice involves some as-

pects of punishment.

Punishment in this tradition helps in maintaining social order.

It further performs a tripartite role in African, perhaps Igbo

thought system: deterrent, reforming and restitution. Dispensa-

tion of justice is not a hereafter concept but rather offence(s)

are dealt with in the natural plane of existence. Dukor (2010: pp.

27-28) explicates that

Misfortune may be interpreted as indicating that the suf-

ferer has broken some moral or ritual conduct against God,

the spirits, the elders or other members of his society.

However, in some cases appeasement or atonement can be

made in form of restitution and punishment for various

offences. It could be death for offences like practising

sorcery and witchcraft, committing murder and adultery

and it could be payment of fines in cash or kind for other

minor offences. The elders deal with disputes and

breaches arising from various types of moral offences

against custom and ritual.

This shows that there cannot be any hiding place for criminal

offenders in Igbo society with the proactive course for social

justice. It also enlightens the society on the need to inculcate

morally commendable conducts expected in the context of a

social morality (Gyekye, 1987: p. 67). In short, it shows pun-

ishment in this context as not limited to the relationship be-

tween natural beings qua natural beings but also encompassed

that of spiritual being. Here, greater value is attached to the

feeling of communal fair play and justice, with the motivational

belief that an individual must exercise restraint and take re-

sponsibility for his/her actions. If otherwise, the efficacy of the

moral sanction and punishment ensued. Hence the community

need to offer sacrifice to these supernatural forces in order to

survive. They also need to appease the benevolent forces so as

to continue to enjoy their support and blessings. More so, they

need to reparate the malevolent forces so that they might not

oppose them whenever an important endeavour is embarked

upon. For example, the spiritual realm hates any act of violence

and injustice, any instance of breaking the social order and

violating specific bans. All these attract to the natural realm

punishment with shortage of agricultural produces, famine,

infertility, drought or illness. These beliefs are premised on the

fact that there is a continuum between the spiritual and natural

realms of existence. Also, that life goes on beyond the grave for

the Igbo and is a continuous action and interaction with the

ancestors. This reflects that culprits will not only be sanctioned

but commensurability is also assured towards appropriate jus-

tice (Dukor, 2010: pp. 30-34).

By and large, the communalistic orientation of Igbo society

emphasizes the notion that an individual’s image will depend

rather crucially upon the extent to which his or her actions

benefits him/herself first but yet satisfy the interest of others

which is not, of course, by accident or coincidence but by de-

sign. It is important for man to see to his ambitions, desires, and

actions but not at the detriment of needs and interest of others.

In another sense, human conduct in Igbo culture demands ab-

solute behaviours grounded in personal and social well-being.

The Implications of Dukor’s African Ontological

Practice to Contemporary Society

The primary implication to the ontological practice hinges on

the questioning of its background in-itself. The practice is be-

clouded by the social morality as expressed in the Igbo culture

which is in part codified in the traditional African laws, and

whose condemnation of crime punishment in justice system is

taken to express. Fundamentally, one might raise doubt as to its

soundness, its homogeneity, and the consistency and authentic-

ity of the judgement it passes on crime through punishment. Its

response to the challenges of public order is cloudy going by its

ordeal and oath taking approaches to social justice system. One

may say that it instils anticipated fear of attempting crimes in

the first place rather than engaging in the dispensation of jus-

tice.

Besides, this African ontological practice might be taken to

believe uncritically that the social morality of society is self-

authenticating that its principles are moral axioms and that

social justice is conclusively justified once it is shown to ex-

press the emphatic moral condemnation of actions offending

against the ontological practise whereby the supernatural realm

provides the natural realm with a useful overarching system

which assist human being to organise reality and impose sanc-

tions to his life. But, to what extent can this go even where

morality itself is m or ally flawed?

Also, an eagle-eyed view of the Ontological practice in Igbo

culture might be thought to assuming that social morality is a

much more homogeneous set of beliefs and attitudes than the

reality of most contemporary societies would warrant. It is per-

tinent to note that contemporary society is as typically plural-

A. AINA

istic and conflict-ridden in the area of morals as in other fields

of study. It is factual that there can never be a moral consensus

among all human beings. It is indeed true that the reality on the

ground is the lack of moral consensus. People vary greatly in

the way they view issues. Some have no moral opinions of their

own but accept the opinion which has been laid down by their

custom or traditions. Some have highly developed moral con-

victions and a strong sense of right and wrong. Some adjust this

sense of right and wrong depending on the circumstances and

whether it suits them. Therefore, what we now have today is

almost as many moral opinions as there are human beings.

However, there are still a great number of people who have

common ground on a number of issues but as can be seen these

mostly contain nothing fundamental and everything can still in

most cases be interpreted in ways that will suit the individual or

even probably evade the issue altogether. To this end, on many

moral issues, one may likely find not one acceptable stand but

two or more different and even mutually opposed views, sup-

ported by significant sections of society. The dilemma then is

which of them is to be expressed on the view of social justice

grounded on ontological practice and in law for offending

against it?

These, at the end, raise dust as to the consistency and authen-

ticity of the condemnation conveyed through social justice.

Ontological practice may breed double standards where in some

instances questions of shame and hypocrisy can rise and one

might suspect that punishment is not much more than a “fetish-

istic surrogate” for a value which is not given expression in

other area of life (Primoratz, 1989: p. 204).

However, the responses to these anticipated implications of

soundness, homogeneity, and consistency and authenticity of

punitive measures levied against African ontological practice

may after al l not assume to damaging its construction but rather

to point out the conditions of its proper applications. It should

be noted that the part of the Igbo social morality, which

co-extend with its social justice, are basically sound. Hence the

traditional Igbo social morality flourishes from time immemo-

rial and its strengths learn credence to its accessibility and dy-

namism which motivate cultural experiences. After all if one

cannot accept the moral outlook of a society, it is imperative

that we withhold support when it expresses moral condemna-

tion through punitive measures. African ontological practice is

rooted in this justification.

The justice system, in this tradition, functions not so much to

reform or deter potential offenders, but rather to maintain social

cohesion by safeguarding a vigorous collective conscience.

Implicitly, this ontological system offers an account of practice

which ascertains a measure of moral consensus despite the

anticipated criticisms. It justifies those actions that are based on

this consensus and, at the same time, refuse justification to

those that transcend it. In fact, social morality is the bases on

which the contemporary society is grounded. Thus society le-

gitimately expresses moral condemnation by punishment only

when its conscience speaks strongly and unequivocally with

one voice. Hence, sincerity is necessary in this punitive ap-

proach to sanction rather than furthering conditions that pro-

mote double standard in punishment. Hence, the system of

ontological practice does not hesitate to blame and punish alike

offenders adjudged to contravene her value system. They be-

lieve in a continuity of life and a community of interest be-

tween the two realms of existence. Conflicts to them are a part

of life which must not be allowed to be resolved by individual

parties in order not to disrupt the social order. A strong sense of

sanction is meted to the individual who acts or contravenes the

common good of the community and its values despite the pro-

tection of individual interests.

Conclusion

The study has shown that the African lived experiences are

rooted in her ontological practice. And its further discourse by

Maduabuchi Dukor provokes a systematic display of social

justice whereby the wrong and the wronged are appropriated

deserted in order to maintain and promote harmony between the

two planes of human existence. This engenders the belief in a

continuity of life and a community of interest where objective

truth in place of deception, to the extent that the ordeal and oath

taking mechanism are upheld to instil in people conscientious

attitude in the system. Besides, the study is after all man’s re-

sponse to meet the challenges of his time. Thus, a more critical

study of the past is brought to the fore, in the present, in order

to make room for strong social justice for the best future of con-

temporary society. In addition, the punitive measures grounded

in this social morality are not treated at prima-facie level, but

rather transcend the immediate offenders on to the family and

community where the offender is necessarily a member. Im-

plicit here is the idea of reconciliation whereby the offender is

restitutively reconcile to himself, the victim concerned in the

case and the entire comm u nity at large.

By and large, the discussion of ontological practice is of im-

portance in African thought system due to the crucial role it

will serve in determining the direction of contemporary politi-

cal, socio-cultural and economi c system.

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