Personal Identity and “Life-Here-After Poetics”: A Critique of Maduabuchi Dukor’s Metaphysics

doi:10.4236/ojpp.2013.31A024

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2013. Vol.3, No.1A, 146-149

Published Online February 2013 in SciRes (http://www.scirp.org/journal/ojpp) http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojpp.2013.31A024

146

Personal Identity and “Life-Here-After Poetics”: A Critique of

Maduabuchi Dukor’s Metaphysics

Francis Offor

Department of Philosophy, Universit y of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeri a

Email: [email protected]

Received September 24th, 2012; revised October 24th, 2012; accepted No ve mber 9th, 2012

This essay examines Maduabuchi Dukor’s perspective on the African conception of man, personal iden-

tity and “life-here-after”. This is with a view to showing that although, Dukor’s views represent what ob-

tain among some ethnic nationalities in Africa, this nevertheless does not provide a basis for generalising

across the whole of Africa, as there are countless number of ethnic groups in Africa to which Dukor’s

general claims may not be applicable. Given the varieties of metaphysical conceptions of man and destiny

in Africa which we are yet to fully explore, and given also the inherent contradictions in some of these

conceptions, which calls into questioning, the veracity of claims made therein, it will amount to a major

logical error to make sweeping generalisations that would be representative of the whole of Africa. Such

generalisations would remain a non-holistic, but partial representation of the African conception of man

and human destiny.

Keywords: Metaphysics; Personal Identity; Destiny; Man; Africa

Introduction

In his Theistic humanism of African philosophy (Dukor,

2010a) and African philosophy in the global village (Dukor,

2010b), Maduabuchi Dukor takes a swoop at two fundamental

aspects of African metaphysics. These have to do with the Af-

rican conception of man and of personal identity, as well as the

issue of “life-here-after”, otherwise known as “destiny”. Among

the claims made by Dukor are that there is a monolithic con-

ception of man across the whole of Africa and that “if there

were any variation from one ethnic to another, it would be only

in nomenclature and not in substance” (Dukor, 2010a).

To demonstrate this, Dukor itemised the various elements

with which man is identified in Western ontology and gave

their corresponding equivalents in the thought systems of the

Igbo and Yoruba groups of Nigeria, the Akan and Ewa groups

of Ghana and the Kotokali language group of Togo. The aim

here is to show that the different interpretations adequately

represent the African conception of man. Dukor extends this

thesis further by presenting a generalisable position on the issue

of personal identity and of “life-here-after”. As far as Dukor is

concerned, the issues he raised, with regards to the questions of

“personal identity” and “life-here-after”, “are generalisable on

grounds that whatever obtains in two or more ethnic groups in

black Africa, roughly obtains in the whole of black Africa

(Dukor, 2010a).

This essay attempts to respond to this “Dukorian” perspec-

tive on the African conception of man and of the problem of

personal identity and “life-here-after”. This is with a view to

showing that although, Dukor’s findings corroborate what ob-

tain among some ethnic nationalities in Africa, this nevertheless

does not provide a basis for generalising across the whole of

Africa, as there are countless number of ethnic groups in Africa

to whom some of these claims may not be applicable. Given the

varieties of metaphysical conceptions of man and destiny in

Africa which we are yet to fully explore, and given also the

inherent contradictions in some of these conceptions, which

calls into questioning the veracity of claims made therein, it

will amount to a major logical error to make sweeping gener-

alisations that would be representative of the whole of Africa.

Such generalisations would remain a non-holistic, but partial

representation of the African conception of man and human

destiny.

Conceptions of Person

In Western ontology, a person is conceived from both the

dualist and monist perspectives. Dualist philosophers like Des-

cartes, Malebranche and Geunilex hold that a person is made up

of two principal substances, one spiritual and the other physical

or material. Monist philosophers like Ryle, Schelling, Smart,

Hegel, Armstrong and Place, hold that a person is made of a

single substance. For some, such as the materialists, it is pure

matter, whereas for others like the idealists, the human essence

is purely immaterial. For most dualist philosophers such as

Descartes, Plato and Pythagoras, it is the soul that constitutes

the identity of a person on account of its destructible, immuta-

ble and changeless nature. But for the monists, the identity of a

man is determined by that which they hold to be the real es-

sence of the human person. Following this conception of a per-

son in Western ontology, the challenges of the problem of

“life-here-after” dissolve quickly into oblivion. This is because

if man’s identity is necessarily dependent on bodily continuity

as claimed by the materialists, then there will be no sense in

which man’s conscious self could be said to exist after the dis-

integration of the body at death. If on the other hand, we uphold

the argument of some dualist and idealist philosophers, that the

mind or soul is the real essence of the human person and that it

can continue to exist after the death of the physical body, then

the fundamental objection to the problem of “life-here-after”

F. OFFOR

becomes unsustainable.

In many parts of Africa, a person is conceived to be made up

of two principal substances, one physical, corporeal and ex-

tended, and the other spiritual, incorporeal and unextended. Of

these substances, one survives the death of the other. According

to Dukor, “death in African theistic panpsychic universe is a

transmigration kind of transition to the world beyond … Life

therefore is a continuous process from this world to the world

beyond” (Dukor, 2010b). By this, Dukor means that life for the

African is continuous, and that the death of the physical body

does not mean the cessation of life. This assertion by Dukor is

based on his analysis of how man is conceived in some African

thought systems.

Generally, the conception of man in many parts of Africa is

such that he is said to be made up of certain constituent parts

(Dukor, 2010a). For instance, among the Yoruba of south west-

ern Nige ria, a person is believed to be made up of three i mpor-

tant parts. These are the “Ara” which is the material body, in-

cluding the internal organs of a person; the “Emi” which is the

life giving element and the “Ori” which is the individuality

element that is responsible for a person’s personality (Oladipo,

1992).

In Akan ontology, a person is also made up of three parts

namely the “Okra”, the “Sunsum” and the “Honam” or “Nipa-

dua”, representing the soul (or life giving entity), the spirit that

gives a personality its force and body respectively (Wiredu,

1983). For the Igbo of eastern Nigeria, a person is an embodi-

ment of the “Chi” (the personality soul), the “Ndu” (the ani-

mating spirit) and the “Ahu” the physical body. Among the

Bini of southern Nigeria, a person is conceived as consisting of

the “Egbe” (body), the “Ehi” (personality spirit or guardian self)

and the “Orion” (animating spirit or soul). The “Ehi” is respon-

sible for one’s personality and its fortune is not tied to what

happens to the physical body. It is the bearer and transmitter of

one’s destiny, and the one that receives the account of how one

lived while on earth, in order to ascertain whether one con-

formed to the earlier received destiny from “Osanobua” (the

Supreme Being). The “Orion” is the life principle and the ani-

mating spirit that is capable of reincarnation and of bearing the

consequences of one’s actions or inactions while on earth. The

“Orion” is the most critical constituent of the human person and

its departure signifies death for the body.

Apart from the “Orion” and the “Ehi”, there is yet another

element which plays a significant role in the Bini conception of

a person. It is called “Ekhoe”. Paradoxically, Ekhoe has both a

spiritual and a material status. As a spiritual substance, Ekhoe is

linked to the mind and it is the seat of passion. In admonishing

a person to change his disposition or character, the Bini would

say “fie ekhoe werie” which means “change your mind or think-

ing”. As a material substance, Ekhoe translates as heart (Udu)

which is part of the physical body (Egbe). This is the reason the

Bini would entreat someone who is agitated to calm the nerves

of his heart “Yo obo wie ekhoe”, which translates as “rub your

hands down your heart”. Someone who understands the Bini

language would simply respond by rubbing his hands down the

side of his chest that houses the heart. So, whereas the “Ehi”

and the “Orion” are both immaterial spiritual substances, the

Ekhoe is both spiritual and material. However, the Egbe (body)

is believed to house both the Ekhoe and the Orion which ani-

mates it.

At the level of the physical, there is hardly any serious varia-

tion among the Yoruba, Akan, Igbo and Bini conceptions, as

they all agree that a person is made up of the physical body

with all biological organs playing certain interconnected roles

to ensure the survival of the human being (Oyeshile, 2002).

Also, all the conceptions are in agreement that the material

aspect of a person is not self sufficient and self enclosed. They

all suppose a symmetrical functional relationship between the

material aspect of a person and the non-material invisible as-

pect, with complimentary implications for the human person.

At the non physical level also, all the conceptions share a be-

lief in some animating spirit called the “Emi” in Yoruba, “Sun-

sum” in Akan, “Ndu” in Igbo and “Orion” in Bini. The Yoruba,

Akan, Igbo and Bini also believe in the inner head or personal-

ity soul which derives from God or the Supreme Being. This

inner head is largely responsible for human destiny (Oyeshile,

2002) and it is called “Ori” in Yoruba, “Okra” in Akan, “Chi”

in Igbo and “Ehi” in Bini.

On the strength of the foregoing apparent overlaps, one be-

gins to see the point in Dukor’s generalisation “that whatever

obtains in two or more ethnic groups in black Africa obtains in

the whole of black Africa” and that if there were any variation

from one ethnic group to another, it would be only in nomen-

clature and not in substance (Dukor, 2010a).

Personal Identity and “Life-Here-After”

There is a truism in science that all the cells in a person’s

body are completely replaced after every seven years and that

the human body is continually changing through the process of

nutriment and waste, to the extent that no individual may be

said to possess the same body after seven years. In the same

way, it is believed that a person’s mind, that is, mode of think-

ing, changes continually with the passage of time (Omoregbe,

2001).

So, whether from the materialist or idealist perspective, a

person changes with the passage of time, for as Copi once re-

marked, “… the mind grows old as well as the body” (Copi,

1982). Maduabuchi Dukor alluded to this, when he stated that:

There is no such thing as a person or a proper part of a

person, her ego, self or mind’s “I” that is exactly the same

overtime (Dukor, 2010b).

If therefore man is continually changing, what then is it that

constitutes a person’s individuality and identity, such that in

spite of a lapse of time and the changes the person may have

gone through, the person in question still remains the same as

we knew before? This question describes what has come to be

known in philosophy as the problem of personal identity. Phi-

losophers of Western extraction have responded to this problem

in several ways.

In his “theory of matter and form”, Aristotle postulated that

everything is composed of two elements-substance and acci-

dents. Whereas “accidents” or “matter” undergo change, the

“substance” or “form” does not, and this for Aristotle is what

constitutes the identity of a thing. When we covet this theory to

explain the position of dualist philosophers with regards to the

human person, the “matter” then becomes the body while the

“form” is the soul. Whereas the body changes, the soul does not

change but remains the same in spite of tremendous changes in

the body from birth to old age. Hence, the soul or mind is the

real essence of the human person.

For some others like Hume and Russell however, there is

nothing like the soul or mind conceived as an unchanging entity,

F. OFFOR

apart from series of inner perceptions or observable psycho-

logical experiences, which are themselves distinct and dis-

jointed. These different perceptions, which are usually in suc-

cession, cannot be brought together to form one continuous

perception. What we have instead is a mere succession of per-

ceptions which is now being mistaken for continuity and per-

sonal identity (Omoregbe, 2001).

The various conceptions of person in many African thought

systems not only provide a satisfactory analysis of the concept

of man but of his destination as well. So destiny remains a

common feature in the various conceptions of persons among

the African peoples (Oyeshile, 2002). But an account of man’s

destination would remain vacuous, unless the problem of per-

sonal identity has been adequately addressed. This is the reason

the various conceptions of man in Africa are in agreement that

“man possesses a kind of transcendental self, which though

invisible, (yet) is real” (Oyeshile, 2002). In this respect, Dukor

also concurs that:

Death in Africa theistic panpsychic animistic universe is a

transmigration kind of transition to the world beyond [and

that] life therefore is a continuous process from this world

to the world within or beyond (Dukor, 2010b).

Dukor’s claim that life for the African is a continuous proc-

ess from this world to the world within or beyond finds expres-

sion in the thought systems of most groups in Africa, but this

same generalisation cannot be extended to his claim that “death

in Africa … is a transmigration kind of transition”. Elaborating

further on what he meant by this, Dukor writes:

Man in panpsychic animistic universe in African meta-

physics is undergirded and circumscribed by panpsychic

forces, as it were, he is convertible or transmigratable into

any of the forms of panpsychic force, spirits and powers,

which are also symbolic of man, animals, snakes, lions,

bulls, leopards, cattle, lizards etc. Death as a transmigra-

tion could also mean a man dying to enter the animals or

big trees like iroko as the animating spirit (Dukor, 2010b).

In order to give strength to his claim, Dukor cited some be-

liefs among Africans supported mainly by mythologies, that “in

African theistic panpsychic animism, there are animals or trees

that are held sacred and untouchable because they have human

but animistic spirit, consequent upon transmigration from

earthly life to life after death” (Dukor, 2010b).

It is true that we have sacred animals and trees believed to

have been inhabited by human spirits in many parts of Africa.

But the question Dukor left unattended to, is whether humans

actually inhabited such trees or animals after their physical

death, or whether as suggested by most African mythologies,

they do such while alive in order to gain immortality in the

present world. In any case, reducing the metaphysical issue of

man’s destination after death to “a transmigratable kind of tran-

sition” would betray an attempt to super impose the Pythago-

rean category on the Africa thought system, and this would

have both logical and ontological consequences.

Conclusion: The Onto-Logical Implications of

Dukor’s Generalisations

Dukor’s generalisations may indeed by supported on the

strength of the logical principles of Existential and Universal

Generalisation, and the interchange between them, made possi-

ble by the principle of Quantifier Exchange. According to the

principle of Existential Generalisation, what is required to gen-

eralise a position to cover a few more instances is the occur-

rence of a single instance of that phenomenon. According to

this principle, from a statement containing the occurrence of a

single instance of a phenomenon, we can obtain a general prin-

ciple whose form is derived by replacing the “constant” with a

“variable” that will be representative of some of the occur-

rences of the “constant” or phenomenon to be generalised.

Schematically, the principle is represented thus:



xPx∴

where “a” is the individual occurrence or constant, “x” is the

variable that serves to indicate where individual occurrences

can be slotted to produce a kind of generalisation describing the

occurrence of the phenomenon, “p” is the predicate term and

(x) is the Existential Quantifier sign (Offor, 2010).

The principle of universal generalisation on the other hand is

to the effect that one can come up with a general statement that

will be representative of all occurrences of a phenomenon in an

entire class merely from a statement describing an individual

occurrence of that phenomenon. The schematic representation

of this principle is as stated below:



xOx∴

where “a” is the individual occurrence (constant), “x” is the

variable, “O” is the predicate term and “(x)” is the Universal

Quantifier sign.

The transition from generalisations about part of a class to

the whol e cl a ss is a c hie ve d t hr oug h t he i nte r c hang e be tw ee n th e

principles of Existential Generalisation and that of Universal

Generalisation, made possible by the rule of Quantifier Ex-

change. This rule merely serves to develop some relationships

among general statements by replacing statements that general-

ise about part of a class with their equivalents that generalise

about an entire class. For example, “some things are composed

of matter” is a statement that generalise about part of a class

and is symbolised as (x)Cx. However, to say that “some things

are composed of matter” is logically the same as saying “it is

not the case that all things are not composed of matter”, sym-

bolised as ~(x)~Cx.

Given the benefits of hindsight from the foregoing logical

principles, one begins to see the point in Dukor’s generalisable

assertions on the metaphysical conception of man and human

destiny in Africa. However, a closely knitted survey of the

various African conceptions would show that the overlaps that

prompted Dukor’s generalisation are not as simplistic as he

presented them. In fact, there are rigid variations among these

conceptions that would make their generalisation as African

conception logic ally faulty.

Olatunji Oyeshile, in his comparative study of the concept of

person in Yoruba, Akan and Igbo thoughts noted such rigid

variations when he pointed to the very “many … overlaps in

Akan conception of a person which are not so common in

Yoruba and Igbo conception, and the fact that “both Igbo and

Akan have a conception of soul in the manner of Western phi-

losophy, whereas the Yoruba have no such conception of soul”

(Oyeshile, 2002).

Also, some of the generalisa tions made by Dukor not only do

148

F. OFFOR

not hold for many groups in Africa, some of these claims have

deeper ontological meanings which when properly explored

would render Dukor’s generalisations about them baseless. For

instance, the claim by Dukor that in African thought system, the

human shadow will cease to exist the moment the personality

soul disappears at death and that consequently, corpses can cast

no shadow, not only fails the litmus test of science, it also does

not accord with the belief of the Bini people. The claim that

dead bodies don’t cast shadow is indefensible, going by the

experiment of rarefaction in Physics. All bodies are opaque,

whether death or alive! By the experiment of rarefaction, light

particles travelling on a straight line and hitting the bodies that

are opaque, cause rarefaction and consequently, the shadow.

Certainly, if a man commits suicide by hanging himself on a

tree, he will surely cast shadows, for the simple fact that the

body is opaque and depending also on the direction of the sun.

This expression, “that dead bodies don’t cast shadow” has

deeper ontological meanings in the various African thought

systems which Dukor failed to explore.

Again, Dukor’s claim that “that circle of life in Africa com-

mences from the conception of a child and ends at death” (Du-

kor, 2010a), does not align with the idea of life circle among

the Bini people. For the Bini people, the circle of life predates

biological conception, starting from the world beyond, con-

tinuing through the processes of birth, puberty, marriage, death

and then back to the world beyond. These adjoining processes

are mere episodes in one’s life circle. The circle is only com-

pleted, according to the Bini, after a man has gone round it

fourteen times.

Finally, Dukor’s general claim that “the soul and the guard-

ian self severally and collectively constitute the mind in African

traditional thought system” (Dukor, 2010a) cannot be said to

accurately represent what obtains in many parts of Africa.

Among the Bini people for instance, the guardian self is “Ehi”,

the animating spirit or soul is “Orion” while the mind is “Ek-

hoe”. The “Ehi” is not housed by the physical body. It is sig-

nificated by the shadow and only disappears when the body is

interred. The “Ekhoe” (mind) and the “Orion” (animating spirit

or soul) are housed by the physical body but they perform dif-

ferent functions. The “Ekhoe” (mind) is the seat of passion and

thought, while the “Orion” is the life principle that animates the

body, hence, its departure from the body signals death. It is

clear then that the soul and guardian self do not together con-

stitute the mind in Bini and perhaps in many other thought sys-

tems in Africa.

We are not trying to insinuate here that one conception of

“life-here-after” in Africa is superior to any other, but to show

the varieties of opinions on the metaphysical conception of man

and destiny among the African peoples and how this should

moderate the attempt by any scholar to make generalisations for

the whole of Africa. The fact still remains that each thought

system has its peculiar nuances and contradictions that would

call into question, the veracity of beliefs held by the people.

The Bini for instance are ambivalent on the actual status of the

“Orion” (the life principle) and its relationship with the body.

At some point the Bini believe that whatever happens to the

“Egbe” (body) does not affect the “Orion”. In this sense, the

physical disability of a man does not tra nslate into disability of

any form, for the “Orion”. At another level however, the Bini

believe that physical deformity can impact on the “Orion”,

hence their saying that “a one-handed man is never a stranger

whenever he gets to the spirit world” (Omwen obo okpa

erorumwunyen vbe ogha se erhinmwin). The understanding

here is that the amputated arm would already be present in the

spirit world before it is joined by the remaining parts of the

man’s body at death! The apparent contradiction here results

from the fact that the Bini admit that it is the “Orion” (animat-

ing spirit) and not the “Egbe” (physical body), that survives

man and takes abode in the world of the spirit.

The point of the foregoing is not to affirm the superiority of

any one conception over another, or to dismiss any of the con-

ceptions, but to expose the varieties of conceptions on the

metaphysics of man in Africa and the sense in which this may

help protect one from the danger of over generalisation. Given

the varieties of metaphysical conceptions of man and destiny in

Africa which we are yet to fully explore, and given also the

inherent contradictions in some of these conceptions, which call

into questioning the veracity of the claims made therein, it will

amount to a major logical error to make sweeping generalisa-

tions that would be representative of the whole of Africa. Such

generalisations would remain a non-holistic, but partial repre-

sentation of the African conception of man and of human des-

tiny.

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