The Effect of Motivation and Attention on Bias in Memory for Duration

doi:10.4236/psych.2013.42011

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Psychology

2013. Vol.4, No.2, 83-87

Published Online February 2013 in SciRes

(http://www.scirp.org/journal/psych) http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/psych.2013.42011

The Effect of Motivation and Attention on Bias in Memory for

Duration

Sebastian Schwab1, Daniel Memmert1, Michael M. Roy2

1Institute of Cognitive and Team/Racket Sport Research, German Sport University, Cologne, Germany

2Department of Psychology, Elizabethtown College, Elizabethtown, USA

Email: [email protected]

Received October 30th, 2012; revised November 29th, 2012; accepted December 23rd, 2012

In the present study, we investigated the effect of regulatory focus on bias in memory for task duration.

Specifically, whether or not a person’s motivational outlook, seeking gains or avoiding losses, would

cause them to over- or underestimate task duration. Eighty-four college students completed an origami

task for which motivational focus (gains or losses), experience with the task and amount of attention di-

rected to the task were manipulated. Participants with a focus on seeking gains tended to remember the

task as taking less time when their attention was drawn towards the details of the task instead of away

from the task than did participants in the other conditions. It seems that this effect occurred because par-

ticipants with a focus for seeking gains did not sufficiently account for the fact that drawing attention to-

ward the task caused them to take longer on the task than on previous trials.

Keywords: Motivation; Attention; Regulatory Focus; Time Estimation

Introduction

People are often inaccurate and biased when estimating pre-

vious task duration (Block & Zakay, 1997; Fraisse, 1963; Roy,

Christenfeld, & McKenzie, 2005). Task variables, such as whether

or not the interval was filled or unfilled (Wearden, Norton,

Martin, & Montford-Bebb, 2007) or relatively short or long

(Roy & Christenfeld, 2008; Vierordt, 1868), can influence size

and direction of participants’ bias in estimates of previous task

duration. Similarly, person variables, such as emotional state,

can also influence their memory for previous task duration

(Droit-Volet & Gil, 2009). More important to the current re-

search, a person’s motivations can influence remembered dura-

tion; participants were more likely to remember quicker com-

pletion times when they were told that quick task performance

reflected intellectual ability than when they were told that the

task was an innocuous game (Meade, 1963). Also, people with

high intrinsic motivation are more likely than people with low

intrinsic motivation to underestimate how much time has

passed (Conti, 2001). Here we examine whether or not a per-

son’s motivational focus can influence memory for past task

duration.

Higgins (1997) proposed that there are two distinct motive-

tional states (regulatory focus), a promotion focus centered on

accomplishments and aspirations and a prevention focus con-

cerned with safety and responsibilities. People with a promo-

tion focus seek gains while people with a prevention focus try

to avoid losses. Motivational focus has been found to influence

cognitive processes such as the ability to learn classification

rules (Markman, Baldwin, & Maddox, 2005) and recognize

previously learned words (Crowe & Higgins, 1997). In general,

people with a promotion focus tend to be more flexible and

inventive in their thought processes (Friedman & Förster, 2001).

Regulatory focus has also been tied to a person’s sense of time,

with shifts in regulatory focus changing perception of distance

to future events (Pennington & Roese, 2003).

Here we examine whether a promotion or prevention focus

influences duration memory for already completed tasks. Shifts

in regulatory focus have been found to cause corresponding

shifts in attentional focus with promotion focus leading to a

broad focus and a prevention focus leading to a narrow a focus

(Förster & Higgins, 2005). For example, participants complet-

ing a Navon (1977) task (an identification task using a large

letter made up of smaller letters) could identify the large letter

quicker in a promotion mode and the small letters quicker in a

prevention mode (Förster, Friedman, Özelsel, & Denzler, 2006;

Förster & Higgins, 2005). A shift in attention can influence

time perception: at times, increasing attention to a task can

cause a corresponding decrease in experienced task duration

(Thomas & Weaver, 1975; Zakay & Block, 1997). Increased

attention to the task can cause participants to pay more attention

to the task and less on time in passing and, as a result, experi-

ence the task as taking less time (Zakay & Block, 1997).

Therefore, a prevention focus (narrow focus on the task) could

cause participants to pay less attention to time in passing and

underestimate duration. A promotion focus (broad focus) would

likely leave more attentional resources available for monitoring

time and lead to longer estimates.

However, attentional models of time estimation (Thomas &

Weaver, 1975) best explain perception for time in passing, and

not memory for past duration (Zakay & Block, 1997). It is pos-

sible that directed attention due to a prevention focus might

cause participants to remember more details of the tasks in

retrospect, with more remembered items or changes making the

task seem to have taken longer. When asked to estimate dura-

tion retrospectively, people may use amount of memory associ-

ated with the task or number of changes remembered to help

estimate task duration (Block & Reed, 1978; Ornstein, 1969;

Zakay & Block, 1997). If a shift in regulatory focus influences

memory for the details of the task, or how many details of the

S. SCHWAB ET AL.

task are encoded while performing the task, then participants

with a promotion focus (broad attentional focus shifting focus

away from the task) should remember that task as taking less

time than do participants with a prevention focus (narrow fo-

cus). Participants would have paid attention to more of the de-

tails of the task, creating more elaborate memories, which, in

turn, cause longer estimates of duration.

To examine the impact of motivational focus on attention, we

manipulated both participants’ motivational focus and also the

amount of attention that they paid to the task. Attention to the

task was manipulated both indirectly and directly. As an indi-

rect manipulation of attention, level of experience with the task

was varied. As people become more familiar with a task, atten-

tion shifts from the components of the task to the overall out-

comes (Wulf, 2007). A shift in attention could explain why

novices are more likely to overestimate task duration while

experts are more likely to underestimate task duration (Boltz,

Kuppermann, & Dunne, 1998; Hinds, 1999; Roy & Chris-

tenfeld, 2007). For example, Roy and Christenfeld (2007)

found that increasing experience with an origami task led esti-

mation to move from overestimation when participants were

new to the task to underestimation when participants were fa-

miliar with the task. Novices may have paid more attention to

the small details, while experts focused more on end quality.

Consequently, it might be expected that novices would be less

likely to overestimate when given a promotion focus, changing

from a narrow to a broad focus, while experts would be less

likely to underestimate when given a prevention focus, chang-

ing from a broad to a narrow focus.

To directly manipulate participants’ attentional focus, parti-

cipants’ attention was drawn toward or away from the specifics

of the task. Previous research has found that novices seem to do

better on a motor task when their attention is drawn toward the

task while experts tend to do better when their attention is di-

verted away from the task (Beilock, Bertenthal, McCoy, & Carr,

2004). Here, we might expect the effect of a broad focus caused

by a promotion orientation to be lessened when the partici-

pants’ attention is drawn toward the task. In contrast, a narrow

focus, caused by a prevention orientation, might be lessened

when attention is drawn away from the task.

In summary, the aim of this study was to examine the influ-

ence of promotional focus on time estimation. Further, we ex-

amined if the potential influence of promotional focus on bias

in time estimation was caused by a shift in attention paid to the

tasks. Participants performed an origami task while regulatory

focus, amount of experience with the task, and level of attention

towards the task were manipulated. We hypothesized that par-

ticipants with a promotion focus would remember the origami

task as taking less time than someone with a prevention focus

due to a shift in attention away from the details of the task.

Method

Participants

Eighty-four students from the University of Heidelberg and

the German Sport University Cologne (40 female) aged 18 - 32

years (M = 24.0) participated voluntarily in this experiment.

Only a few participants had experience making origami objects

and their inclusion did not change the results. Informed consent

was obtained from every participant before commencing the

experiment in accordance with the Helsinki Declaration of

1975.

Materials and Design

The experiment was a 2 (experience) × 2 (regulatory focus)

× 2 (attention) design. Participants either had no practice mak-

ing origami rabbits (low experience) or made nine practice

rabbits (high experience) before performing two test trials.

Participants then received either a promotion or prevention

manipulation before their first test trial rabbit. Finally, partici-

pants were given an external or internal attention manipulation

before their last test trial with attention directed either away

from or toward the task. The regulatory focus and attention

manipulations were spread out over two trials so that partici-

pants were not overwhelmed with directions. In the end, par-

ticipants were asked to estimate the duration of the last test trial.

The origami task was chosen because, in a pilot study, there

was an interaction between experience and attention for the task

(as in the Beilock et al., 2004, study), with attention away from

the task hurting novices (making them slower) and helping

experts (making them faster) and attention toward the task

helping novices and hurting experts.

Procedure

Participants first drew lots that determined their condition for

the regulatory focus and attention manipulations. Then partici-

pants either made nine practice rabbits or were not given any

practice. Participants making practice rabbits were given an

example origami rabbit and written instructions to examine.

They were next given the appropriate number of sheets of paper,

a pair of scissors and a pen. The same procedures were fol-

lowed for the participants in the no practice group before they

made their first rabbit.

Participants in the promotion condition (seeking gains) were

verbally told: “If you perform better than 50% of all partici-

pants both in accuracy—evaluated by an origami expert—and

in speed, you will get a lottery ticket.” The lottery ticket was for

the state run lottery giving participants a chance to win millions

of Euros, dependent on luck and the size of the jackpot. The

investigator then held up a lottery ticket for them to view. Par-

ticipants in the prevention condition (avoiding losses) were told:

“If you perform worse than 50% of all participants both in ac-

curacy—evaluated by an origami-expert—and in speed, you

will lose a lottery ticket, which otherwise would be yours.”

Following this instruction, the investigator gave them a lottery

ticket. All participants were given a lottery ticket by the end of

the task. A similar manipulation has been found to alter regula-

tory focus in previous experiments (Maddox, Baldwin, &

Markman, 2005; Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, 1998). After the

regulatory focus manipulation, participants were asked to make

an origami rabbit as accurately and quickly as possible. Par-

ticipants were made aware that they would be timed.

The attentional focus manipulation was introduced before the

final trial. Participants in the internal/play-by-play condition

were instructed: “Now I want you to make one more rabbit, but

I want you to describe what you are doing while making the

rabbit—like a play-by-play announcer would on TV. Try not to

let your commentary interrupt the folding of the rabbit.” Par-

ticipants in the external attention condition were instructed: “I

am going to play a tape that has tones on it, high and low, and I

am going to have you monitor the tones while you are making

another rabbit. Here is an example of the two tones.” The in-

vestigator played the tape of the first two tones and stopped the

tape. “What I want you to do is say ‘high’ when you hear the

S. SCHWAB ET AL.

high tone and disregard the low tone.” See Beilock, Carr,

MacMahon & Starkes (2002) for a study using a similar ma-

nipulation. In both conditions, the investigator handed the par-

ticipants the materials and timed the trial. After finishing this

second test trial, the participants were asked to estimate in min-

utes and seconds duration of the last trial.



= .06, with participants in the play-by-play (internal) con-

dition (M = 147.0 sec) taking longer than participants in the

tones (external) condition (M = 121.2 sec). There was no main

effect of regulatory focus, and there were no significant 2-way

or 3-way interactions Fs < 1.6, ps > .2.

Unlike previous research (Beilock et al., 2002, 2004), in-

cluding our pilot study, there was no interaction between level

of experience and attentional focus: participants both low and

high in experience performed slower when attention was di-

rected toward the task. It is unclear why, for our experiment,

that drawing attention to the task caused performance to be

worse. It may be, for example, that it was difficult for partici-

pants to find proper terms to describe their actions. To a certain

degree, however, the direction of change in performance due to

the manipulation might not be as important as whether or not

participants recognized that the manipulation altered their per-

formance.

Measures

An index of estimation bias was created by taking the log of

the ratio of estimated duration to actual duration, which we will

call log proportional error (Roy & Christenfeld, 2007, 2008).

Here, actual duration was the time it took the participant to

complete the second test trial. This index helps to simplify in-

terpretation; a negative score indicates underestimation, a score

of zero indicates perfect accuracy, and a positive score indicates

overestimation. The index also normalizes the data; there was,

as is generally found, a strong positive skew in estimates of

duration. In addition, this index allows a comparison of the bias

in estimates across tasks of different lengths. Effect of Condition on Bias

Of central interest, there was an effect of the regulatory focus

and attention manipulations on bias. A 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA on

bias (log proportional error) showed, as has been found previ-

ously (Boltz et al., 1998; Roy & Christenfeld, 2007), a signifi-

cant main effect of experience with low experience participants

more likely to overestimate task duration and high experience

participants more likely to underestimate F(1,76) = 53.8, p

< .001, 2



= .42. There was also a significant two-way inter-

action between focus and attention F(1,76) = 4.41, p = .04, 2



= .06: participants that received both the promotion and internal

focus manipulations were less likely to overestimate task dura-

tion if they had low experience with the task and were more

likely to underestimate duration if they had high experience

(see Table 1). Simple effect tests indicate that participants with

a promotion focus were significantly more biased toward un-

derestimation in the internal condition (M = −.061) than in the

external condition (M = .032, p = .044, = .05) and that

participants with an internal focus tended to be more biased

toward underestimation when they had a promotion focus rather

than a prevention focus (M = .027, p = .056 = .05). Other

simple effects were not significant (ps > .3). Overall, partici-

pants in the promotion condition were more likely to be biased

towards underestimation in the internal condition. All other

main effects and interactions for bias (log proportional error)

were not significant (Fs < 1.1, ps > .3). While previous research



2

Results and Discussion

Effect of Condition on Performance

While we were mainly interested in the influence of motive-

tional focus on bias, we first examined the influence of the

manipulations on actual duration. Differences in task duration

can cause corresponding shifts in bias (Roy & Christenfeld,

2008).

On the first test trial, participants in the low experience con-

dition took 234.6 sec to make the origami rabbit, while partici-

pants in the high experience condition took 94.8 sec (see Table

1 for full results). A 2 (experience) × 2 (regulatory focus)

ANOVA on actual duration revealed a significant difference in

time needed to complete the task due to level of experience F(1,

80) = 132.1, p < .001, = .62. There was no effect of the

regulatory focus manipulation on time needed to complete the

task and no interaction between focus and expertise, Fs < .5, ps

> .5.



For the second trial, a 2 (experience) × 2 (regulatory focus) ×

2 (attention) ANOVA on actual duration indicated a significant

main effect of experience F(1,76) = 18.6, p < .001, 2



= .20,

with low experience participants (M = 159.6 sec) taking longer

than high experience participants (M = 108.0 sec). Here, there

was also a main effect of attention F(1,76) = 5.19, p = .026,

Table 1.

Time needed (in seconds) to complete the first rabbit, the second rabbit, the estimated duration for the second rabbit, and bias (log proportional error)

for the estimate (with standard error).

Experience Level Regulatory FocusAttentional FocusActual Duration First TrialActual Duration

Second Trial

Estimated Duration

Second Trial Bias (LPE)

Internal 226.8 (27.6) 171.0 (19.8) 232.8 (45.6) .07 (.07)

Promotion External 231.0 (11.4) 162.0 (13.2) 223.8 (21.6) .14 (.03)

Internal 252.0 (22.8) 166.2 (10.8) 228.0 (23.4) .13 (.02)

Low Experience

Prevention External 228.0 (28.2) 139.2 (14.4) 190.2 (30.0) .12 (.04)

Internal 87.0 (7.8) 112.8 (10.8) 73.8 (7.8) −.19 (.05)

Promotion External 96.0 (10.2) 99.0 (7.2) 85.8 (9.6) −.07 (.03)

Internal 100.8 (13.8) 142.2 (28.8) 121.8 (24.0) −.07 (.05)

High Experience

Prevention External 91.8 (8.4) 91.2 (9.0) 67.8 (9.0) −.15 (.05)

S. SCHWAB ET AL.

has found that task duration can affect size of bias (Roy &

Christenfeld, 2008), adding actual task duration as a covariate

to the above analysis did not alter the results.

It is possible that the increased tendency to underestimate

when the promotion and internal focus conditions were com-

bined was because participants with a promotion motivation did

not account for the fact that performing the play-by-play condi-

tion forced them to take longer at the task. In support, when

given both the promotion and internal focus manipulations,

participants’ overall error (absolute value of the difference be-

tween their estimate and the actual duration) was smaller when

their estimate was compared to their first trial, M = 40.2 sec,

than when compared to their second trial (which they were

actually estimating), M = 67.2 sec, t(20) = 2.13, p = .04, d = .46.

However, this same relationship was not true in the other three

conditions: there was no significant difference in overall error

when comparing participants’ estimates to either completion

time (ps > .4). In the promotion condition, estimated duration

appeared to be more influenced by previous trials than the trial

that was actually being estimated.

General Discussion

While regulatory focus did influence time perception with a

shift in attention likely causing this influence, the connection

between motivation and attention were not as we originally

envisioned. We thought that having a promotion or prevention

focus might cause a shift in attention to the task at more of a

micro level, with people high in prevention paying more atten-

tion to the small details of the tasks. Instead, a shift in regula-

tory focus appears to influence attention to the task at more of a

macro level: participants with a promotion focus did not pay

attention to changes in the task that caused it to take longer.

Given that previous research has found that people with a

promotion focus are more attuned to the big picture and not the

small details (Förster & Higgins, 2005), we speculated that a

promotion focus would change how participants experienced

the details of the task. Participants might have been less likely

to attend to the specifics of the tasks causing longer estimates

due to decreased attention spent monitoring time in passing

(Thomas & Weaver, 1975; Zakay & Block, 1997) or partici-

pants might have remembered less specifics of the task causing

shorter estimates due to less attention paid to details of the task

during performance (Block & Reed, 1978; Ornstein, 1969;

Zakay & Block, 1997). However, these explanations are not

consistent with our finding that the tendency toward underesti-

mation was greatest only when a promotion focus was com-

bined with an internal focus. If motivational focus influenced

attention or memory for the specifics of the task, then bias

should have been largest when focus was very broad (promo-

tion and external focus) or very narrow (prevention and internal

focus). Instead, there was a differential effect of promotion

focus for the internal and external conditions indicating that the

results cannot simply be explained in terms of participants pay-

ing less attention or remembering less of the specifics of the

task.

The influence of a promotion focus was only evident on the

task at a macro level that included the participants’ full experi-

ence with the task. The tendency to remember the origami task

as being shorter when given both the promotion and internal

focus manipulations can be explained by insufficient adjust-

ment from previous experience with the task. The internal focus

manipulation caused participants to take longer on the task or,

in the case of participants with low experience, improve less.

Participants did not seem to take this into account retrospect-

tively when they had a promotion focus, which causes people to

look at the big picture and not the details (Förster & Higgins,

2005). Therefore, if participants were trying to reconstruct their

memory by focusing first on what they consider the prototypi-

cal duration of the task and then adjusting for aspects of the

task that might have made it take longer or shorter (Bartlett,

1932; Burt, 1992), a promotion focus appears to have caused

them to make an insufficient adjustment from the prototype.

Participants with a prevention focus, who likely paid more at-

tention to changes in the task, were able to make a sufficient

adjustment. When a promotion focus was combined with an

internal focus, which increased task duration, participants re-

membered the task as taking less time than did others with

similar experience. In contrast, when a promotion focus was

combined with an external focus, which did not alter task com-

pletion times, there was no shift in bias. Attention, or lack of

attention to be precise, to changes in the task led to bias in re-

membered duration.

The results of the current study indicate that a person’s mo-

tivational focus can influence their memory for task duration.

This seems to be limited to situations where the task takes

longer or shorter than it has previously. Participants who were

focused on seeking gains appeared to ignore the circumstances

that caused a change in the task and, therefore, were more

likely to differ in bias from others. Participants that were high

in experience with making origami rabbits were most likely to

underestimate the duration. For novices with origami task, the

shift in regulatory focus actually led to a more positive outcome

with a promotion focus leading to a decrease in the tendency to

overestimate.

Acknowledgements

We thank Nina Heinen, Katharina Kurz, Katharina Mayerle,

Ekaterini Nasta, Martina Herma, Saskia Sekanina and Teresa

Stegmüller for their help collecting the data.

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