Influences on Adoption of Greenhouse Gas Reduction Targets among US States, 1998-2008

doi:10.4236/ojps.2013.31006

Paper Menu >>

Journal Menu >>

Open Journal of Political Science

2013. Vol.3, No.1, 39-43

Published Online January 2013 in SciRes (http://www.scirp.org/journal/ojps) http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojps.2013.31006

Influences on Adoption of Greenhouse Gas Reduction

Targets among US States, 1998-2008

Tabitha M. Cale1, Margaret A. Reams2

1Department of Political Science, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, USA

2Department of Environmental Sciences, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, USA

Email: [email protected]

Received October 7th, 2012; revised November 17th, 2012; accepted November 29th, 2012

While the United States has not established federal regulations for greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction tar-

gets, many US states have adopted their own standards and guidelines. In this study we examine state

adoption of targets for GHG reductions during the ten-year period of 1998-2008, and identify factors that

explain variation in target adoption. Potential influences are drawn from research from the public policy

formulation and diffusion literature, and from studies specific to climate policy adoption. Potential influ-

ences on GHG reduction efforts among US states include socioeconomic attributes of residents, political

and ideological orientations of citizens and state government, interest group activities, environmental

pressures, and proximity to other states that have adopted GHG reduction targets. The findings of the

multinomial logistic regression analysis indicate that states are more likely to adopt GHG reduction tar-

gets if they share a border with another state with a similar climate program and if their citizens are more

ideologically liberal. Other factors including socioeconomic resources and interest group activities were

not found to be associated with policy adoption. The findings yield insights into the conditions under

which states are more likely to take action to reduce GHG’s, and are relevant both to state policy makers

and residents with an interest in climate planning, and for researchers attempting to estimate future green-

house gas reduction scenarios.

Keywords: Climate Change Policy; State Climate Planning; Greenhouse Gases (GHG’s); State

Environmental Policy

Introduction

The 1997 Kyoto Protocol was not ratified by the US Senate

and, to date, no federal targets for greenhouse gas (GHG) re-

ductions have been set. In this context, many states have been

proactive in establishing their own GHG reduction targets. The

potential greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions from state actions

are significant. Lutsey and Sperling (2008) calculated that if all

of the state and city emissions targets in place were to be achie-

ved, US GHG emissions could be stabilized at 2010 levels as

soon as 2020. This would be a substantial reduction in GHG’s

and could be accomplished without federal mandates.

Adoption of climate-change mitigation policies is a complex

challenge for state and federal policy makers for several rea-

sons. As W. Neil Adger (2009) pointed out, the scale and in-

terconnectedness of the impacts of climate change are growing

each year, so that “the window to act” may be shorter than we

realize. Despite a possible sense of urgency, it is difficult to

conduct cost-benefit type analyses of various mitigation strate-

gies because the precise extent and timing of future damages

are difficult to determine. As a result, the future benefits to be

gained through mitigation programs are difficult to quantify

fully, while the present-day costs of some of the options, in-

cluding implementing specific GHG reduction targets, are eas-

ier to determine. In this context, it can be hard to summon the

political will necessary to address climate change mitigation,

especially given the existence of other compelling public prob-

lems competing for limited public resources.

Also, climate change planning is made more difficult by a

tendency among policy makers in the US to display a “short-

term bias” in decision making. Consideration of problems and

associated damages likely to occur more than four years in the

future tend to be differed to later administrations, while more

pressing issues are considered and acted upon in the present

(Vig & Kraft, 2010).

Given these challenges and disincentives, why have some US

states taken steps to address climate change while others have

not? In this paper we examine the adoption of GHG reduction

targets among US states during the ten year period after Kyoto,

from 1998 to 2008. Our central research objective is to identify

key factors that may explain variation in state officials’ deci-

sions to adopt state-level GHG reduction targets.

Related Research

In order to identify potential influences on state actions, we

consider several themes within the political science public pol-

icy literature. First, researchers have examined patterns of pol-

icy “diffusion” among states within a geographic region and

from one level of government to another. This “policy learning”

and diffusion literature has examined “horizontal” diffusion of

policy across the same level of government (Volden, 2006;

Berry & Baybeck, 2005; Berry & Berry, 1990; Mooney & Lee,

1995) as well as “vertical” diffusion of policy between different

levels of government (Shipan & Volden 2006). Studies of hori-

zontal policy diffusion generally have concluded that policies

T. M. CALE, M. A. REAMS

“seem to spread between states that share a region and between

states that share borders”. (Ingle et al., 2007: p. 607).

Other researchers have turned to factors within the state or

“internal determinants” as key influences on officials’ decisions

to adopt certain policies (Gray, 1973, 1994; Fredriksson & Mil-

limet, 2002). This orientation is reflected in Ingle and collea-

gues’ statement that “states adopt politics only when their own

political, economic, and social environments are favorable”

(Ingle et al., 2007: p. 607).

Of course, diffusion across state or regional borders is not

mutually exclusive with the view that state policy adoption also

is influenced by contextual factors within each state. So, re-

cently, a third approach to understanding policy diffusion has

emerged, combining elements of the diffusion literature and

elements of the internal determinants literature; policies may

spread across states with similar political party identifications

and other internal characteristics and need not necessarily share

a border or be in the same region as a state that is being emu-

lated (Gray & Hanson, 2008). For example, Volden found that

“similarities based on ideological leanings, per-capita income…

and budgetary considerations” were all significantly related to

policy diffusion (Volden, 2006: p. 310).

A second broad theme examines potential linkages between

environmental policy adoption and the level of enforcement of

existing environmental regulations. Woods (2006) argues that

environmental regulation is particularly susceptible to a “race to

the bottom” scenario since negative externalities of pollution

could be left to other jurisdictions to address, while the nearby

state with the least regulation could benefit economically. In

other words, states could have an incentive to avoid adopting

strict regulatory standards, in order to attract polluting Indus-

tries and thereby gain a competitive economic advantage (Ring-

quist, 1993).

Woods notes that there is “little evidence that firms relocate

on the basis of regulatory cost differentials” but that “survey

evidence suggests that regulators believe they do and that this

belief appears to affect environmental policy” (Woods, 2006: p.

177). This apparent paradox may exist either because policy-

makers are unaware of all factors involved in a decision for a

given firm to relocate, or because regulators are under pressure

from industry lobbyists to regulate as little as possible, even

when firms have no intention of relocating.

In an examination of EPA data on the enforcement of federal

pollution laws, Konisky (2007) concludes that states respond to

the regulatory behavior of others states, but those responses

tend to vary. Whereas some states would respond to the more

stringent regulatory stance of neighboring states, for example,

and “race to the top”, actually strengthening their environmen-

tal standard and regulations, others may tend to maintain less

stringent standards.

In addition to these potential influences on state GHG reduc-

tion efforts, the political and ideological perspectives of citizens

and policy makers concerning climate change may be espe-

cially relevant (McCright & Dunlap 2003). The Pew Research

Center for the People and The Press, in a survey conducted

April 23-27, 2008, found a significant partisan divide between

Republicans and Democrats concerning attitudes toward cli-

mate change. When asked if there is “solid evidence of global

warming” 84% of Democrats and 75% of Independents agreed,

as compared to only 49% of Republican respondents. Democ-

rats and Independents (58% and 50% respectively) also were

more likely to believe that global warming is anthropogenic

caused by human activity, than Republicans (27%). When re-

spondents were categorized into college graduates and non-

college graduates, the partisan divide became even larger.

Asked if “global warming is happening because of human ac-

tivity”, 31% of Republicans who did not graduate from college

agreed as compared to 19% of those who did graduate from

college. Fifty-two percent of Democrats who did not graduate

from college agreed as compared to 75% of those who did, and

48 percent of Independents who did not graduate from college,

and 57% of those who did, agreed that global warming is oc-

curring as a result of human activity.

Research Questions

In light of findings and insights from these studies, we pose

several research questions.

Question 1: Are states that share a border with one or more

other states with GHG reduction targets more likely to adopt

their own GHG reduction targets?

In addition we want to examine possible “internal determi-

nants” of state adoption GHG reduction targets. We are par-

ticularly interested in whether the differences in opinions con-

cerning the causes and consequences of climate change be-

tween Democrats and Republicans may carry over into state

efforts to limit GHG’s.

Question 2: Are states with liberal citizens and/or govern-

ments more likely to adopt GHG Reduction Targets?

Additional internal attributes or conditions such as socio-

economic and environmental conditions should be examined as

well. Thus, we pose the following questions:

Question 3: Are states with higher levels of poverty less

likely to adopt GHG Reduction Targets?

Question 4: Are states with higher levels of toxic releases

less likely to adopt GHG Reduction Targets?

Also, the possible influence of a “race to the bottom (or top)”

motivation should be explored. Specifically the combination of

a state’s industrial pollution level and the climate policy actions

of neighboring states may be a relevant consideration. Thus,

Question 5: Are those states that have lower levels of toxic

releases, and also share a border with a state with GHG reduc-

tion targets, more likely to adopt GHG Reduction Targets?

A final set of potential influences include interest group ac-

tivities within each state. Setting targets for GHG emissions

could affect a range of economic interests including those in-

volved in energy production and delivery, building and con-

struction, and infrastructure and transportation planning. Given

that these interests may be competing with environmental

groups for influence in the establishment of new climate poli-

cies, it is useful to examine potential associations between po-

litical donations from major interest groups and state adoption

of GHG reduction standards. We assume that environmental

interest groups would be more likely to support climate change

policies, in general, and traditional energy interests (oil and gas

industry) may be hesitant to accept increased regulation con-

cerning GHG’s. Thus, we pose the following questions:

Question 6: Are states with higher levels of political contri-

butions from environmental and alternative energy interest

groups more likely to adopt GHG Reduction Targets? , and;

Question 7: Are states with higher levels of political contri-

butions from traditional energy interest groups less likely to

adopt GHG Reduction Targets?

T. M. CALE, M. A. REAMS

Data and Methods

The analysis uses panel, cross-sectional data to examine state

adoption of GHG reduction targets from 1998-2008. The de-

pendent variable in this analysis is whether a state had GHG

reduction targets in place during each year of the ten-year time

frame. Data to construct the dependent variable came from the

Pew Center on Global Climate Change. The variable is coded

as “0” (zero) in years the state had not adopted GHG targets,

and “1” (one) for years in which targets were present. The ten-

year period was selected because it was a time of heightened

public debate concerning climate change, including the 1997

Kyoto Protocol, the US Senate’s subsequent vote not to ratify

the treaty, and the release of the influential film, An Inconven-

ient Truth.

The independent variables include one indicator of possible

“horizontal policy diffusion” or the spreading of the GHG re-

duction target policy between states with shared borders. We

constructed the variable “Border State” using information pro-

vided by the Pew Climate organization. The variable was coded

“0” if no bordering state had a GHG reduction target within the

year, and coded “1” if at least one bordering state had targets in

place that year. Concerning the internal characteristics of the

state, the variables “Liberal Government” and “Liberal Citi-

zens”, were included. These variables were constructed by

Berry et al. in 1996 and have been updated annually.

The variable Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) releases was

gathered from the EPA for each year, as a measure of environ-

mental pollution from regulated manufacturing industries with-

in each state. We included the percentage of citizens below the

federal poverty level as an indicator of economic conditions

within the state. The variable “Poverty” was taken from the US

Census for the year 2005. Contributions from environmental

and alternative energy groups to state political parties and can-

didates (“Environmental Interest”) and contributions from tra-

ditional oil and gas energy groups (“Energy Interest”) were

compiled using data from the Followthemoney.org website. All

of the independent variables with the exception of “Poverty”

were compiled for each year from 1998-2008.

The data were analyzed using a multinomial logistic regres-

sion analysis using SPSS version 15.0. The logistic model is an

appropriate method to determine the relative associations of

each of the independent variables with the dichotomous de-

pendent variable

Results and Discussion

Seventeen states had adopted GHG reduction targets by 2008,

with California being the first state to formulate specific targets.

Thirty-three US states had not adopted reduction targets. The

17 states with GHG reduction targets are listed in alphabetical

order:

Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois,

Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jer-

sey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont

and Washington.

The logistic model yielded several interesting results con-

cerning the relative associations between the independent vari-

ables and states’ adoption of the GHG reduction targets. The

variables most significantly associated with the policy action

are “Border State”, “Liberal Citizens,” and the interaction or

combination of “Low Toxin” and “Border State” variables. The

results of the analysis are summarized below in Table 1.

Question 1: Are states that share a border with one or more

other states with GHG reduction targets more likely to adopt

their own GHG reduction targets? Yes, the results indicate that

neighboring states tend to adopt similar reduction efforts. This

finding lends support to the horizontal policy diffusion expla-

nation that public policies across a variety of issue areas are

likely to be picked up and implemented by policy makers in

neighboring states, consistent with earlier findings by Gray

(1973, 1994) and Turner and Cassel (2007). This finding offers

evidence that the process of formulating and implementing

climate change policies at the state level is similar to and influ-

enced by the same forces and influences that drive policy diffu-

sion in other subject areas.

Question 2: Are states with more liberal citizens and gov-

ernments more likely to adopt GHG reduction targets? Yes, to

some extent the findings support this linkage. The results indi-

cate that states with more liberal citizens are much more likely

to have adopted GHG reduction targets. The liberal government

variable was not found to be significantly associated with the

targets, however. The findings suggest that the extreme partisan

divisions in opinions concerning climate change documented

by the Pew research group and Berry et al. (1998) probably

have affected state adoption of GHG reduction targets, with

states with more liberal citizens being much more likely to at-

tempt to mitigate climate change.

Question 3: Are states with higher levels of poverty less

likely to adopt GHG reduction targets? No, the findings do not

offer evidence that states with larger numbers of economically

disadvantaged citizens were less able or willing to set GHG

reduction targets from 1998-2008. We included this variable to

examine whether policy makers in states where poverty is more

of a problem may be reluctant to introduce climate change

mitigation programs because the efforts may be perceived as

imposing regulatory costs that may affect private sector em-

ployment. However, the findings indicate no such reluctance on

the part of officials in states with higher poverty rates. The

results suggest that poverty within a state may not introduce

significant obstacles to GHG reduction efforts.

Question 4: Are states with higher levels of toxic releases

less likely to adopt GHG reduction targets? No, the analysis

yielded no evidence that levels of toxic releases, on their own,

Table 1.

Logistic analysis results: State adoption of greenhouse gas targets.

Coefficient SE (Robust)

Border State [+] 1.0221 0.4781*

Liberal Government [+] 0.0118 0.0094

Liberal Citizens [+] 0.0674 0.0202***

Toxic Releases [−] 0.0646 0.7323

Poverty [−] 0.0180 0.0792

Environmental Interest [+] 0.1777 0.1458

Energy Interest [−] 0.0066 0.0393

Low Toxin B or der [+] 3.4558 1.0667***

Constant −7.0661 1.5608***

Note: N = 537 (State-years); Prob > chi2 = 0.0000; Pseudo R2 = 0.5509; ***p <

0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 (one-tailed tests).

T. M. CALE, M. A. REAMS

are related to adoption of GHG reduction targets. In other

words states with more industrial manufacturing activity that

results in higher levels of toxic emissions are not any less likely

to develop GHG reduction targets.

Question 5: Are those states that have lower levels of toxic

releases, and also share a border with a state with GHG reduc-

tion targets, more likely to adopt GHG reduction targets? Yes,

the interaction or combination of lower TRI emissions and the

presence of a border state with a GHG a reduction target pro-

gram, was found to be significantly associated with adoption of

reduction targets. States with low levels of toxic emissions may

be influenced by the GHG reduction actions of neighboring

states. This finding offers some evidence of a “race to the top”

influence among states with lower levels of toxic emissions

from regulated manufacturing industries.

Question 6: Are states with higher levels of political contri-

butions from environmental and alternative energy interest

groups more likely to adopt GHG reduction targets? and,

Question 7: Are states with higher levels of contributions to

state legislators from traditional energy interest groups less

likely to adopt GHG reduction targets?

Neither environmental interest group contributions, nor en-

ergy interest group contributions had a significant effect on

state adoption of GHG targets. One explanation for this finding

is that lobbyists for traditional oil and gas enterprises and those

representing alternative energy companies, may be engaged in

issues other than whether a state adopts GHG reduction targets.

Also, these interest groups’ positions on GHG reduction efforts

may not be as polarized as the general view of average citizens

concerning climate change. Finally, while setting GHG reduc-

tion targets may be viewed as a first step in addressing climate

change, these programs may not introduce onerous measures

that would be resisted by oil and gas energy interests at this

time. In fact “no regrets” policies and actions, such as those that

require or encourage greater energy efficiency, can introduce

benefits in addition to reduced GHG levels, and may enjoy

more widespread support among various interest groups. Addi-

tional information about the stringency of state climate change

mitigation programs will be needed to examine this question

more fully.

Conclusion

This examination of states’ adoption of GHG reduction tar-

gets yielded insights into the conditions under which states are

more likely to take action to address climate change. In light of

the polarization of public attitudes and opinions concerning the

causes and consequences of global climate change, we were

particularly interested in the extent to which political ideology

may be affecting state actions.

The results of the logistic regression analysis suggest that the

most important factor in explaining variation in GHG reduction

target adoption is whether the state is located next to a state

whose officials have adopted a similar program. This finding

supports the “horizontal diffusion” of state actions to reduce

GHG’s. Also, those states with relatively low levels of toxic

pollution, and also are in close proximity to another state with

GHG reduction targets, are more likely to implement similar

efforts, providing evidence of a possible “race to the top” in-

fluence at work.

Certainly, the influence of political ideology is confirmed by

the finding that those states with more liberal voters and citi-

zens are much more likely to have set specific targets for reduc-

tions in GHG’s. This suggests that the polarization among the

public concerning climate change may be affecting the choices

made by state officials as to whether to engage in climate

change mitigation efforts.

In future studies it would be useful to examine the specific

GHG reduction targets adopted by the states, especially any

incentives that may be offered to encourage GHG reductions. In

addition, considering whether a state is a member of a regional

climate change alliance like the Regional Greenhouse Gas Ini-

tiative in New England, and the Western Climate Initiative,

may be useful. Also, the inclusion of variables related to fossil

fuel energy production and consumption, as well as alternative

energy production and consumption may be relevant in under-

standing why some states engage in efforts to reduce GHG’s

and others do not. In addition, a look at the degree to which

neighboring states with similar climate policies may also have

similar ideological orientations may yield additional insight

into policy diffusion across states. Finally, close examinations

of leader and laggard states, through case studies, would help to

shed more light on specific contextual factors affecting adop-

tion of climate change policies.

States have an important role to play in devising policies to

address climate change, both in terms of mitigation strategies to

reduce GHG’s entering the Earth’s atmosphere, and in helping

communities to adapt to some of the consequences of a warm-

ing planet, such as planning for extreme weather events. This

analysis provides insight into some of the influences at work as

state policymakers grapple with whether and how to address

climate change, with little direct guidance from the federal go-

vernment. As a result the findings are relevant to theorists and

state policy makers with an interest in climate planning, and for

researchers attempting to estimate future greenhouse gas reduc-

tion scenarios.

REFERENCES

Adger, W. N. (2009). Commentary. Environment and Planning A, 42,

2800-2805. doi:10.1068/a42244

Berry, F., & Berry, W. (1990). State lottery adoptions as policy innova-

tion: An event history analysis. American Political Science Review,

84, 395-415. doi:10.2307/1963526

Berry, W., & Baybeck, B. (2005). Using geographic information sys-

tems to study interstate competition. American Political Science Re-

view, 99, 505-519. doi:10.1017/S0003055405051841

Berry, W., Ringquist, E., Fording, R., & Hanson, R. (1998). Measuring

citizen and government ideology in the American states, 1960-1993.

American Journal of Political Science, 42, 327-348.

doi:10.2307/2991759

Erickson, R., Wright, G., & McIver, J. (1993). Statehouse democracy:

Public opinion and policy in the American states. New York: Cam-

bridge University Press.

Fredriksson, P. G., & Millimet, D. (2002). Strategic interaction and the

determination of environmental policy across US states. Journal of

Urban Economics, 51, 101-122. doi:10.1006/juec.2001.2239

Gray, V. (1973). Innovations in the States: A diffusion study. American

Political Science Review, 67, 1174-1191. doi:10.2307/1956539

Gray, V. (1994). Competition, emulation, and policy innovation. In L.

C. Dodd, & L. C. C. Jillson (Eds.), New perspectives on American

politics (pp. 230-248). Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly

Press.

Gray, V., & Hanson, R. (2008). Politics in the American states: A com-

parative analysis (9th ed.). Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly

Press.

IPCC (2007). Summary for Policymakers. In S. Solomon, D. Qin, M.

T. M. CALE, M. A. REAMS

Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K. B. Averyt, M. Tignor, & H. L.

Miller (eds.), Climate change 2007: The physical science basis. Con-

tribution of working group I to the fourth assessment report of the

intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge and New

York: Cambridge University Press.

Konisky, D. (2007). Regulatory competition and environmental en-

forcement: Is there a race to the bottom? American Journal of Po-

litical Science, 51, 853-872. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00285.x

Lutsey, N., & Sperling, D. (2008). America’s bottom-up climate change

mitigation policy. Energy Policy, 36, 673-685.

doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2007.10.018

McCright, A., & Dunlap, R. (2003). Defeating Kyoto: The conservative

movement’s impact on US climate change, policy. Social Problems,

50, 348-373. doi:10.1525/sp.2003.50.3.348

Moore, M. (2007). Energy & environmental giving in the States. Natio-

nal Institute on Money and State Politics, 1-10. URL (Last checked

23 February 2011) http://www.followthemoney.org

Pew Center on Global Climate Change (2009). President Obama and

climate change. URL (Last checked 26 February 2011).

http://pewclimate.org/obama-administration

Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (2008). A deeper

partisan divide over global warming. URL (Last checked 26 Febru-

ary 2011). http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/417.pdf

Ringquist, E. (1993). Does regulation matter? Evaluating the effects of

state air pollution control programs. Journal of Politics, 55, 1022-

1045. doi:10.2307/2131946

Shipan, C., & Volden, C. (2006). Bottom-up federalism: The diffusion

of antismoking policies from US cities to states. American Journal of

Political Science, 50, 825-843.

doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00218.x

Vig, N., & Kraft, M. (2010). Environmental policy: New directions for

the twenty-first century. Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly

Press.

Vogel, D. (1995). Trading up: Consumer and environmental regulation

in a global economy . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Volden, C. (2006). States as policy laboratories: Emulating success in

the children’s health insurance program. American Journal of Politi-

cal Science, 50, 294-312. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00185.x

Woods, N. (2006). Interstate competition and environmental regulation:

A test of the race to the bottom thesis. Social Science Quarterly, 86,

792-811.

Wright, G., Erikson, R., & McIver, J. (1987). Public opinion and policy

liberalism in the American states. American Journal of Political Sci-

ence, 31, 980-1001. doi:10.2307/2111232