Engineering Management Framework to Achieve Safety of a Service of an Organization Based on Social Acceptance

doi:10.4236/ojsst.2012.21003

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Open Journal of Safety Science and Technology, 2012, 2, 16-24

http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojsst.2012.21003 Published Online March 2012 (http://www.SciRP.org/journal/ojsst)

Engineering Management Framework to Achieve Safety

of a Service of an Organization Based on

Social Acceptance

Yuichi Otsuka1*, Hiroshi Noguchi2

1Top Runner Incubation Center for Academia-Industry Fusion, Nagaoka University of Technology,

Niigata, Japan

2Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan

Email: *[email protected]

Received November 13, 2011; revised December 19, 2011; accepted December 28, 2012

ABSTRACT

We aim at a management framework of an organization in order to achieve its safety in a limited case for a system in-

volving the organization for the service, its users and the surrounding society. The proposed framework is possible to

allow safety managers to specify tasks involving safety measures based on the concept of “a study of safety”. In the

beginning, we discuss the definitions of safety and acceptance, which will be the target of safety management. Next,

problems in which the hierarchy of components in the safety systems involves are noted. We then propose the following

details of the management framework to achieve the safety of the service of the organization based on acceptance by the

surrounding society. Applications of the components in the proposed framework are effectively demonstrated. The

shown application can aid in visualizing a way of specification of the proposed concept in a target system.

Keywords: Safety Theory; System Management; Organizational Safety; Incident Report; Safety Rule; Hierarchy

1. Introduction

The extents of accidents within systems have become

more serious according to the increases in complexities

of the systems [1]. In a hierarchical structure composed

of humans, the structure amplifies the effect of human

errors by its complexity and finally results in an organiza-

tional accident. As a precaution to prevent a serious ac-

cident, the safety management involving a reduction in

the occurrence of errors and the detection of errors before

resulting in damage to the victims is indispensable. For

the former factor, the concepts of human factors and stan-

dard safety measures for them have been studied [2,3].

Regarding the concept of the human factors, human errors

emerge due to various causes in their workplace. A safety

management system should then be constructed on the basis

of the considerations for cognitive and physiological cha-

racteristics of humans. Considering the latter factor, the con-

cept of a man-machine system [4] to optimize the inter-

faces between the both has recently been investigated.

Furthermore, the concept of complexity adaptive system [6]

based on the theory of complexity [5] has been proposed.

This concept is applied to some cases in designing safety

systems for patient safety management [7]. In other words,

the activity for establishing the constructing policy of

safety systems is in progress.

Murakami has proposed a “safety theory” [8] as the

universal concept of safety. He argued that safety itself is

a value and that the “safety theory” should become meta-

science integrating normal safety engineering and social

science. Axelrod [6] also showed the management frame-

work of a complex organization whose purpose is not

limited in achieving safety. On the other hand, Tominaga

[10] discussed his theory of structural variation in which

an observer within the system can organize the force of

structural variation. This point indicates the necessity of

including the interactions in workplaces (among workers

practicing safety rules) in the process of achieving safety

of the system. However, the framework in which the

view of utilizing this bottom-up interaction is involved

has not been established.

The concept of the “safety theory” normally includes

the following elements.

1) The design concept of reliability and safety engineer-

ing including fail-safe and foolproof characteristics [8,9,11].

2) Incident reporting [2,12].

3) The concept of safety climate [13,14].

4) Risk communication [8,15].

There are many examples of the elements such as safety

audits in nuclear plants [16] or marine plants [17], an

incident reporting system in aviation safety [18] and the

*Corresponding author.

Y. OTSUKA ET AL. 17

investigation for cognitions of risks in nuclear plants [15].

An integrating framework of these elements to establish a

safety management system is necessary in the case where

someone applies the above concept to a practical organiza-

tion.

Horii et al. [19] have reported a concept of social tech-

niques for safety involving visualization technique to the

structure of the problems and handling the situations of

society in order to take countermeasures for the problems

and evaluate those effects. Their study targets involved

various fields, and they reported remarkable results in

handling the complex structure, such as the structure of

emerging anxiety in humans due to the risks of nuclear

plants [19]. Their major target was to enclose the problem

and unfortunately the management framework for the

systems as risk sources was little considered. If the in-

tegrating concept based on the above elements to specify

the framework of the “safety theory” under limited con-

ditions is established, it is possible to construct an effective

and applicable framework for safety management systems

in practical fields. However, to the author’s knowledge,

no investigation has been reported for an integrating

concept.

This paper describes an engineering management frame-

work for safety systems based on social acceptance for

the limited target including an organization providing ser-

vice, service users and the surrounding society. The pro-

posed framework allows the specification of the safety

management system in one application to become easier.

All of the elements in the proposed framework are pro-

vided as examples, in order to refer to the examples in

applications for other systems. Finally, we discuss the con-

sequence of our proposal for safety system management.

2. Definitions of Safety and Acceptance

At first, definitions for conditions of safety and accep-

tance are discussed using the simplest case shown in

Figure 1.

These conditions emerge from the relationship between

two subjects in the figure.

Service subject: A subject who creates a service and

serves it for users.

User object: A subject who purchases the service or

considers utilization of it.

In the case where the service is one product, the service

subject is the designer of service and the user object is

regarded as a customer.

The service includes both its quality [20] and risk. The

involved risk may determine the expected damage to the

users. This relation can determine the condition for safety

[9,11].

Safety: The extent of the risks involved in the service

remains lower than the target level (Dtarget in Figure 1).

Figure 1. Definition of safety of service and acceptance.

The definition is based on the assumption that risk can

be calculated by the function of probability of an occurrence

and the extent of damage [9].

On the other hand, Slovic revealed that the subjective

risk that people perceive is different from the value of

objective risk calculated by statistical data [21]. This fact

requires that the target of safety is also lower than the

value people accept. Consequently. the definition of accep-

tance is shown as follows.

Acceptance: The extent of the risks involved in the

service remains lower than the level acceptable to the

user objects (Dsub in Figure 1).

“Sense of security” has meaning similar to that of

“acceptance”. However, this term may lead people to

misunderstand that no risk is involved, which cannot be

achieved by any activities. The term “acceptance” is pre-

ferably used because it means that the user objects auto-

nomously judge the acceptability of a service by con-

sidering both its quality and its risk. The term “active

security” is also proposed [19]; however, it may have the

same meaning as “acceptance”.

The service subject provides a service to the user ob-

jects under the constraint condition Dtarget ≤ Dsub. To

specify the values in the equation, a proactive risk com-

munication must be practiced.

3. Considerable Aspects Emerge from the

Hierarchies of Subjects to Achieve

Safety in Social Acceptance

The service subject becomes a hierarchical organization

when he produces and provides a complex service [5].

This hierarchy may produce considerable new aspects as

shown in Figure 2 on the process to achieving safety.

3.1. Aspects Produced by the Hierarchy of

an Organization Creating a Service

We discuss the problems in a safety management process

using a simple hierarchical structure of an organization,

such as Safety manager-section manager-worker, shown

in Figure 2. The organization involves the following pro-

blems in safety management activities.

Y. OTSUKA ET AL.

Figure 2. Considera ble pr oblems produc ed by the hierar chy

of the service subject and the user object.

3.1.1. Problems Involved in the Relationship

between a Section Manager and Workers

1) A section manager has difficulty in observing a de-

tailed (complex) condition in his workplace. He/she often

misunderstands that problems in his workplace are sim-

ply caused by errors of the workers. Furthermore, the sec-

tion manager also orders the workers to obey current safety

rules which have not properly adapted to the working

situations. These safety rules may be a significant work-

load for the workers, and the ambivalent relation between

safety and efficiency then becomes a considerable pro-

blem.

2) Workers often hesitate to report their errors to a

safety management section. This problem forces the safety

manager to handle the real tendency of errors occurring

in the workplaces and to analyze the causes of the errors.

This also damages the effectiveness or the acceptability

of safety measures proposed by the safety manager. Namely,

safety measures determined based on insufficient infor-

mation may involve difficulty in their practical efficiency in

real workplace. The safety rules may increase their load in

practice and produce many more errors or violations.

3.1.2. Problems Involved in the Relationship

among Sections

Workers are unable to judge whether their workplaces

are objectively safe, because they have no target for com-

parison. This problem misleads workers into confusing

which practices in the workplace are really effective for

process safety. Furthermore, even if they collect numer-

ous error reports, they cannot perceive them as an alarm

that tell them the necessity of taking safety measures.

Because the errors are a usual event for them without

objective data. To make matters worse, these reports in-

cluding real errors by workers are often hidden by a sec-

tion manager, because he she may consider that these

reports are not very useful for neighboring sections.

3.2. Aspects Produced by the Hierarchy of User

Objects: As a Social Group

an evaluation. The constraint condition for safety-accep-

tance is then determined by his individual evaluation.

However, a social group, composed of various persons, is

a target as customers of the organization. The social group

has no autonomous subjectivity other than a set of indi-

vidual ones among its members. The organization then

has the problem.

A user object in Figure 1 has a single personal view of

3.3. Policies of Treatments for the

In sent should be neces-

ucting an improvement process for safety

for accept-

4. Management Framework to Achieve

Fi ed management framework to

l structure by Safety Mana-

the

ety of persons who in-

Considerable Aspects

ummary, the following treatm

sarily investigated in order to achieve safety of a service

based on social acceptance, as illustrated in Figure 2.

1) Establishment of a predicting method for a target

cial acceptance (if possible, a quantitative prediction is

preferable).

2) Constr

les using incidents or occurrence reports.

3) Constructing an improvement method

ility of safety rules by treatment of worker’s percep-

tion to lessen the ambivalent relation between the safety

of service and the efficiency of the service.

Safety of a Service on the Basis of

Social Acceptance

gure 3 shows the propos

achieve the safety of a service of an organization based

on social acceptance. The proposed framework includes

the following participants.

Organization: Hierarchica

r-Supervisor-Worker to provide a service for users.

Users group: A set of persons who have accepted

ality of the service and use it.

Surrounding society: A soci

uding both the organization and the users group. A

competitive organization providing the same services can

also be existed.

Figure 3. Management Framework to achieve the safety of a

service by an organization based on acceptance by a society.

Y. OTSUKA ET AL. 19

We now discuss the procedure of operating the pro-

posed framework as the follows.

1) Communicating the quality of a service to the sur-

rounding society.

2) Determining the acceptance limit for the quality of

service by a society and transforming it into an organiza-

nal safety target. (Reliability and safety design, manu-

facturing and provision of a service under the safety tar-

get)

3) Establishing a system for collecting failure informa-

tion (i

tio

ncidents or adverse events) inside the organization.

tions in the workplace by comparing

Limit for the

Thee of an organization

The ined by

4) Visualizing the problems in the safety systems based

on the collected incidents.

5) Introducing the safety measures for the problem by

a safety manager.

6) Improving the contents of the safety rules to optimize

the complex situa

the execution method among sections

4.1. Determining the Acceptance

Quality of Service by a Society

(Processes 1-2 in Figure 3)

attitude of a person for a servic

is determined by a judgment based on service informa-

tion, as shown in Figure 4. We simply assume that the

status of persons involves only two conditions, accepting

or rejecting. The status of persons can be changed by the

interactions (discussions) among persons [22]. However,

if a target set for the quality of service is lower than one

characteristic value in the organization, the ratio of ac-

cepting person among total persons can be stable after a

sufficient number of interactions [23,24]. This value is the

acceptance limit of the society for the quality of the ser-

vice. The organization should determine its safety target

in order to satisfy the acceptance limit. This service should

be continuously accepted by the society to earn a suffi-

cient profit; otherwise the organization will be bankrupt.

4.2. Organizational Learning from the Collected

Incidents (Processes 3-6 in Figure 3)

process of achieving the safety target determ

the society is shown in Figure 5. Firstly, a collecting system

for failures in the workplaces must be established. Inci-

dent reports [2,18] are normally collected. In the intro-

duction stage of the incident report system, it should be

necessary to evaluate the usability of the system in order

for users to accept comfortably [25]. Next, the collected

data must be analyzed to investigate the cause and deter-

mine the problem in the organization. The kinds of pro-

blems are considered such as human factors as well as

technical and management problems [27]. Among these

three types of problems, the organization should take

measures for the management problem (especially relating

the safety rule and the management systems) because this

Figure 4. Determination of safety target of service by the

predicted acceptance limit of the surrounding group.

rted

tendencies involved in the determined problems can be

wn measures or

ework of Learning

from Failures

the ey decrease the occurrences of errors.

causes technical and human errors to occur. The repo

used to visualize the potential problems in the management

systems. If no measures have been introduced, the safety

manager should call the experts to analyze the cause and

take safety measures in the workplaces.

In introducing the safety measures, there are two cases

to be considered, such as the case of kno

w measures. The new measure should have no diffi-

culty in execution. In the latter case, the already practiced

measures were probably insufficient. To improve the meas-

ure’s effectiveness, the details in the measure should in-

clude consideration of them to the complexity in the work-

place. It is possible to improve the contents of the safety

measures in order to adapt for the complexity by collect-

ing practices in the workplaces and extracting its “good”

heuristics. In this process, by introducing the practices of

the safety rules, the details of the safety rules can be im-

proved sufficiently to attain both work efficiency and the

worker’s acceptance. These continuous treatments enable

a safety manager to establish the effective management

framework in which occurrences of human errors can be

reduced and damage to victims may also be prevented by

the certain detecting the errors.

4.3. On Evaluating the Fram

The evaluation of safety measures can be quantified by

xtent to which the

However, the evaluation cannot be avoided based on the

failure information that workers voluntarily report. The

case in which the change in the number of reports does

not correspond to the change in the practical number of

error occurrences is naturally predicted. If the safety mana-

ger decides that a lower number of reports is good for

organizational safety, the workers will more hesitate to

report, because the activity of not reporting will obtain

“good” evaluation by the manager. In this case, the differ-

Y. OTSUKA ET AL.

ence between the number of reports and that of the

practical occurrences should be extended, and effective-

ness of the evaluation based on the number of reports

will be lost. Therefore, an indicator which can encourage

reporting by workers and express the decrease in damage

due to errors is necessary.

Continuously introducing safety measures in the work-

place may yield difficulty in determining the effect of

oncept of Acceptable

Safety Rule

ers. In

ordeworker’s acceptance, consideration for

dividual measures. However, it is not really necessary

to identify the effect of one safety rule or measure. Entire

evaluation of the whole framework shown in Figure 5

can be performed using the indicator mentioned above.

Furthermore, in the process of introducing safety meas-

ures, the supervisors in one workplace probably partici-

pate. Their judgment based on experiences in a complex

situation in the workplace can prevent bad measures

from being introduced.

4.4. Introducing the C

The contents of safety rules must be kept by work

r to obtain the

increasing the conscious effort to keep the rule is neces-

sary. Rule violating action is affected by both individual

factors and organizational factors. In Figure 5, the objec-

tive analysis by experts and practical heuristics of work-

ers can improve the contents of safety rules to become

acceptable and safe. By participating workers themselves

into the improvement process, the improved rule can be

better acceptable by the workers because of explicitly con-

sidering both the factors for rule violating actions [29].

The flow of the work above mentioned is continuously

practiced up to achieving the target of safety. It should

ted that the target itself may be changed according to a

change in the situation of a society. This point will re-

quire a safety manager to update the safety target in a

timely manner.

5. Case Studies for Elements in the

Proposed

Figure 5. Safety management system to achieve safety and

accepted rule s.

patient

safety the proposed framework

Otsu for

porting

een devel-

Framework

We provide example cases in engineering and

fields for each element in

to support specification of the proposed framework.

5.1. Quantification of the Target Quality of

Service: Prediction of the Acceptance

Limit Cost

ka et al. [24] reported that the state of acceptance

a social group is that the ratio of accepting person for one

service can be maintained after sufficient interaction (dis-

cussion) among persons. An acceptance limit cost is also

defined as the maximum cost of the acceptance. Fur-

thermore, the prediction method for the value of the ac-

ceptance limit by combining simulations using cellular

automata and experiment with real persons to determine

the value of control parameters in the simulation. For exam-

ple, the prediction of airplane fares shown in Figure 6 is

conducted. The predicted value is accepted for almost all

examinees at that time. Using the prediction method and

modeling the interaction process among humans for one

group can quantify the acceptance limit of a service. The

proposed method is also applicable to predict the extent

of acceptable safety by one society.

5.2. Development of Incident Re

System for Enthusiastic Reporting

A web-based incident reporting system has b

oped in the patient safety field [25]. In the development

stage of the system, the results of usability tests by real

workers which indicate a better functionality of the sys-

tem than that of a previous one may be effective to allow

workers to use new system. After introducing the devel-

oped system, a number of reports increased more than

50% after two years, which indicates efficiency impro-

vement in collecting failure information. This research can

Figure 6. Case study of predicting acceptance limit; permissible

cost of airlines fares [24].

Y. OTSUKA ET AL. 21

be a reference in establishin acceptable reporting

in-

cide press

bothhe decrease in the extent

get value of the horizontal axis is

ng a

system for practical workers.

5.3. Pattern Indicator for the Damage

Distribution of Incidents for Evaluating

the Entire Framework

The pattern indicator for the damage distribution of

nts shown in Figure 7 was proposed in order to ex

the increase in reports and t

of damages [26]. The proposed indicator is defined by

the ratio of the number of reports for unacceptable damage

among the total reports. Figure 7 illustrates a predicted

correlation relationship between the proposed indicator

and the average numbers of reports for unacceptable da-

mage in the workplaces. The predicted relationship can be

observed in the incident data from one university hospital

[26]. Using Figure 7 allows the safety manager to quan-

titatively evaluate the effectiveness of the entire safety

management framework by the changes in the value of

the pattern indicator.

The vertical axis in Figure 8 can be regarded as the

indicator of safety. If the safety target in the vertical axis

is determined, the tar

so determined using the regression line. Therefore, Figure

7 can transform the safety target externally determined into

an internal reporting target for the management sections.

Figure 7. Determination for comparing sections by pattern

indicator [26].

Figure 8. Example of acceptable safety rule; checking with

patient by communication [27].

5.4. Improving Procedure for the Contents of

Safety Rules Using Incident Reports

By the analysis of collected incidents, causes of the inci-

dents relating to fails in checking, work process and others

were determined [27]. The safety manager decided to select

one of the causes, “the failure in checking the contents of

drugs in distributing to patients” as one target of im-

proving. Comparisons between sections using the pattern

indicator and interviewing supervisors in the sections

could lead to an acceptable safety rule based on practical

all

s the job training concept in a design re-

vi al. [28].

ucing his knowledge and

ocess

Drough

by d

heuristics, as shown in Figure 8. The resulting rule in-

volves the following considerations in order to satisfy

participants.

upervisor: The contents of the check safety.

Worker: Communicating to patients to handle their

conditions at the same timeof checking for efficiency

improvement.

Patient: Accepting for participation in the checking

process by active communications from workers.

The framework in Figure 8 can be regarded as one

target of safety rules to be achieved. Using the pattern

indicator and comparing an empirical method for prac-

ticing safety rules in sections can enable visualization of

those acceptable safety rules.

5.5. Job Training Concept in Design Review

Process; Example of Acceptable Safety

Rule in Engineering Management

Figure 9 show

ew process, which is named Design Review Based on

Failure Mode (DRBFM), proposed by Shimizu et

fety and acceptance by all participants can be achieved

by the following.

Manager: Establishing the process of DRBFM for

precautionary prevention (Safety).

Professional adviser: Introd

experience to designers in the design review pr

(Efficiency).

esigner: Determining his lack of knowledge th

iscussion with the adviser (Acceptance).

Figure 9. On-the-job training in design review based on failure

mode [28].

Y. OTSUKA ET AL.

The type of the framework shown in Figure 9 is ob-

viously the same as that in Figure 8. This similarity can

support the applicability of the concept of an “acceptable

safety rule” for workers not only for patient safety fields

but also for other fields such as engineering management.

Consequently, the target of the safety management frame-

work is to improve the contents of the safety rules to be-

come an “acceptable safety rule” for workers in order to

achieve safety target.

the correspondence between the elements

lues in the axes in Figure 8.

n be

ent relation between safety and efficiency of

the work probably becomes a considerable problem, as

e 10 [30]. Namely, a worker may judge

ed manage

ing

5.6. Applicability of the Entire Framework

Table 1 shows

the proposed framework and the explanatory examples.

All elements in Figure 3 can be specified in a practical

management system because all of the elements possess

the correspondent examples. The functionality of the entire

framework should be discussed. The difficulty in the con-

nection between the second element and the third element

in Figure 3 is concerned, because these elements were

applied to different fields. However, both processes are

controlled using the va

We can then integrate the considered connection suc

cessfully using Figure 8. This is because Figure 8 ca

observed in a practical subject and can be utilized effec-

tively for safety management. Therefore, the proposed

framework is totally effective for achieving one safety

target and possessing a sufficient applicability to practi-

cal subjects.

6. Discussion

Workers should always obey one safety rule, because they

Table 1. Relationships between elements of the propos

cannot predict when they take an error [30]. In some situa-

tions, an ambival

tient safety.

Element of the proposed framework Application 1: Engineer

illustrated in Figur

whether he keeps one safety rule by comparing the loss

due to the work load with the benefit of preventing future

accident using the rule. It is very easy for all workers to

perceive the work load. Unfortunately, cognition of the

benefit due to the rule greatly varies according to the

subjectivity of the workers [8]. The less cognizant the

person is of the benefit of a safety rule, the more likely

the person will not keep the rule. The ordinary treatment

for this assignment achieves only a not-specific result,

“recommendation for obtaining the consciousness of prior

thinking for safety”.

The proposed management system model is a kind of

specified adaptive complex system model [6,7,31] to achieve

safety of a service produced by the system. The roles of

agents (workers, a supervisor and a manager) are deter-

mined, subject to the respective hierarchy of the system

structure. Heuristic practices will be examined by the

safety management activity for the purpose of improving

safety, efficiency and the acceptability of the safety rules.

These bottom-up activities will change the internal (safety)

rules in the organization, which means that the structure

of the system will have been slightly changed [10]. The

described model in Figure 10 integrates internal (heuris-

tic) experiences and external objective knowledge to achieve

the condition of acceptable safety. This concept also cor-

responds to the internal interaction model in normal sys-

tem theory [10]. This coherence supports the applicability

of the proposed framework to other practical fields.

ment framework and applications in engineering safety and

Safety Application 2: Patient Safety

1. Service information Risk and time for an airplane [24]

2. Acceptance limit Airplane fare [24]

the service,

eb-Based report system [25]

actors in safety rules for checks or specific

ks [27]

Monthly report of the incidents to workers

ble measures n-the-job training in DRBFM processes [28] s [27] found by

using the pattern indicator [26]

(2’: Reliability and Safety design for manufacturing and serving)

3. Incident report W

4. Setting problems F

wor

5. Safety measures

6.Learning acceptaOHeuristic practices in workplace

Y. OTSUKA ET AL. 23

s s

Figure 10. Concept of changing trade-off relationship for ac-

ceptable safety work.

The elements in the proposed framework have undergone

empirical case study in the field of patient safety manage-

ment or engineering management, which indicates s

cient applicability of the proposal to practical tar ets.

ules, can be specified in both fiel

he contents of safety ru

fe for workers. We have provide

lements in the proposed framework.

[1] T. Kletz, “Lm Accidents,” 3rd Edition, Gulf

Professional Publishing, London, 2001.

[2] J. Reason, “MAcci-

dents,” Ashgate Publishing Limited, London, 1997.

Practical Guimited, London,

de Disasters,” Wykeham Publica-

l Syetem Theory: Foundations,

uffi- [7] Institute of Medicine, “Crossing the Quality of Chasm,”

National Academy of Science, Washington DC, 2001.

hown Furthermore, the concept of acceptable safety rules s

in Figure 10, as one of the desirable targets of improving

the quality of safety rds. Assessment of Engineering Systems,” Chapman & Hall,

London, 1996.

[10] K. Tominaga, “A theory of Action and Social System:

is strongly indicates the possibility of establishing an

acceptable safety rule in other fields. In the process of

application, the total guidance that means the normal struc-

ture of the management framework is given in Figure 3. In

addition, when practitioners are confused about how to

establish each element in the normal framework, the case

studies described in section 5 can help them to be successful.

This framework is effective only after the problems to

be solved are discovered. However, the complex structure

of the problems may hide their causes from analysis by

safety management activities. In this case, a soft system

model [32], a self-organized map or direction graphs [19]

will help the safety manager to visualize the complexity

and also reveal its causes.

7. Conclusion

We have proposed the concept of a management frame-

work to achieve the safety of a service of an organization

based on acceptance by a society. The proposed concept

includes collecting failure information and learning from

failures in order to improve tles to

be acceptable and sa

examples for all e

These examples can be useful in the case of application

to other practical subjects.

8. Acknowledgements

One of the authors was partially supported by the Top

Runner Incubation System through the Academia-Indus-

try Fusion Training in the Promotion of Independent Re-

search Environment for Young Researchers, MEXT, Japan.

2003.

[4] B. A. Turner, “Man-Ma

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