Rainbows, Time Zones, and Other Mind-Dependent Objects: Making Sense of the Relevant Notions of “Mind-Dependence” in the Debate between Metaphysical Realists and Antirealists

doi:10.4236/ojpp.2012.21006

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Open Journal of Philosophy

2012. Vol.2, No.1, 38-44

Published Online February 2012 in SciRes (http://www.SciRP.org/journal/ojpp) http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojpp.2012.21006

Rainbows, Time Zones, and Other Mind-Dependent Objects:

Making Sense of the Relevant Notions of “Mind-Dependence”

in the Debate between Metaphysical Realists and Antirealists

Deborah C. Smith

Kent State University, Kent, USA

Email: [email protected]

Received November 9th, 2011; revi sed December 14th, 2011; accepted December 21st, 2011

In a recent article, Sam Page distinguishes four kinds of mind-(in)dependence: ontological, causal, struc-

tural, and individuative. He argues that, despite the fact that the metaphysical realism/antirealism debate

has been frequently characterized as a debate between those who accept and those who deny that the

world is causally and/or structurally dependent on minds, many antirealists are primarily interested in de-

fending the claim that the world is individuatively mind-dependent. In this article, I critically examine

these differing senses of “mind-dependence” highlighting ways in which they remain ambiguous and

identifying various entailment relations between them. I argue that there is reason to believe that onto-

logical dependence, structural dependence, and the only sort of individuative dependence that is relevant

to the metaphysical debate are coextensive notions. As such, any argument that succeeds in establishing

that it is incoherent to suppose that everything is ontologically and/or structurally dependent thereby es-

tablishes the incoherence of metaphysical antirealism.

Keywords: Realism; Antirealism; Mind-Dependence

Introduction

There seems to be little doubt that, since at least the middle

of the last century, there has been a lively debate (or rather a

family of lively debates) between proponents of views dubbed

“realism” and “antirealism” respectively revolving around the

question of whether or not a given set of objects, properties/

relations, facts, truths, etc. is significantly dependent on the

existence and activities of (human or other finite) minds. The

debate between mathematical realists and antirealists is plausi-

bly construed as a debate over whether mathematical objects,

properties or truths are somehow constructed (as opposed to

discovered) via our mathematical theories and the development

of mathematical proofs. The debate between sortal realists and

antirealists centers on the question of whether there are real

kinds in nature independent of our categorizing or sorting of

individuals into various kinds. Scientific realists and antirealists

debate about whether scientific laws hold or whether the unob-

servable entities postulated by our best scientific theories exist

independent of our scientific theorizing. In addition to these

localized realism/antirealism debates, there is the more global

metaphysical debate concerning whether or not there is any-

thing at all that is mind-independent. While it is clear that the

notion of mind-dependence plays an important role in these and

other realism/antirealism debates,1 the notion of mind-depend-

ence itself remains less than clear. This paper will examine the

various notions of mind-dependence that are germane to the

global debate between metaphysical realists and antirealists.

Mind-Dependence and the Debate between

Metaphysical Realism and Antirealism

In “Metaphysical Antirealism and Objective Truth: Is Meta-

physical Antirealism Self-Refuting?” I defended a realist view

that I called modest metaphysical realism. As defined there,

modest metaphysical realism (hereafter simply “metaphysical

realism”) is the conjunction of two theses (Smith, 1999: p. 411):

1) The world does not depend on the existence or activities

of minds for its ontological status.

2) The world has some structure(s) that is(are) mind-inde-

pendent.

Denying either thesis yields a (near) global version of meta-

physical antirealism according to which any and all structure in

the world and/or the very ontological status of the world is

mind-dependent. In defense of metaphysical realism, I argued

that neither the ontological status nor all of the structure of

minds themselves could be mind-dependent (Smith, 1999: pp.

414-415).

Sam Page has suggested that my argument for metaphysical

realism misses the mark because I (and others) have failed to

appreciate the relevant sense of “mind-dependent” at issue in

the (or better, one significant) contemporary debate between

realists and antirealists (Page, 20 06: p. 327). Page himself disti n-

guishes four kinds of mind-(in)dependence: ontological, causal,

structural, and individuative. He argues that, despite the fact

that the contemporary realism/antirealism debate has been fre-

quently characterized as a debate between those who accept and

1A notable exception to the claim that any given realism/antirealism debate

trades on the question of mind-dependence is the debate between moral

realists and antirealists. It seems to me that the moral realist can and should

allow that moral properties, principles, or truths are dependent on the exis-

tence of rational, sentient creatures. If there were no creatures with minds,

the world wou ld plausibl y be a completely a moral place. In stead, the d ebate

over moral realism seems to trade on whether there are any universal or

objective moral truths, principles, or prescriptions.

D. C. SMITH

those who deny that the world2 is causally and/or structurally

dependent on human minds (Page, 2006: pp. 326-327), many

nota- ble antirealists (he cites Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam,

and Nelson Goodman) are primarily interested in defending the

claim that the world is individuatively dependent on us (Page,

2006: pp. 330-332).

While I’m inclined to stand by the cogency of my earlier ar-

gument as well as its relevance to the contemporary debate3

(whose opponents I will continue to call “metaphysical realists”

and “metaphysical antirealists” respectively), I agree with Page

that the crucial notion of mind-dependence is far from clear.

Indeed, the notion is sufficiently ambiguous that I have fre-

quently found myself disturbed by a sense that the metaphysical

realist and antirealist were merely talking past one another.

Even so, I’m inclined to believe that there is a meaningful de-

bate to be engaged in here and that additional work to disam-

biguate the relevant sense of “mind-dependence” is needed to

better articulate what is at issue—let alone make any head-

way—in that debate.

Disambiguating “Mind-Dependence”

In “Metaphysical Antirealism and Objective Truth”, I sug-

gested that the claim that something X was mind-dependent

could be glossed by a counter-factual conditional of the fol-

lowing form: “X would not exist and have the features that it

does if there were no minds” (Smith, 1999: p. 416). An obvious

problem with this counter-factual gloss on the relevant sense of

“mind-dependence” is that when “X” is replaced by “minds”,

the result is an instance of the trivially true counter-factual form:

“X would not exist and have the features that it does if there

were no Xs”. It might prima facie appear that my case for

metaphysical realism is rendered incoherent. To address this

concern, I argued that there was an ambiguity in the claim that

minds are mind-dependent. I wrote:

Consider the following two claims:

1) Trees are mind-dependent entities. That is, a tree would

not exist and have the features that it does if there were no

minds.

2) Trees are tree-dependent entities. That is, a tree would not

exist and have the features that it does if there were no trees.

The first claim is a nontrivial claim about trees. …The sec-

ond claim is merely an instance of the trivial claim that nothing

of a kind K can exist and have the features that it does unless

there is at least one instance of a given kind K (namely it-

self) …As such, it is a trivial claim that no one would reject.

Now consider this third claim:

3) Minds are mind-dependent entities. That is, a mind would

not exist and have the features that it does if there were no

minds.

I want to suggest that this claim is ambiguous between an

utterly trivial reading á la 2) above and a nontrivial reading á la

1) above. The proponent of [metaphysical realism] can and

should accept c) on its trivial reading. It is the nontrivial read-

ing of 3) that a would-be opponent of [metaphysical realism] is

committed to accepting. And it is this nontrivial reading of 3)

that the proponent of [metaphysical realism] takes himself to

have shown to be incoherent…. (Smith, 1999: p. 416).

Recognizing the need to be more precise concerning what is

meant by “mind-dependence” and “mind-independence”, I sug-

gested that a fruitful first step would be to begin by examining

cases in which both the metaphysical realist and antirealist

would agree that an aspect of the world was significantly

mind-dependent (Smith, 1999: p. 418).

Consider, as one such putative example a rainbow. A rain-

bow has a definite stripy character. Although, for example,

yellow and green may blur a bit where they meet, there seems

to be a finite number of distinct stripes in a rainbow. But of

course, the ranges o f wavelengths of light… constitute a smoot h

spectrum; the light spectrum (visible as well as nonvisible)

possesses no distinct stripes. The stripes of the rainbow (and

perhaps the rainbow itself) are, it seems to me, a paradigm case

of aspects of the world that depend for their existence and

structure on perceivers, and hence, more generally on minds. …It

seems to me that such putative entities as time zones or hours

are mind-dependent in a way significantly different (and stronger)

from the stripes of a rainbow. Chairs and other artifacts are

mind-dependent in a still different (weaker) sense (Smith, 1999:

p. 418).

In “Metaphysical Antirealism and Objective Truth”, I was

able to do no more than provide the brief, thumbnail sketch

above of how an attempt to disambiguate the relevant sense of

“mind-dependent” might proceed. In many ways, Page’s article

takes up where my thumbnail sketch left off. Despite the fact

that Page makes considerable headway in the endeavor, I be-

lieve that there is much more work that needs to be done. In

what follows, I will critically examine the differing senses of

“mind-dependence” presented by Page highlighting ways in

which they remain ambiguous and identifying various entail-

ment relations between them. I will argue that three of the four

senses of “m ind-dependence” identified by Page yield co-extens ive

classes of mind-dependent objects.

Ontological Dependence and the Debate between

Metaphysical Realism and Antirealism

2In several places, Pag e seems to limit his unqualified use of “realism”and

“antirealism” to views that focus on the question of whether or not the entire

natural world is mind-dependent. (See especially Page, 2006: p. 321). How-

ever, throughout the article, he considers other versions of realism and anti-

realism some of which are more global in nature and some of which are

more restricted.

3My reasons for so doing will become clearer below. Here let me say that, i

it turns out (as Page suggests) that Putnam, Rorty, and/or Goodman would

accept metaphysical realism in my sense, I would be content. However, I

seriously doubt that there are none but strawmen who would be inclined to

deny theses 1) and/or 2) of metaphysical realism .

4More precisely, ontological dependence (rather than causal, structural or

individuative dependence) seems to be the notion of mind-dependence

central to thesis a) of the version of metaphysical realism that I have de-

fended: the world does not depend on the existence or activities of minds for

its onto lo gical s tat us . St ru ctur al d epen den ce i s more clear ly at i ss ue i n t hes is

b) of metaphysical realism: that the world has some structure that is mind-

independent.

Of the four types of mind-dependence Page identifies, onto-

logical dependence seems to most closely approximate the sort

I take to be germane to the debate between metaphysical real-

ists and antirealists.4 Page too is initially inclined to give a

counter-factual analysis of the concept of ontological depend-

ence: “Something is ontologically dependent on us if our ceas-

ing to exist would immediately cause it to cease to exist” (Page,

2006: p. 322). As before, the counter-factual analysis serves to

masks the ambiguity in and seemingly renders trivial the claim

that minds themselves are ontologically dependent. However,

Page goes on to examine putative examples of objects that are

ontologically dependent (money, national borders, tax laws, and

other “social realities”) as well as putative examples of objects

D. C. SMITH

that are ontologically independent (mountains, rocks and other

“brute physical realities”). In doing so, he is able to articulate a

significant way in which an object (or kind of object) might be

ontologically dependent on minds:

Things like money, national borders, tax laws, and speed

limits—which are sometimes called social realities—are onto-

logically dependent on people, since if all people went out of

existence, they would immediately follow. Their very being is

generated and sustained by our collective agreement and social

practices (Page, 2006: p. 322).

Engaging in various social practices (including the practice

of agreeing or disagreeing) is clearly something that we do qua

creatures with minds. So, anything that is generated by and

depends for its continued existence upon our engaging in vari-

ous social practices is clearly mind-dependent in a significant

way.

While, I’m inclined to agree that money, national borders,

tax laws, and speed limits are ontologically dependent for the

reason Page cites, I think that his focus on social realities sug-

gests too narrow a scope for the concept of ontological de-

pendence, at least if that concept is to be at all relevant to the

debate between metaphysical realists and anti-realists. To use a

now familiar example, it seems to me that the stripes in a rain-

bow (if not the rainbow itself5) are generated by and depend for

their continued existence upon on minds. If humans (and other

species of animals) were to cease to exist, sunlight would no

doubt continue to refract in moisture laden air, but rainbows (if

they continued to exist at all) would no longer have stripes.6

For this reason, I’m inclined to say that the stripes of a rainbow

are ontologically dependent. However, what generates and

sustains the stripes of a rainbow is not our collective agreement

and social practices. Instead, the stripes of a rainbow are gener-

ated and sustained (at least in part) by our perceptual apparatus.

Perceiving—at least if that is to include the conscious experi-

ence of what is perceived—is again something we do qua crea-

tures with minds. So again, anything that is generated by and

depends for its continued existence upon our perceptual appa-

ratuses or the perceptual apparatuses of other animals is sig-

nificantly mind-dependent.

Just as it is plausible to suggest that mountains and rocks

(and moisture laden air) are not generated by nor do they de-

pend on our social practices, it is plausible to suggest that

mountains and rocks are not generated by nor do they depend

on our perceptual apparatuses. They are ontologically inde-

pendent in both respects. The central argument of “Meta-

physical Antirealism and Objective Truth” is that, whatever is

true of money or the stripes of a rainbow, minds cannot be on-

tologically dependent in either way. If there were no minds,

there would be no social practices to generate or sustain minds

in the way that money or national borders are generated and

sustained. If there were no minds, there would be no con-

scious perceivers to generate or sustain minds in the way the

stripes of a rainbow are generated and sustained. The chal-

lenge to the metaphysical antirealist that I presented in “Meta-

physical Antirealism and Objective Truth” is to more fully

articulate the ways in which something might be ontologically

dependent on minds and to identify a way in which it is coher-

ent to suppose that minds themselves might be ontologically

dependent on minds.

Page is inclined to disagree with my claim that ontological

dependence is what is at stake in contemporary metaphysical

realism/antirealism debates.

Radical Idealism is an apt name for the thesis that all reality

is ontologically dependent on us-that if all people ceased to

exist, everything else would consequently cease to exist. Few if

any academic philosophers, with the notable exception of

Berkeley, defend or are alleged to defend something akin to this

view (Page, 2006: p. 323).

He is no doubt correct that contemporary metaphysical anti-

realists are disinclined to share the view of Berkeley or of nine-

teenth-century absolute idealists. What is less clear is whether

what they do have to say entails some other form of global

ontological dependence. To answer that question, we must get

clearer about the notion of ontological dependence and the

entailment relations in which it stands to other forms of mind-

dependence.

Causal Dependence and the Debate between

Metaphysical Realism and Antirealism

While Page himself has little more to say about ontological

dependence, the concept is perhaps more clearly articulated by

way of contrast with his notions of causal, structural, and indi-

viduative dependence. Page again initially defines causal de-

pendence counter-factually but follows up with a hint of a

non-counter-factual account in terms of our making various

things or causing them to exist. “If people had never existed,

then physical things like baseballs, skyscrapers, and lamps

would never have existed, since we make these things. Such

manufactured realties are causally dependent on us, since we

caused them to exist” (Page, 2006: p. 323). Despite the fact that

baseballs and skyscrapers are causally dependent on us, Page

notes that they are plausibly taken to be ontologically inde-

pendent of us. Whatever our hand in generating these objects,

we do not appear to sustain them in any relevant sense (Though

of course we are capable of destroying them). This highlights

the fact that what is crucial to the concept of ontological de-

pendence is not that ontologically dependent objects are gener-

ated by us—this they share in common with causally dependent

objects. Rather, aspects of the world that are ontologically de-

pendent on us are, presumably unlike baseballs and skyscrapers,

inherently dependent on our existence and activities as crea-

tures with minds for their continued existence.

5Whether or not the rainbow itself is generated by and depends for its con-

tinued existence upon minds depends on whether we take rainbows to be

inherently striped objects. If we do, the rainbow itself is ontologically de-

pendent. If we take the inherently bowed structure but not the stripes to be

essential to a rainbow, the rainbow itself is plausibly taken to be ontology-

cally independent. Black and white photographs are able to capture the

illuminated arc of a rainbow (though not the stripes) and presumably would

continue to do so if humans suddenly ceased to exist.

6This is analogous to Page’s claim about social realities. Claiming that social

realities are generated and sustained by our social practices “is not to say

that the physical things that get counted as money and national borders, for

instance, would go out of existence if all people did, but just that those

physical things would no longer count as money or national borders” (Page,

2006: p. 322).

Since it is not incoherent to suppose that objects such as

baseballs, while causally dependent on us, are ontologically

independent of us, it seems clear that causal dependence does

not entail ontological dependence. But what of the converse?

Page himself claims that “[i]t is presumably the case that all

things that are causally independent of us are ontologically

independent as well” (Page, 2006: p. 323). But of course, for

this claim to hold, its contrapositive must also hold: all things

D. C. SMITH

that are ontologically dependent on us are causally dependent

on us. Whether or not that is the case depends on how broadly

we construe causal dependence.

While even a minimally adequate exploration of the notion

of causality is well beyond the scope of this discussion, I think

it is safe to say that causality is generally construed as a relation

between events or types of events. In what follows, I will

largely remain neutral concerning what sort of relation between

events constitutes a causal relation. I will instead explore dif-

ferent ways of construing causal dependence that differ with

respect to what kinds of events are taken to be possible relata of

the causal relation. The paradigm instances of causal relata are

purely physical events: events involving only physical realities.

Here I want to construe “physical reality” fairly broadly to in-

clude both the realities postulated by our best scientific theories

(such as electrons and quarks, but also molecules, proteins,

chromosomes, etc.), as well as macro-physical objects (such as

mountains, stars, baseballs, and skyscrapers) recognized by

commonsense.

One way of construing the notion of causation is to hold that

physical events exhaust the field of the causal relation. On such

a view, mental events are able to stand in causal relations (ei-

ther as cause or effect) only if mental events are a subset of

physical events. On this construal of causation, if mental events

are not physical events, there is no sense of “mind-dependence”

that genuinely involves causation. However, we have already

seen that ontological dependence is a significant sense of

“mind-dependence”. So, if physical events exhaust the field of

the causal relation and mental events are not a subset of the

physical events, then it follows (contra Page) that ontological

dependence does not entail causal dependence. In the discus-

sion that follows, I will consider the case in which mental

events do constitute a (proper) subset of the physical events.

It is worth noting at this point that not every event that is

physically caused in whole or in part by us is caused by us qua

creatures with minds. The examples of causally dependent ob-

jects cited by Page (baseballs, skyscrapers, lamps) are impor-

tantly all e xamples of artifacts. Artifac ts are intentionally ma de

by us to serve some sort of purpose. Having intentions and

purposes are clearly things we do qua creatures with minds.

However, artifacts are only a proper subset of the things created

by us. As I walk outside on a sunny day, I cause a shadow to be

formed. As I live over time in my home, I create numerous dust

bunnies. But shadows and dust bunnies are not things that I

intentionally cause (indeed, I would prefer not to cause dust

bunnies). A creature otherwise like me but without a mind

would still cast shadows and cause dust bunnies as it moved

about its environment. These items would not seem to be

mind-dependent in any significant way.7

If causal dependence is to be taken as a species of mind-de-

pendence, then the notion of causal-dependence should not be

so broadly construed so as to include shadows and dust bunnies

as causally dependent realities. Were (purely physical) causal

dependence to be the sort of mind-dependence at issue in the

metaphysical realism/antirealism debate, it would follow (ab-

surdly) that the existence of dust bunnies constitutes a sufficient

reason for denying metaphysical antirealism. I submit that this

result gives us reason to agree with Page that causal depend-

ence construed in terms of purely physical causation is not

germane to the metaphysical debate (This result is not surprise-

ing. I am aware of no metaphysical antirealist who is inclined to

claim that the world and all of its structure is made by us in the

way we make baseballs or other artifacts). Given that ontology-

cal dependence is plausibly thought to be germane to the meta-

physical debate, we once again have reason to disagree with

Page that ontological dependence entails causal dependence.

But perhaps there is a role for causal dependence to play in

the debate between metaphysical realists and antirealists if we

construe causal dependence in such a way that the causal relata

are not explicitly limited to physical realities and explicitly

deny that mental events (at least the ones involved in causal

dependence) are a species of physical event. The problem that

we face in this case is that, divorced from the purely physical

setting at which it is most at home, the notion of causation and

with it the distinction between causal dependence and the other

varieties of mind-dependence identified by Page becomes quite

murky.

Structural Dependence and the Debate between

Metaphysical Realism and Antirealism

A third sense of “mind-independence” identified by Page is

what he calls “structural independence”.

Something is structurally independent of us if it has a struc-

ture independent of how we say it is structured. Mountains are

structured independent of us, since they would have many of

the physical features and characteristics they do had we never

existed (Page, 2006: p. 325).

At first blush, it might seem as if Page would want to cite

objects that are causally dependent on us as examples of objects

that are structurally dependent. After all, baseballs would not

have had the physical features and characteristics that they do

had we never existed. Further, the structure of a baseball very

much depends on how those who make up the rules of baseball

say a baseball is to be structured. However, once created, base-

balls (like mountains) have a structure that is quite independent

of what we believe or say about how they are structured. In-

stead, Page states that “Something would be structurally de-

pendent on us if it were totally amorphous and we (somehow)

imposed all structure onto it” (Page, 2006: p. 325).

Initially, Page cites clouds as possible examples of items that

are structurally dependent since they are somewhat amorphous

and it is we who see familiar shapes and patterns in them (Page,

2006: pp. 325-326). However, he is quick to point out that

clouds are not really good examples of structurally dependent

objects since they do have an independent structure.

7It is also worth noting that not ever y object we cause t o exist qu a creatures

with minds is properly thought of as an artifact. While money, time zones,

and other social realities may well be something that we intentionally create

to serve a purpose, I am somewhat disinclined to call them artifacts.

Moreover, the stripes of a rainbow are not (generally) created intentionally

by us to serve any purpose. We simply find ourselves perceiving the stripes

of a rain bow at cert ain times i n cer tai n l ocat io ns at leas t p rima f aci e in much

the same way we find ourselves perceiving mountains and rocks.While

there is some sense in which we cause the stripes of a rainbow to exist (our

erceptual apparatuses are a significant part of the causal explanation), the

rainbow’s stri

es are clearl

not artifacts.

Clouds, for instance, are comprised of certain molecules and

have properties independent of what we think and say about

them. It is likely that there are no natural realities that are com-

pletely structurally dependent on us… (Page, 2006: p. 326).

To be genuinely structurally dependent, an object would

have to be totally amorphous so to speak all the way down so

that it was we who imposed any and all structure on the object.

Structural dependence is the sort of mind-dependence I had

D. C. SMITH

in mind when formulating thesis b) of metaphysical realism:

that the world has some structure(s) this is(are) mind-inde-

pendent (Smith, 1999: p. 411). Given that I took metaphysical

realism to be the conjunction of two theses, any view that de-

nied thesis b) alone would count as a version of metaphysical

antirealism. However, as I noted in “Metaphysical Antirealism

and Objective Truth” (Smith, 1999: p. 414), it is far from clear

that the notion that something could have independent onto-

logical status but be totally amorphous is even coherent. Page

himself notes that even if reality were “at base a fluid, undif-

ferentiated continuum,” it would still be structurally independ-

ent of us (Page, 2006: p. 328). It seems far more probable that,

if anything is structurally dependent on us, that is due to the

fact that it is ontologically dependent on us.

The example of a rainbow’s stripes is again instructive here.

A rainbow has a definite stripy structure that is imposed on

reality by our perceptual mechanisms. However, it isn’t as if the

rainbow exists with a totally amorphous structure prior to our

imposition of stripes onto it. Rather, our perceptual mecha-

nisms interacting with an external portion of the world that

presumably has independent structure give rise to the stripes of

the rainbow. I believe that similar things could be said about the

structure of time zones, money, and other social realities that

are ontologically dependent on us. This suggests that structural

dependence entails ontological dependence. Since it is difficult

to see how something could have any independent structure at

all were it to lack independent ontological status, I would sug-

gest that something is structurally dependant if and only if it is

ontologically dependent.

In rejecting structural dependence as relevant to the meta-

physical realism/antirealism debate, Page does not seem to

consider the possibility that it might stand or fall with onto-

logical dependence.8 He seems only to consider the possibility

that there would be some aspect of reality that has independent

ontological status but which is amorphous and onto which we

impose all structure. Whether or not structural dependence (and

with it ontological dependence) is germane to the metaphysical

debate will depend heavily on its relation to the type of mind-

independence Page does take to be relevant: individuative de-

pendence.

Individuative Dependence and the Debate

between Metaphysical Realism and Antirealism

The final sense of “mind-independence” described by Page

(and, according to him, the most relevant to the contemporary

realism/antirealism debate) is individuative independence. “To

say that the natural world is individuatively independent of us

is to say that it is divided up into individual things and kinds of

things that are circumscribed by boundaries that are totally

independent of where we draw the lines” (Page, 2006: p. 327).

While the question of whether or not there are real kinds inde-

pendent of us is the heart of the historical debate between sortal

realists and nominalists, it is (or so it seems to me) of dubious

relevance to the contemporary debates between metaphysical

realists and antirealists. As such, I will focus exclusively on the

element of individuative dependence/independence that in-

volves the individuation of the world into discrete things. As

examples of objects that are plausibly taken to be indivi-

duatively independent of us, Page cites the moon, individual

apples, grizzly bears, and pearls. As prime examples of things

that are individuatively dependent on us, Page cites individual

constellations.

We individuate the night sky into constellations. We, or more

specifically our ancestors, determined which stars comprise

which constellations. We can come up with new constellations

whenever we like simply by pointing out a few stars and giving

the cluster a name. Furthermore, the boundary between a con-

stellation and its surroundings is very much a function of where

we draw the lines (or more aptly, how we connect the dots)

(Page, 2006: p. 328).

While reality may be divided up into individual heavenly

bodies independently of us, it is we who select certain stars and

not others as belonging to a given constellation. We could chop

up the visible objects in the night sky into constellations in any

number of ways. No one of these divisions into constellations

would better carve reality at its joints than any other.

It is worth noting that what goes for constellations also goes

for national borders, time zones, and many (though perhaps not

all) other social realities. There are facts about the existence

and structure of the continental land mass of North America

that are (plausibly) independent of us. Given our various inter-

ests in having nations and keeping time, we chop up the land

mass into individual nations and individual time zones. We

could have chopped up the land mass into nations and time

zones in any number of ways. Some might have been more or

less convenient. Some might have made strategic use of natural

features (such as mountains or rivers). But to a great extent,

none of them would better reflect any true national or time-zone

like joints in any reality that is independent of us. I would sub-

mit that constellations, like nations and time zones, are among

the social realities that are ontologically dependent on us. If

humans were to wink out of existence, the heavenly bodies

would still be arranged in the sky in a certain fashion, but con-

stellations would cease to exist.

Interestingly, Page is inclined to take rainbows (or at least

their stripes) to be further examples of things that are indi-

viduatively dependent on us. “Though it may appear that there

is a finite number of colour stripes in a rainbow, in reality a

rainbow is a smooth spectrum that can be divided into as many

stripes as we like” (Page, 2006: p. 328). Whether or not there is

a sense in which rainbows or their stripes are individuatively

dependent on us, I think it is a mistake to suggest that the

stripes of a rainbow are individuatively dependent on us in the

way in which constellations are. In the case of constellations,

we perceive an arrangement of heavenly bodies in the sky and

then group these heavenly bodies in various ways thereby indi-

viduating constellations. This is not what is going on in the

individuation of the stripes of a rainbow. Whether or not it is

true to say that “in reality a rainbow is a smooth spectrum”, it is

certainly not the case that we consciously perceive rainbows as

a smooth spectrum and only then chop them into stripes. We

consciously perceive the rainbow and its stripes simultaneously.

Unlike the case of the night sky and constellations, we are not

free to chop up the rainbow into stripes in any number of ways.

Instead, our perceptual mechanisms do the chopping prior to

the conscious experience of the rainbow. If the stripes in a

rainbow are examples of individuatively dependent objects,

they depend for their individuation on us in a very different

way than do constellations, time zones, or national borders. In

8Though to be sure he does suggest, contrary to what I want to maintain, that

ontological dependence is not relevant to the contemporary metaphysical

realism debate when he notes that few if any contemporary philosophers

would be willing to accept radical idealism. (See Page, 2006: p. 323).

D. C. SMITH

fact, the distinction between the way in which the stripes of a

rainbow are individuated by us and the ways in which constel-

lations, time zones, and national borders are individuated by us

perfectly parallels the distinction noted above between these

objects taken as ont o l o g ic a l ly dependent.

It is difficult to imagine how something could, quite inde-

pendent of us, be an individual thing when it depends on us for

its ontological status. The very idea of something individuatively

independent but ontologically dependent would seem to be

incoherent. I would submit that individuative independence

entails ontological independence. But what about the reverse?

Despite the variety of ways in which an object can be indi-

viduatively dependent on us, the plausible examples of indi-

viduatively dependent objects have all turned out to be onto-

logically dependent on us (though in different ways). It is thus

tempting to conclude that individuative dependence entails

ontological dependence. If this is correct, the set of objects that

are individuatively dependent is coextensive with the set of

objects that are ontologically dependent (and hence with the set

of objects that are structurally dependent). It would appear that

Page has too hastily dismissed the notions of ontological and

structural dependence as irrelevant to the metaphysical real-

ism/antirealism deba te.

But what are we to make of Page’s explicit denial that indi-

viduative dependence entails structural dependence (Page, 2006:

p. 332)?

If something is individuatively dependent on us, it does not

follow that it is structurally dependent on us as well. Moun-

tain peaks, for example, are individuatively dependent on us,

since the number of peaks in a given mountain range depends

on how “peak” is defined. …Of course, it would be absurd to

think that the peaks are also structurally dependent on us, that

we somehow structure the peaks through some mysterious cog-

nitive faculty (Page, 2006: pp. 332-333).9

The answer lies in noting an important ambiguity in the no-

tion of individuation. On one sense of “individuation”, indi-

viduation is a metaphysical/ontological notion. Something is

individuated in this sense if it exists or otherwise has ontology-

cal status as an individual (This is the sense in which I have

been using “individuation” above in arguing that ontological

dependence and individuative dependence are coextensive no-

tions). Let us call this sense “metaphysical individuation”. On

another sense of “individuation”, individuation is an epistemic

and/or linguistic notion. Something is individuated in this sense

if it is singled out for reference by having a singular term or

definite description applied to it. Let us call this sense “linguis-

tic individuation”.

As I want to use the term, “linguistic individuation” is a suc-

cess term. Nothing can be linguistically individuated if there is

no object that is metaphysically individuated (whether depen-

dently on or independently of us) to serve as the referent of the

term or definite description (I make no presumption that any

definite description used to linguistically individuate an object

accurately describes the object. It is sufficient that the descrip-

tion allows for successful reference to the object). While lin-

guistic individuation entails metaphysical individuation, the

reverse is not the case. No doubt, there are many objects that

are metaphysically individuated that have not been and likely

never will be linguistically individuated by us. Plausible exam-

ples include individual rocks on the far side of the moon, most

individual examples of extinct species, most individual hydro-

gen molecules, and the individual sub-portions of the surface of

the Earth that might have been but were not in fact picked out

as time zones.

With the distinction between metaphysical individuation and

linguistic individuation in mind, let us return to Page’s example

of mountain peaks. Consider a portion of a mountain range that

includes a summit and surrounding saddles such that the sum-

mit rises 150 feet above its highest surrounding saddle. Call this

portion “Mt. X”. Let us first suppose that Page’s claim is

merely that Mt. X can have an independent structure while

being dependent on us for its being accurately linguistically

individuated as a peak. I would submit that this is not a claim

that has any bearing on the debate between metaphysical real-

ists and antirealists. Of course it is true that whether or not “be-

ing an individual peak” can accurately be predicated of Mt. X

depends on our linguistic conventions (as does its being called

“Mt. X”). Whether or not Mt. X is a peak depends upon how

we define ‘peak’. If we require that a peak be 200 feet higher

than any saddle surrounding it, then Mt. X is not a peak. If we

allow any summit that is 100 feet or higher than any saddle

surrounding it to count as a peak, then Mt. X is a peak. I would

be surprised if any philosopher had ever wanted to claim that

whether or not a linguistic item is accurately predicated of an

individual is something that is independent of us and our use of

language. In any case, this is certainly not something that the

metaphysical realist must ma i ntain.

However, the question of whether or not “peak” is accurately

predicated of Mt. X is a distinct question from whether its

metaphysical individuation is in any way dependent on us. If

we suppose (as is plausible) that Mt. X is not dependent on us

for its metaphysical individuation (i.e., that there would have

been a summit in this range rising 150 feet above its highest

surrounding saddle even if humans had never existed), it is

natural to suppose that Mt. X is structurally independent of us.

But this is not a case in which we have a structurally independ-

ent object that is metaphysically individuatively dependent on

us. If we suppose along with the metaphysical antirealist that

Mt. X is dependent on us for its metaphysical individuation,

then, barring an account of how an object can have any struc-

ture at all if it lacks ontological status, it is not plausible to

agree with Page that its structure is independent of us. I would

submit that metaphysical individuative dependence, which is

the sort of individuative dependence germane to the meta-

physical realism/antirealism debate, stands or falls with struc-

tural dependence.

Conclusion

In summary, there is reason to believe that ontological de-

pendence, structural dependence, and the only sort of indi-

viduative dependence that is relevant to the metaphysical de-

bate are all coextensive notions. As such, any argument that

succeeds in establishing that it is incoherent to suppose that

everything is ontologically and/or structurally dependent th ereb y

establishes the incoherence of metaphysical antirealism. To

resist this conclusion the metaphysical antirealist has limited

9It is worth noting that a similar claim could be made about the structure o

time zones, which are plausibly taken to be ontologically dependent on us.

The number of time zones depends upon how we chopped the surface of the

Earth int o ti me zones . Howev er, on ce th e surf ace of t he Ea rth i s chop ped u p

into ti me zones, we can con sider the st ructur e of the p art that co nsti tutes th e

Pacific time zone. This portion of the surface of the earth would seem to

have at least most of its structure (if not its defining borders) quite inde-

pendent of us. I believe that what I have to say in response to Page’s exam-

ple of mountain peaks will apply mutatis mutandis to time zones.

D. C. SMITH

options: 1) provide an account of how one and the same thing

could be dependent on us for its ontological status as an indi-

vidual without being dependent on us more generally for its

ontological status (thereby rejecting the entailment between

metaphysical individuative dependence and ontological de-

pendence), 2) provide an account of how one and the same

thing could be dependent on us for its ontological status as an

individual without being dependent on us for its structure

(thereby rejecting the entailment between metaphysical indi-

viduative dependence and structural dependence), or 3) tackle

the arguments that appear to establish the incoherence of global

ontological or global structural dependence head on. In any

case, it would appear that the metaphysical antirealist has a

significant explanatory burden to meet if he is to defend the

viability of his view.

REFERENCES

Page, S. (2006). Mind-independence disambiguated: Separating the

meat from the straw in the realism/anti-realism debate. Ratio, 19,

321-335. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9329.2006.00330.x

Smith, D. C. (1999). Metaphysical antirealism and objective truth: Is

metaphysical antirealism self-refuting? The Southern Journal of Phi-

losophy, 37, 293-313. doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.1999.tb00869.x